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"Everything has its turn in this chequered scene of things, 
unless we prevent it from taking its turn by over-rigid 
conditions, or drive men to despair or the most callous 
effrontery, by erecting a standard of perfection, to which 
no one can conform in reality!" 
--William Hazlitt 
"On Cant and Hypocrisy" 
(1828) 
--
CHAPTER I 
FOUNDATIONS: THE ESSAY AND IMAGINATION 
"Till I began to paint, or till I 
became acquainted with the author 
of The Ancient Mariner, .I could 
neither write nor speak. He encouraged 
me to write a book, which I did to 
the original bent of my mind. 11 
(1828: xvii, 312} 1 
Hazlitt's An Essay on the Princieles of Human Action,· 
published anonymously in 1805, is important in that, first, 
it marks the beginning of the writing career of one of the 
greatest English essayists of the nineteenth century; and, 
second, it sheds revealing light upon the whole subsequent 
course and content of that career. 
Although largely ignored by contemporari~s,2 the 
thoughts expressed in the Essay remained ·with Hazlitt for 
the rest of his life; he restated his same argument in pub-
lished works in 1819 and again in 1828. And looking back 
lAll references are to P.P. Howe's Centenary Edition 
of Hazlitt's Complete Works (21 vols.; London: J.M. Dent 
and Sons, Ltd., 1930-1934}. 
2Keats was an exception--he owned a copy of the Essay 
(cf. The Keats Circle, ed. by H.E. Rollins [2nd edn., 2 vols.; 
1 
2 
at his first book from a vantage point of twenty-three years 
later, he could still write of it with pride: "Yet, let me 
say that that work contains an important metaphysical dis-
covery, supported by a continuous and severe train of reason-
ing, nearly as subtle and original as anything in Hume or 
Berkeley" (xvii, 312). 
The purpose of the Essay is indicated by its subhead-
ing, "Being an Argument in favour of the Natural Disinterest-
edness of the Human Mind." It was conceived as a philosophi-
cal refutation of key doctrines of what Hazlitt later called 
"the modern school of philosophy." Among the sins of this 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1965], 
I, 254}, and his reading of it firmly impressed upon him 
Hazlitt's ideas of "disinterestedness" (cf. W.J. Bate's 
John Keats [Cambridge,- Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 1963], 202, 216, 240, 254-259, 586). 
Coleridge had various connections with the book. 
After initially encouraging the young Hazlitt to wri.te it (xi, 
4; xvii, 312} he remained silent when a copy was sent to him 
at the Lakes (Lamb records the delivery; cf. Lucas's edition 
of his Letters [3 vols.; London: J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd. & 
Methuen & co. Ltd., 1935], I, 420). Only years later did he 
acknowledge that it demonstrated "great ability and original-
ity" (cf. On the constitution of Church and State ••. Lay 
Sermons ••• [Henry Nelson Coleridge, ed.; London: William 
Pickering, 1839], 380n; see also xi, 3, in Hazlitt's Works: 
"Even Mr. Coleridge held his piece for twelve years, and then 
put it into a note to his Second Lay-Sermon, that this was a 
work of great acuteness and originality"). Note, though, that 
Hazlitt received this belated praise very bitterly (xi, 4). 
Herschel Baker, in William Hazlitt (Cambridge, Massa-
chusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1962), 
asserts that, according to DeQuincey, Coleridge claimed to 
--
3 
school of thought, based largely on Hobbes, 3 were its asser-
tions that "all our ideas are derived from external objects 
by means of sense alone''; that "the sense of pleasure and 
pain is the sole spring of action, and self-interest the 
source of all our affections"; and that "the mind acts from 
a mechanical or physical necessity, over which it has no con-
troul, and consequently is ·not a moral or accountable agent" 
(ii, 144-145). Such assertions eroded the philosophical base 
have suggested everything "important" in the book {p. 141). 
I think that this should be clarified, especially in regard 
to the first reference that Baker offers in his footnote. 
DeQuincey wrote: 
"Amongst the philosophical works of Hazlitt, I do not ob-
serve that Mr. Gilfillan is aware of two that are likely 
to be specially interesting. One is an examination of 
David Hartley, at least as to his law of association. 
Thirty years ago, I looked into it slightly; but my rev-
erence for Hartley offended me with its tone; and after-
wards, hearing that Coleridge challenged for his own most 
of what was important in the thoughts, I lost all inter-
est in the essay •••• It forms part of the volume which 
contains the Essay .2.!! Human Action." 
(Cf. DeQuincey's Collected Writings [14 vols.; Edinburgh: 
Adam and.Charles Black, 1889-1890), XI, 351f.) Coleridge 
was obviously referring, here, to Some Remarks .2.!! the Systems 
of Hartley and Helvetius, which was appended to the Essay in 
the 1805 volume, and not to the Essay itself. DeQuincey does 
say elsewhere, however, that Coleridge "used to assert" that 
the Essay itself was "derived entirely" from him (III, 82). 
But here DeQuincey may be confusing the Essay with the ap-
pended Remarks, especially since Coleridge did indeed else-
where refer to the Essay as a work of "originality." 
3
see W.P. Albrecht's Hazlitt and the Creative Imagin-
ation (Lawrence: The University of Kansas Press, 1965), 
1-21, for a review of this tradition. 
---
4 
'for the existence of morai action; it was to restore this 
base that Hazlitt derived his argument. 
The key points of his reasoning are: 
1) That the human mind is not motivated by present physi-
cal objects at all; rather, it is motivated only by ideas 
of future objects: 
The objects in which the mind is interested may be 
either past or present, or future. These last alone 
can be the objects of rational or voluntary pursuit; 
for neither the past, nor the present can be altered 
for the better, or worse by any efforts of the will. 
It is only from the interest excited in him by future 
objects that man becomes a moral agent . • • • 
(i I 1) 
All voluntary action, that is all action proceeding 
from a will, or effort of the mind to produce a cer-
tain event .must relate to the future, or to those 
things, the existence of which is problematical, [and] 
undetermined . • • • We are never interested in things 
themselves which are the real, ultimate, practical ob-
jects of volition: the feelings of desire, aversion, 
&c. connected with voluntary action are always excited 
by the ideas of those -things before they exist. 
(i. 8) 
2) That the imagination is the means by which these 
future objects act upon the mind: 
The imagination, by means of which alone I can antici-
pate future objects, or be interested in them, must 
carry me out of myself • • • 
(i, 1) 
But that which is future, which does not yet exist 
can excite no interest in itself, nor act upon the 
mind in any way but by means of the imagination. 
(i I 8) 
5 
3) That "self is a concept which can be thought of 
only in relation to one's past and present being, 
not to one's future being: 
However nearly allied, however similar I may be 
to my future self, whatever other relation I may 
bear to that self, so long as there is not this 
intercommunity of thoughts and feelings, so long 
as there is an absolute separation, an insur-
mountable barrier fixed between the present, and 
the future, so that I neither am, nor can possibly 
be affected at present by what I am to feel here-
after, I am not to any moral or practical purpose 
the same being. 
( i I 10-11) 
I saw plainly that the consciousness of my own 
feelings which is made the foun<;lation of my con"-
tinued interest in them could not extend to what 
had never been, and might never be, that my. iden-
tity with myself must be confined to the connec-
tion of my past and present being,. •.. 
(i I 4 7) 
4) That f.uttire objects cannot mechanically interest 
one's pres~nt self: 
The question is whether •.• [a child's] future 
impressions affect him as much ahd impel him to 
action with the same mechanical force as if they 
were actually present. This is so far from being 
true that his future impressions do not exert the 
smallest influence over his actions, they do not 
affect him mechanically in any degree. 
( i I 30) 
It is absurd to suppose that the feelings which I 
am to have hereafter should excite certain corre-
spondent impressions, or presentiments of them-
selves before they exist, or act mechanically upon 
my mind by a secret sympathy. 
(i, 39) 
6 
5) That, therefore, all contemplation of future 
objects is done selflessly; and that, since one is 
motivated only by contemplation of future objects, 
one is therefore motivated selflessly (i.e., without 
self-interest): 
It is plain • • . that there is no communication 
between my future interests, and the motives by 
which my present conduct must be governed. . . • 
I cannot therefore have a principle of active 
self-interest arising out of the immediate connec-
tion between my present and future self, for no 
such connection exists, or is possible. 
(i' 48) 
With this argument Hazlitt believed that he had 
pulled down the key pillars of the Hobbesian school of · 
ethics; he thought that, since he had proven the act of 
choice to be not necessarily selfish, the possibility of 
free moral decision was thus demonstrated to exist. In 
his words, "we are not obliged at last to establish gen-
erosity and virtue 'lean pensioners' on self-interest" 
{i, 17). 
The keystone in the structure of his argument is 
his concept of the imagination. An appreciation of the 
role played by this faculty is esse~tial not only to com-
prehend the complexities of the Essay itself, but also to 
grasp the essential elements of Hazlitt's thought through-
7 
out his later writings. It is helpful, first, to see the 
imagination as contrasted to the understanding. Since the 
essayist used these terms throughout his career, and since 
we shall be concerned with that whole career, I believe that 
an examination of his usual distinction of these faculties 
will be useful. 
The understanding is "a superintending faculty, which 
alone perceives the relations of things, and enables us to 
comp::r:_ehend their connexions, forms, and masses" (ii, 151; 
xx, 25). It is the power of arranging .and combining the data 
6f sense-perception into unified ideas. 4 .Ih 1812 Hazlitt re-
fers to the understanding as "the cementing power of the mind" 
(ii, 280). And in 1814 he cites for an example the process 
of forming an idea of a table, a chair, a blade of grass, or 
a grain of sand! 
Every one -of these includ~s a certain configuration, 
hardness, colour, size, &c., i.e., impressions of dif-
ferent things, received by different senses, which must 
be put together by the understanding bef6re they c~n be 
referred to any particular object, or considered as one 
idea. 
(xx, 25) 
Earlier in this same work ("Madame de Stael's Account of 
German Philosophy") he says: 
4Much like the familiar "complex ideas" of Locke. 
Cf. his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, II, xii. 
8 
The only power of the sensitive faculty is to receive 
blind, unconscious, unconnected impressions; the only 
category of the understanding is to perceive the rela-
tions between these impressions, so as to connect them 
consciously together, or to form ideas. 
(xx, 20n) 
The mind is naturally constituted to automatically combine 
the data of the senses, to automatically mould it into 
wholes. Thus, in 1829, Hazl.itt writes that "the mould in 
which truth must be cast ••. is born with us"; and that 
-"Truth is, in a word, the shape which our·ideas take in the 
moulds of the und~rstanding~ just as the potter's clay de-
rives its figure (whether round or square) from the mould in 
which· it is cast" (xx, 228). 
Whereas the understanding arranges and combines phys-
ical impressions, the imagination, on a higher level, deals 
with moral values; the important difference is the ethical 
quality of imaginative ideas. "The direct primary motive, or 
impulse which determines the mind to the volition of any 
thing must therefore in all cases depend on the idea of that 
thing as conceived of by the imagination" (i, 8). It is 
through the imagination that the will is motivated--i.e., the 
will acts in accordance with the values presented to it by 
the imagination: 
[My real interestJ is fundamentally, and in it's origin 
and by it's very nature the creature of reflection, and 
9 
imagination, and whatever can be made the subject of 
these, whether relating to ourselves or others, may 
also be the object of an interest powerful enough to 
become the motive of volition and action. 
(i, 11) 
In 1819, in A Letter to William Gifford, Hazlitt states that 
it is the same faculty [a reasoning imagination] that 
carries us out of ourselves as well as beyond the pre-
sent moment, that pictures the thoughts, passions, and 
feelings of others to us, and interests us in them, that 
clothes the whole possible world with a borrowed real-
ity, that breathes into all other forms the breath of 
life, and endows our sympathies with vital warmth, and 
diffuses the soul of morality throu~h all the relations 
and sentiments of our social being. 
(ix, 58) 
The distinctive moral aspect of imaginative perception is 
again stressed in 1825:· 
What the proportion between the good and evil will really 
be found in any of the supposed cases Ce.g., wars, atroci-
ties, fires, murders], may be a question to_ the under-
standing; but to the imagination and the heart, that is, 
to the natural feelings of mankind, it admits of none! 
(xi I 11) 
And the connection of imagination and morality is.asserted 
again in 1827: 
Indignation, contempt of the base and grovelling, makes 
the philosopher no less than the poet; and it is the 
power of looking beyond self [i.e., imagination) that 
enables each to inculcate moral truth and nobleness of 
sentiment, the one by general concepts, the other by 
individual example. 
(xvii, 297) 
5My italics, here as elsewhere throughout the dis-
sertation. 
-10 
This distinction between the imagination and the 
understanding is one that Hazlitt usually abides by. How-
ever, it must be pointed out that he is frequently incon-
sistent or imprecise in his use of these (and other) terms. 
6 
For example, he may equate understanding with reason at 
one time (ii, 166), and with ideas at another (xx, 24), and 
with free will itself at still another (xx, 61). More im-
portant, he may occasionally confuse the understanding with 
the imagination, as he does at one point in "On Liberty and 
Necessity" in 1812: "The l::>ody is said to be free when it 
has the power to obey the direction of the will: so the 
will may be said to be free when it has the power to obey 
the dictates of the understanding (i.e. , the imagination] 11 
·(ii, 255). The reality of this imprecision or carelessness 
cannot be ignored by Hazlitt. scholars,. nor has it been; 7 
6Reason, for Hazlitt, is a systematic analytical 
power. Ashe says in "On Locke's Essay": 
"This property of the understanding, by which certain 
judgments naturally follow certain perceptions, and are 
followed by other judgments, is the faculty of reason, 
or order and proportion in the mind, and is indeed noth-
ing but the understanding acting by rule or necessity." 
( 1812: i'i, 166) 
In the Essay on the Principles of Human Action itself he says 
that reason is "the faculty by which we reflect upon and com-
pare our ideas" (i, 19n). See John ·Bullitt, "Hazlitt and the 
Romantic Conception o.f the Imagination," Philological Quarter-
1.Y, XXIV ( 1945) , p. 344. 
7 Elisabeth Schneider, for example, notes the matter 
11 
my own response to the problem is to take with a grain 
of salt any of Hazlitt's individual statements on topics 
which are of habitual interest to him, for any one state-
ment can often be directly contradicted by another some-
where else in the voluminous writings. I think that it is 
safer to follow patterns of ideas--when a pattern of similar 
statements is found throughout the Hazlitt canon, one may 
feel justified in placing emphasis on ah individual instance 
of it. If a statement is not verified by belonging to the 
context of a consistent pattern of like statements; one must 
feel less safe with it in dealing with this particular writ-
er. I am therefore especially concerned myself with delin-
·eating.the patterns of the essayist's thought, the· repeated 
manifestations of similar ideas.throughout his writings. 
Again, for example, I think that the present distinction be-
tween his 'ideas on the understanding and the imagination is 
generally valid--it is not without pitfalls and exceptions; 
but, on the whole, most of the revelant writings conform to 
this pattern. 
of imprecise diction in 
Hazlitt ·(Philadelp~ia: 
1933), p. 99. 
her study The Aesthetics of William 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 
-12 
Once it is understood that moral values are connect-
ed with imagination in Hazlitt's philosophy, it must also be 
seen that Hazlitt's ideas on the precise nature of this con-
nection fall into two additional and opposite patterns. Ap-
parently he did not recognize (or, perhaps, wish to recog-
nize) the inconsistency which exists in the Essay; what is 
important to realize, though, is that his later writings on 
the imagination, and therefore on values in human life in 
general, proceed in two opposite directions, each following 
closely one side of the inconsistency first noticeable in 
the Essay. 
The last sentence of the Essay refers to "the imag--
ination, which is naturally affe~ted in a certain manner by 
the prospect of good or evil"; it is the ''certain manner" 
in which imagination is linked with good or evil (i.e., 
moral values) which creates the problem of the argument. On 
the whole, Hazlitt wishes to prove that the imagination ~-
ceives good or evil in ideas of objects, and that the good 
or evil perceived is independent of the mind, and of self-
interest. But he leaves a loophole open which allows for 
the possibility that the imagination can also create values 
- . 
in the ideas it forms; that values come not from mental 
objects seen by the imagination, but, on the contrary, come 
p 
13 
from the mind of the individual himself and are invested 
in such objects rather than received from them. 
A closer look at Hazlitt's argument is necessary 
here. The case that he wishes to prove is that the mind 
perceives good or evil which exists, he says, in ideas of 
objects, and which does not exist beforehand in the person 
who creates those ideas of objects. First of all, he has 
this to say about the value properties of objects them-
selves- (rather than the value properties of ideas of those 
objects): 
It is plain there must be something in the nature of 
objects themselves which of itself-determines the mind 
to consider them as desirable or the contrary previous-
ly to any reference of them to ourselves. They are not 
converted into good or evil·by being impressed on our 
minds, but they affect our minds in a certain manner 
because they are essentially good or evil. 
(i I 18) 
Feelings of pleasure or pain are entirely coordinate with 
the good or evil which exists in external objects; to speak 
·of p-leasure or pain is thus to refer to inherent propert_ies 
of external objects, not to peculiar receptive properties of 
individual minds: 
I think that • . • the idea of personal pleasure or 
pain can only affect the mind as a distinct idea of 
that which is in itself the object of desire, or aversion. 
(i, 5) 
14 
The subtle transition that Hazlitt makes in his argument is 
that ideas of objects have exactly the same inherent proper·-
ties that the objects themselves have; the ~ essential 
properties to create pleasure or pain reside in both objects 
themselves and in imaginative ideas of those objects. This 
is apparent in a reply the essayist makes to a possible ob-
jection: 
This notion [to suppose that the imagination does not 
exert a direct influence over human action] could not 
have gained ground as an article of philosophical faith 
but from a perverse restriction of the use of the word 
idea to abstract ideas, or external forms, A§. if the ~­
sential quality in the feelings of pleasure, or pain, 
must entirely evaporate in passing through the imagina-
tion; and, again, from associating the work imagination 
with merely fictitious situations and events, that is, 
such as never will have a real existence, and as it is 
supposed never will, and which consequently do not admit 
of action. 
(i, 23) 
It is thus denied that the imagination represents only ex-
ternal forms of objects; Hazlitt's contention (here, at 
least) is that it also represents the essential properties 
of objects. Imaginative ideas, he continues, are not mere 
powerless fictions; they have all the motivating force of 
actual objects, the "essential quality" of which does not 
evaporate in passing through the imagination. This point 
is made again in "Some Remarks on the Systems .of Hartley 
and Helvetius," which he published in the same volume with 
the Essay in 1805: 
p 
15 
But it seems to me a much more rational way to suppose 
that [an] idea does not lose it's efficacy by being com-
bined with different circumstances, that it retains the 
same general nature ~ ~ original impression, that it 
therefore gives a new and immediate impulse to the mind, 
and that it's tendency to produce action is not entirely 
owing to the association between the original impression, 
and a particular action, which it mechanically excites 
over again. First, because the connection between the 
impression and action was not accidental but necessary, 
and therefore the connection between the idea and action 
is not to be attributed to association, but to the gen-
eral nature of the human mind EY. which similar effects 
follow from similar causes. 
( i I 80) 
The mind is thus affected by ideas just as it is affected by 
impressions of actual objects. And good and evil, pleasure 
and pain.,--in short, moral values, or those properties which 
motivate choice--reside inherently in objects (and in ideas 
of objects) and are perceived there by the mind. The self, 
in acts of moral choice, is thus affected by forces essen-
tially not of its own creation, for the essences of ideas 
are derived from external objects and not from internal acts 
of imaginative creation. Volue lies in objects themselves, 
and therefore the same value is automatically present in 
ideas of objects: 
This implies that the object, in which I am supposed 
to be interested without being sensible of it, is in 
itself interesting to me, that it is an object in which 
I can and must necessarily be interested, the moment it 
is known to me: • • To go farther than this, and say 
that the mind as the representative of truth is or 
ought to be interested in things ~ they ~ really and 
truly interesting in themselves, without any reference 
p 
16 
to the manner in which they immediately affect the 
individual, is to destroy at once the foundation of 
every principle of selfishness, . ~ • . 
(i, 31) 
In short, the self perceives rather than creates value in 
its own ideas. 
This is a difficult position to hold, and Hazlitt 
occasionally realizes it. For if motivating ideas of future 
objects are entirely divorced from present and past external 
objects (as he insists they are), then this implies either 
of two things: a) that future objects actually exist by them-
selves somewhere, in a kind of Platonic world of their own 
which is not dependent for its existence on creation by a 
human mind; and that imagination simply perceives these inde-
pendently-existing objects in this external world; or, b) 
that future objects are in reality simply ideas which are en-
tirely created by the mind. 8 But if they are the latter, then 
everything about these ideas--including their properties of 
moral value--is created by the self of.the individual. 
8 These ideas themselves, then, would exist in the 
present. This points up a weakness in Hazlitt's argument: 
since the mind is actually dealing with present phantoms 
of future objects, the self--which Hazlitt says does exist 
in the present, though not in the future--cari indeed be con-
nected with these present ideas, and so modify them with 
self-interest. Hazlitt does not seem to be aware of this 
loophole; however, he is aware of another {as I will point 
out in the ensuing discussion), that ideas of future objects 
are created rather than perceived. 
17 
Nowhere does Hazlitt prove, or attempt to prove, 
that future objects exist by themselves, independently of 
the mind. To the contrary, his argument develops along the 
line that imagination creates ideas of future objects. In 
so arguing, however, he realizes that imagination is not 
necessarily bound to accord with the reality of the external 
world: 
It is the very nature of the imagination to change the 
order in which things have been impressed on the senses, 
and to connect the same properties with different objects, 
and different properties.with the same objects; to com-
bine our original impressions in all possible forms, and 
to modify those impressions themselves to 2_ very great 
degree. 
(i, 26) 
But if it is asserted that the imagination can indeed modify 
impressions, then the loop~ole is left open that such a mod--
ifying imagination can, in particular, change the value prop-
erties of objects. And Hazlitt tacitly recognizes this pos-
sibility even as he tries to assert the contrary. For example, 
he denies that the "essential quality" of objects "must en-
tirely evaporate in passing through the imagination." In 
denying only the most extreme case (that such properties must 
entirely evaporate) he implies that at times the essential 
(moral) quality £EI! entirely evaporate. All he is asserting 
in effect, is that an object's inherent properties of value 
do not necessarily vanish in an imaginative representation of 
p 
18 
the object; by implication, though, it is therefore pos-
sible that they can be lost. Again, he objects to those 
who exclusively limit the word "imagination" to an associ-
ation with "merely fictitious" objects (i.e., those with 
no essential tie to external reality}; he does not deny 
that imagination can deal with such "untied" objects--he 
simply argues that it does. not always do so. 
Similarly, he says that "the mind as the repre-
sentative of truth is or ought to be interested in things 
as they are really and truly interesting in themselves." 
The words "or ought to be" are a characteristic weakening 
of the argument; they allow for the possibility that the 
mind need not be interested in things 11 in themselves" with-
out reference to self-interest. 
Hazlitt deals directly with the problem of imagina-
tive objects untied to essential realities in another pas-
sage: 
It does not surely by any means follow because the real~ 
ity of future objects can only be judged of by the mind, 
that therefore it has no power of distinguishing between 
the probable consequences of things, and what can never 
happen; that it is to take every impulse of will or 
fancy for truth; or because future objects cannot act 
upon the mind from without, that therefore our ideas can-
not have any reference to, or properly represent those 
objects, or anything external to the mind, but must con-
sist entirely in the conscious contemplation of them-
selves. 
(i, 28) 
µ 
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I have italicized the words which indicate the extremity of 
the case Hazlitt argues for--he does not deny that the imag-
ination can create objects free from external referents. In-
deed, in this passage he assumes that it in fact does just 
this; his assertion here is simply that it does not always 
have to. Also, the fact that the statement begins with the 
emotionally argumentative word "surely" indicates again that 
Hazlitt cannot logically close the loophole that imagination 
can indeed create objects whose essential value property is 
dependent solely on the self and not on external reality.9 
He is thus occasionally conscious that the mind can 
create values as well as perceive them. And though at times 
he simply admits or assumes this, at other times he presents 
a different, "compromise" solution to the dilemna. For ex-
ample, in considering a starving man's action to obtain food, 
he admits that apparently the man is motivated solely by 
selfish interest. But he explains the situation like this: 
9Roy Cain, in "David Hume and Adam Smith as Sources 
of the Concept of Sympathy in Hazlitt," Paeers on English 
Language and Literature, I, 2 (Spring, 1965), 133-140, argues 
that Hazlitt derives his argument almost entirely from Hurne 
and Smith, and that, therefore, "little claim can be made 
for originality in ethics, metaphysics, or psychology in the 
Essay" (p. 140). However, in leaving open the loophole which 
allows for a dual function of the imagination, and especially 
in fully expanding this loophole in his later writings, 
Hazlitt's work shows a corresponding dual emphasis different 
from the single focus on "sympathy" which so greatly concerned 
his predecessors. 
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the influence of appetite over our volitions may be ac-
counted for consistently enough with the foregoing hy-
pothesis from the natural effects of a particularly ir-
i table state of bodily feeling, rendering the idea of 
that which will heighten and gratify it's susceptibil-
ity of pleasurable feeling, or remove-some painful 
feeling proportionably vivid, and the object of a more 
vehement desire than can be excited by the same idea, 
when the body is supposed to be in a state of indiffer-· 
ence, or only ordinary susceptibility to that particular 
kind of gratification. Thus the imaginary desire is 
sharpened by constantly receiving fresh supplies of 
pungency from the irritation of bodily feeling. 
(i I 44) 
Thus the desirability of, say, food is still an inherent prop-
erty of food itself; a starving man's mind does not create 
value in it. Rather. (according to this passage) his imagina-
tion simply perceives its essential value ~ vividly. 
Seemingly, then, the imagination still functions in an es-
sentially self less manner in some instances when it appar-
ently functions selfishly. But two points must be noted: 
1) since Hazlitt elsewhere admits that the imagination .££!.!! 
10 (. . . h . . 1 . function selfishly i.e., wit out essentia ties to ex-
ternal reality), this argument explains away only some in-
lOI use the word "selfishly" in a particular sense, 
merely as the opposite of "selflessly." I do not mean to 
imply undesirable moral characteristics when I use the term; 
I simply wish to indicate the operation of one of the two 
types of imagination found in Hazlitt's writings, i.e., that 
which impqses the filter of self in the .process of perception 
("selfish" imagination) as opposed to that which removes it 
("selfless" imagination). Perhaps the words "individual" or 
"personal" would be synonymous with this restricted use-of 
"selfish"; however, since the latter. term most readily under-
scores the contrast I wish to make use of, I hope the reader 
p 
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stances of selfish action; 2) since even in this instance 
the self of the starving man determines the relative pro-
portion of values perceived in external objects (e.g., he 
may perceive more value in obtaining food and less value in 
the act of stealing it from another man, when in other cir-
cumstances he would do the reverse) his action is still 
ultimately motivated by selfishness--that is, the relative 
weight of perceived external values is determined according 
to personal standards not dependent on external objects. 
Thus, try as he might, ·Hazlitt cannot and does not ulti-
mately close the loophole. 
In the final analysis, then, the Essay ..£!! the Princi-
ples of Human Action allows that imagination can work in two 
essentially different w~ys. On the one hand, it may function 
impersonally by perceiving values inherently in ideas of ex-
ternal objects. On the other hand, it may function selfish-
ly, in either of two ways: it may create values entirely 
from internal resources of the mind and· invest them in ob-
jects and ideas, thereby "coloring" the objects of perception 
with personal values untied to external realities; or it may 
simply order or shape perceived values in personally deter-
will accept my continued use of the term in this special 
sense. I will therefore refrain from placing _the word (or 
its derivatives, e.g., "selfishness") in quotation marks. 
pt 
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mined hierarchies, structuring perception according to 
forms which are independent of external checks.11 
11Passion is an element sometimes distinguished 
from imagination in the process of determining moral truth. 
w1lether the imagination perceives values or creates them, 
morality does not come "home" to an individual, Hazlitt be-
lieved, until such values are vitalized by human feelings. 
See, for example, "On Reason and Imagination": 
11 So with respect to moral truth (as distinct from mathe-
matical), whether a thing is good or evil, depends on 
the quantity of passion, of feeling, of pleasure and 
pain connected with it, and with which we must be made 
acquainted in order to come to a sound conclusion, and 
not in the inquiry~ whether it is round or square. 
Passion, in short, is the essence, the chief ingredient 
in moral truth; and the warmth of passion is sure to 
kindle the light of imagination on the objects around 
it." 
(1826: xii, 46) 
Note, though, that it is just the manner in which passion, 
or the feelings of pleasure and pain, is "connected" with. 
moral truth that is left ambiguous. Is the "warmth of pas-
sion11 an affective property of objects themselves (cf. pp. 
13-16 above)? or is it a personal creation . (cf. pp. 16:-19)?. 
CHAPTER II 
THE GENERIC TYPES OF PERCEPTION 
"I hardly ever set about a paragraph 
or a criticism, but there was an 
undercurrent of thought, or some 
generic distinction on which the whole 
turned. Having got my clue, I had 
no difficulty in stringing pearls upon it." 
{1828: xvii, 312) 
Throughout his critical practice Hazlitt was more 
concerned with how men perceived their world than with what 
they saw; he considered the object or content of a man's per-
ception to be of secondary value to his method of perception 
itself. This attention to the way men see probably developed 
from Hazlitt's own early training as a painter; and his later 
writings on art reflect this training. For example, in the 
essay "On Criticism" from 1822 he writes: "But the.power of 
execution [in an art work], the manner of seeing nature is 
one thing, and may be so superlative (if you are only able to 
judge of it) as to countervail every disadvantage of subject" 
(viii, 219-220) . 1 Similarly, he writes in 1824 that "If a 
1Note, too, Hazlitt's sharp distinction between an 
object (st. James's Palace) and our perception of that object 
23 
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picture is admirable in its kind, we do not give ourselves 
much trouble about the subject" (x, 22). Hazlitt saw paint-
ings as embodiments of "kinds" of perception; the way the 
artist approached the subject produced the interest of the 
work. So it was, too, with literary art works; for example, 
the essayist speaks thus of Walton's The Compleat Angler in 
1823: 
Some books have a personal character. We are attached 
to the work for the sake of the author. Thus we read. 
Walton's Angler as we should converse with an agreeable 
old man, not for what he says, so much as for his man-
ner of saying it, and the pleasure he takes in his sub-
ject. 
(ix,· 182) 
He had something similar in mind in 1830 when he published 
his own conversations with that other interesting--though 
perhaps less agreeable--old man, James Northcote. In his 
original introductory note to the Conversations, he says that 
in trying to reconstruct Northcote's words, "My object was to 
catch the tone and manner, rather than to repeat the exact 
impressions, or even opinions" (xi, 350n). What fascinated 
Hazlitt was how the old painter saw and organized his world, 
as revealed in his manner· of speaking and painting; Hazlitt 
himself admits that "I have forgotten, mistaken, mis-stated, 
in "Madame de Stael's Account of German Philosophy" (1814: 
xx, 33) . 
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altered, [or] transposed a number of things," so obviously 
the content of the conversations is of less importance than 
their revelation of Northcote's "manner." 
Again in 1830, at the end of his life, Hazlitt offers 
an extended meditation on the value of the means by which 
men seek truth: 
The pleasure of the chase, or the benefit derived from 
it, is not to be estimated by the value of the same af" 
ter it is caught, so much as by the difficulty of start-
ing it and the exercise afforded to the body and the 
excitement of the animal spirits in hunting it down: 
and so it is in the exercises of the mind and the pur-
suit of truth, which are chiefly valuable (perhaps) less 
for their results when discovered, than for their af-
fording continual scope and employment to the mind in 
its endeavors to reach the fancied goal, without its 
being ever {or but seldom} able to attain it. 2 Regard 
the end, is an ancient saying, and a good one, if it 
does not mean that we are to forget the beginning and 
the middle. By insisting on the ultimate value of things 
when all is over, we may acquire the character of grave 
men, but not of wise ones. Passe pour cela. If we would 
set up such a sort of fixed and final standard of moral 
truth and worth, we had better try to construct life over 
again, so as to make it a punctum stans, and not a thing 
in progress; for as it is, every end, before it can be 
realized, implies a previous imagination, a warm interest 
in, and an active pursuit of, itself, all which are inte-
gral and vital parts of human existence, and it is a beg-
ging of the question to say that an end is only of value 
in itself, and not as it draws out the living resources, 
2see viii, 234 {1822): "It is not then the value of 
the object, but the time and pains bestowed upon it that 
determines the sense and degree of our loss"; and xi, -277 
(1829): "We set a value on things as they have cost us 
dear." cf., too, -"On the Love of Life" (1817: iv, 1-4). 
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and satisfies the original capacities of human nature. 
(xx, 307) 3 
Insofar as any end draws out "the original capacities of 
hllman nature"--one major capacity being "a previous imag-
ination"--it is valuable. The use of imagination is thus 
asserted to be an important thing in itself; for the ob-
jects which draw out imagination are said to be, in a sense, 
only means used to produce a possibly greater end, which is· 
imaginative perception itself. 
Hazlitt usually distinguishes two opposite "manners" 
of such imaginative perception, and these are in line with 
the bifurcation noticeable in the Essay on the Principles 
of Human Action, that imagination may be either selfless or 
3Hazlitt '.s concern for the operation of the mind more 
than for the objects of perception is also evident in the 
Preface to his obscure English Grammar of 1809: 
"It is common to suppose that the parts of speech, of 
different sorts of words, relate to different sorts of 
things or ideas; and that it was to express this dif-
ference in the subject-matter of discourse, that one 
class of words was appropriated to one class of things, 
and another to another. We have endeavored to show on 
the contrary, that the grammatical distinctions of words 
do not relate to the nature of the things or ideas spo-
ken of, but to ~ manner of speaking of them, i ·~·, to 
the particular point of view in which ~ have occasion 
to consider them, or combine them with others in the 
same discourse." 
(ii, 6-7) 
Note also his definition of a substantive, two para-
graphs later: "It is not the name of a thing really subsist-
- ing.by itself (according to the old definition),·but of a 
thing considered as subsisti.ng by itself." 
,, 
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selfish: it may entirely abstract self from the process of 
perception of the world, or it may impose self as a medium 
through which reality is filtered. Obviously, then, how 
men see--which is what interests Hazlitt--is a function of 
imagination. 
The essayist uses both sides of his theory of imag-
ination throughout his career. When, in the Lectures on 
English Philosophy from 1812, he refers to his power to "go 
out of myself entirely" (ii, 239) he is utilizing his idea 
of the selfless imagination. In 1816 he makes further use 
of it in picturing the minds of children, who are "perpet-
ually going out of themselves" (xvi, 67). In the following 
year he states that "Art shows us nature, divested of the 
medium of our prejudices" (iv, 74), i.e., that art embodies 
selfless perception. In 1823 he criticizes women for lack-
ing the ability to see the world selflessly: "Women have 
as little imagination as they have reason. They are pure 
egotists. They cannot go out of themselves" (ix, 213). 
Three years later he analyzes the process of reading accord-
ing to his accustomed theory: 
in reading we always take the right side, and .make the 
case properly our own. Our imaginations are suffic-
iently excited, we have nothing to do with the matter 
but as a pure creation of the mind, and we therefore 
yield to the natural, unwarped impressions of good and 
evil. Our own passions, interests, and prejudices are 
28 
out of the question, . • • • or in an abstracted point 
of view, we judge fairly and conscientiously, for con-
science is nothing but the abstract idea of right and 
wrong. 
(xii, 136n-13 7n) 
"Abstract," of course, here means "separated from concrete 
existence"--specifically, separated from one's self. In 
1828, again, the essayist refers to "Imagination, which owes 
no allegiance to self-interest" (xx, 168). Clearly, the 
concept of the selfless imagination remained with Hazlitt 
throughout his life.4 
But so did his concept of the selfish imagination. 
In 1812 he writes of poets: "They feign the beautiful and 
grand out of their own minds, and imagine all things to be, 
not what they are, but what they ought to be" (iv, 152). 
'I'his type of imagination can create objects--and values5--un-
tied to external realities; it can also modify, mold, and 
arrange external objects by investments of personal energies. 
Thus, in 1816, he writes: "For the imagination is that 
power which represents objects, not as they are, but as they 
4 see also xv111, 122 (1817); here, objects in 
Vandyke's paintings ·are said to be presented to the eye with-
out passing through any "medium." Similar statements about 
perception free from filters are found at iv, 74 (1817) and 
xii, 245 (1826). 
5
aazlitt believed.that the mind can perceive or cre-
ate aesthetic values ju-st as it-d0es ethical values. 
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are moulded according to our fancies and feelings" (xvi, 63) 
--i.e., imagination (here) does not "repose entirely on 
nature" (cf. iv. 162): rather, it reposes on the particular 
ways in which the individual modifies nature. The same 
point is made again in "On Poe,try in General" in 1818: "the 
imagination is that faculty which represents objects, not as 
they are in themselves, but as they are moulded by other 
thoughts and feelings into an infinite variety of shapes and 
combinations of power" (v, 4). The "shapes" and "combina-
tions" referred to are entirely creations of the poet him-
self~· such personal modifications prevent external objects 
from being perceived "as they are in themselves." Hazlitt 
again utilizes this theory of imagination in The Spirit of 
the Age (1825), in which he writes: "We are not, then, so 
much to inquire what certain things are abstractedly or in 
themselves, as how they affect the mind, and to approve or 
condemn them accordingly" (xi, 9). To insist that the way 
in which the mind perceives objects is a vital part of moral 
determinations is to all<M for variations among different 
individual minds. If morality hinges not on "objects them-
selves" but on the perception of such objects by individual 
minds, then, in saying this, Hazlitt is asserting that the 
s~lf of the perce.iver is indeed a vital part of the process 
of reckoning values.. He emphasizes just this point a few 
F 
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sentences later: II .• so moral truth must present itself 
under a certain aspect and from a certain point of view, in 
order to produce its full and proper effect upon the mind." 
V.1hen he insists that "point of view" is essential in deter-
mining moral truth, he thereby calls for the presence of an 
individual personality in the process. And three years 
later, in 1828, he makes a similar point: 
• . . the understanding takes a tincture from outward 
impulses and circumstances, and is led [by imagination, 
probably] to dwell on those suggestions which favour, 
and to blind itself to the objections which impugn, the 
side to which it previously and morally inclines. 
(xvii, 310) 
Morality is thus determined "previously" to the reception of 
"outward impulses and circumstances"; the mind funnels data 
from the external world into previously determined molds of 
value. And if such molds exist before the reception of ex-
ternal data, then obviously the self alone must have created 
them. 6 
6 rt is also possible, of course, that the· self may 
simply be accepting the ready-made molds of value provided 
by social conventions. In this case, the process is simi-
lar--the mind still funnels external data into molds of 
value which are previously determined. 
On the matter of filters being present in perception, 
see xi, 198 (1826): "I mentioned that I thought Sir Joshua 
more like Rembrandt than either Titian or Vandyke: he envel-
oped objects in the same brilliant haze of a previous mental 
conception." Note also the essayist's descriptions of 
Wordsworth and Rembrandt, particularly his interest in the 
"mediums" they ~:reate through which they view nature, e.g., 
xix, 19 (1814); iv, 121 {1817), viii, 43-44, 224 (1821). 
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Hazlitt thus held his dual theory of imagination 
throughout his life--and he held both sides of it simul-
taneously. In 1822, for example, he praised the "manners" 
of Vandyke and Leigh Hunt for exactly opposite reasons: 
[Vandyke] was purely natural, and neither selected 
from nor added any thing from his own mind. 
(viii, 318) 
I prefer H---'s conversation almost to any other 
person's, because, with a familiar range of subjects, 
he colours with a'totally new and sparkling light, 
reflected from his own character. 
{viii, 202) 
This discrepancy in critical standards, based on his dif-
fering conceptions of imagination, did not bother Hazlitt; 
he simply employed whichever theory of imagination he need-
ed when he wrote of particular men. But I will return later 
to the question of the relationship and relative importance 
of the two types of imagination. 
Hazlitt's description of Turner's work (1817: iv, 76n) may 
also, in a sense, be included in this group; the comment 
here is that this painter's pictures are "too much abstrac-
tions of aerial perspectives, and representations not so 
properly of the objects of nature as of the medium through 
which they are seen. They are the triumph of the knowledge 
of the artist, and of the power of the pencil over the bar-
renness of the subject." Elisabeth Schneider, in her excel-
lent review of Hazlitt scholarship in The English Romantic 
Poets and Essayists {New York: New York University Press, 
1966), pp. 98-99, says that "Hazlitt was surely using the 
term 'medium' to mean the air or atmosphere, not, as Bullitt 
[PQ, XXIV,, 345nJ reads it, the technical 'medium' of line 
and color." Perhaps I may be allowed to confuse the matter 
further with still another opinion: I take "medium," here, 
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Hazlitt's use of his two conceptions of imagination 
in his criticisms of particular individuals is worth noting 
in that it points to further patterns of thought in his 
writings: other qualities of perception come to be linked 
with the selfish or the selfless imaginative manners, and 
certain terms and images are characteristically used in 
descriptions of artists who exemplify one or the other of 
the generic types of perception. 
"Intensity" ·is one of the additional qualities that 
is usually found in writers or artists who exemplify the 
selfish imagination. Writing in 1817, for example, Hazlitt 
says of Rousseau, whom he ad~ired greatly: "His ideas dif-
fered from those of other men only in their force and inten-
sity" (iv, 89): and, later in the same passage, he writes 
that Rousseau was marked by "intense feeling." In 1818 he 
points out "the intensity" of impression characteristic of 
to refer to Turner's own "mental set," conditioned by his 
familiarity with "the technical language and difficulties 
of his art" (iv, 76). It is through this personal filter 
of training that he sees his subject: and his painting em-
bodies this individual way of seeing things. In other words, 
the "medium" is the configuration of Turner's own mind, a:n.d 
we see more of it in the painting than we do of external 
nature (cf. xviii, 95 (1815]; " Artists too often chuse 
their subjects, not to exhibit ·the charms of nature, but to 
display their· own skill in making something of the most bar~ 
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Dante (v, 17); in the same work (Lectures on the English 
Poets) he states that "The characteristic of Chaucer is 
intensity" (v, 46). In The Spirit of the Age (1825) he 
says that "Intensity is the great and prominent distinc-
tion of Lord Byron's writings" (xi, 72); and of Wordsworth 
he writes: 
He has described ••• objects in a way and with an in-
tensity of feeling that no one else had done before him, 
and has given a new view or aspect of nature. He is in 
this sen_se the most original poet now living, and the 
one whose writings could the least be spared: for they 
have no substitute elsewhere. 
( . 89) 7 xi, 
Hazlitt frequently uses images of heat, fire, and 
furnaces to help convey the impression of the intensity of 
such writers; a further related image which he uses is that 
of molding, casting, or impressing objects, as in the heat 
of a forge. This figure serves the further purpose of lin~-
ing the quality of intensity to the selfish imagination--
i.e., the self of the artist is the molding or casting agent, 
and therefore the finished product is highly dependent upon 
the purposes and intentions of that self. The "heat--mould-
ren subjects"). I believe Hazlitt is simply suggesting that 
the selfish or filtering imagination, rather than the self-
less, is .operative. 
7see also iv, 38; v, 379; vi, 120;.ix, 
45, 273; xii, 269~ 304; xvi, 18, 41-42, 
xvii, 169; xviii, 33, 114, 116, 123. 
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ing" image sequence is used, for example, to describe 
Rousseau: "The dazzling blaze of his reputation was kin-
dled by the same fire that fed upon his vitals. His 
speculations are the obvious exaggerations of a mind, giv-
ing loose to habitual imp:1l3es, and moulding all nature .!:£ 
its ~wn purposes" (iv, 89). Dante's mind operates in this 
same fashion: "His genius is not a sparkling flame, but 
the sullen heat of ~ furnace." There is an ''identity of 
interest" in his conception that 
moulds every object to its own purposes. • The im-
mediate objects he presents to the mind are not much in 
themselves, they want grandeur, beauty, and order; but 
they become every thing by the force of the character 
he impresses upon them. His _mi£9. lends its ~ power 
to the objects whic~ it contemplates, instead of borrow-
ing it from them. 
(v I 17) 
In The Spirit of the Age Godwin is spoken of in similar 
terms: 
the chains with whic~ he 
out of his ~ thoughts, 
with glowing enthusias~: 
in the furnace of fervid 
ly and ideal forms. 
rivets our attention are forged 
link by link, blow for blow 
we see the genuine ore melted 
feeling, and moulded into state-
(xi, 25) 
Byron receives a similar description in the same work: 
Instead of taking his impressions from without, in entire 
and almo.st unimpaired masses, he moulds them according_ :to 
his own te-,nperament, and he€=!.:!=.~ the materials of his im-
agination in the furnace of his passions.--Lord Byron's 
verse glows like a flame, consuming everything in its way. 
(xi, 69} 
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Hazlitt even uses the same diction when he speaks of poetry 
in general in the essay entitled "Sir Walter Scott": 
It must be owned, there is a power in true poetry that 
lifts the mind from the ground of reality to a higher 
sphere, that penetrates the inert, scattered, incoherent 
materials presented to it, and by a force and inspir-
ation of its ~· melts and moulds them into sublimity 
and beauty. 
(xi, 59) 
A further quality that Hazlitt often links with the 
selfish imagination and intensity of feeling is narrowness in 
the scope of vision. · Men who focus their awareness in a nar-
row range of attention thereby concentrate all of their per-
sonal energies, and such concentration nourishes intensity of 
feeling. The idea of "narrow focus" being important for ar-
tistic achievement and, indeed, for happiness itself, is one 
that Hazlitt held throughout his career. In 1814, for example, 
he writes that "There is a certain pedantry, a given division 
of labor, and almost exclusive attention to some one object, 
which is necessary in Art, as in all the works of man" (xviii, 
4ln). Three years later, in "On Pedantry," he says: 
Any one settled pursuit, together with the ordinary alter-
nations of leisure, exercise, and amusement, and the nat-
ural feelings and relations of society, is quite enough to 
take up the whole of our thoughts, time, and affections_; 
and any thing beyond this will, generally speaking, only 
tend to dissipate and distract the mind. 
(iv, 85-86) 
In 1821, too, Hazlitt points out that the "requisite" for sue-
cess is the want of "any idea but those.of custom and interest 
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on the narrowest scale" (viii, 103); and he says in 1823 that 
"it is not necessary for one man to possess more than one 
quality in the highest perfection" (xi, 180). The positive 
aspect of narrowed focus is repeated two years later in The 
Spirit of the Age: "It is best to choose and act up to some 
one leading character, as it is best to have some settled pro-
fession or regular pursuit in life" (xi, 147)1 similar thoughts 
are found throughout the essay "On the Qualifications Neces-
sary to Success in Life" in 1826 (xii, 195-209). And such 
ideas remained unchanged at the end of the essayist's life in 
1830: "Nature is not one thing, but a variety of things, con-
sidered under different points of view; and he who seizes 
forcibly and happily on any one of them, does enough for fame" 
(xi, 229).8 
When speaking of the narrowed focus of writers or 
artists who also exemplify the selfish imagination, Hazlitt 
often uses images to convey the idea of the funnelled nature 
of their perception. One such image is that of a river or 
channel. Such is exemplified by his statement on Wordsworth, 
that "The current of his feelings is deep, but narrow" (xi, 
94}. Elsewhere the essayist makes the -same point by way of 
8 see also v, 71, 376, 379; vi, 123; vii, 79; ix, 175, 
218, 220, 243; xi, 229, 278, 317 i xii, 312; xvi, 139, 188, 
402, 404, 408; xvii, 33, 167-168, 264, 332; xix, 83-84; xx, 
92, 135, 297, 299, 391. 
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negation, saying that "Mr. Wordsworth is the last man to 
'look abroad into universality'" (viii, 44). So it is with 
Chaucer: "(The interest in him] is like the course of a 
river, strong, and full, and increasing. In Shakespeare, 
on the contrary, it is like the sea, ••. " (v, 52); the 
river, when contrasted to the sea, clearly points out 
Chaucer's narrowness of scope, the channelled quality of 
mind he shares with Wordsworth. Godwin is similar; Hazlitt 
speaks of him as having "valves belong-ing to his mind" (xi, 
37) that have a channelling effect upon his energies. 
Rousseau, too, has this focused quality: Hazlitt speaks of 
the "acuteness of his observation" and of his "keen penetra-
tion" (iv, 89), the terms suggesting the narrowness and sharp-
ness of a s~alpel. 
Another set of words used frequently in connection with 
artists of the Wordsworthian type (including such people as 
Byron, Rousseau, Godwin, and Dante) is a color group: the 
terms "colour," "tincture," and "dye." Hazlitt uses these 
terms to indicate an idea like the one suggested by "mould" 
and "cast," that the artist transforms his perceptions of 
an object through-an investment of personal energy. He 
either shapes or colors what he sees according to character-
istics of his own mind. 9 Speaking of one form of genius, 
9see above, Chapter I, pp. 21-22. 
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Hazlitt writes: 
Genius in ordinary is a more obstinate and less versatile 
thing [than that of Shakespeare]. It is sufficiently ~­
elusive and self-willed, quaint and peculiar. It does 
some one thing by virtue of doing nothing else: it excels 
in some one pursuit by being blind to all excellence but 
its own. It is just the reverse of the cameleon; for it 
does not borrow, but lend its colour to all about it." 
(viii, 42-43) 
And in the essay on Byron in The Spirit of the Age, he refers 
to "The colouring of Lord Byron's style" as being "rich and 
dipped in Tyrian dyes" (xi, 72). So, too., Wordsworth lends 
"the colours of imagina~ion to impressions" {iv, 92}. 
Another term that Hazlitt habitually uses in talking 
of these people is ''egotism" (or "egotist"). Again, it is in 
reference to that quality of the self being impressed on all 
that it perceives. Things gain their importance only in 
reference to such a self, only when they have been "moulded" 
/ 
or "coloured" by the individual arti~t. Thus he says of 
I 
Wordsworth: "he, too, like Rembrandt, has a faculty of making 
something out of nothing, that is, out of himself, by the 
medium through which he sees and with which he clothes the 
barrenest subject"--again, Hazlitt is more concerned with the 
way one sees rather than with what one sees. continuing, he 
says: "[Wordsworth] is the greatest, that is, the most orig-
inal poet of the present day" solely "because he is the 
greatest egotist" (viii, 44). Wordsworth.perceives things 
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through the medium of egotism, of himself; what he sees is 
therefore colored by his own personality. Rousseau is sim-
ilar: he had "excessive egotism, which filled all objects 
with himself, and would have occupied the universe with his 
smallest interest 11 (iv, 89). Of Godwin Hazlitt says: "He 
is blind, deaf, insensible to all but the trump of Fame" 
(xi, 36); and this ties up intimately with what he says in 
"On Posthumous Fame": "To feel a strong desire that others 
should think highly of us, it is, in general, necessary that 
we should think highly of ourselves. There is something of 
egotism, and even pedantry, in this sentiment" (iv, 23). 
Godwin is, therefore, an egotist for wanting to be famous. 
It is interesting to note, too, that "egotism" and "pedantry" 
are very closely linked in Hazlitt's mind. They are not really 
the same thing--pedantry can be said to combine the qualities 
of intensity of feeling and narrowness of scope; egotism is the 
quality of adding personal "colour" to one's perceptions. 
These three distinct qualities often go together (though they 
do not have to--a point I shall return to)--those who are "ex-
elusive" are very often "self-willed" and "intense," too, in 
Hazlitt's mind. 
In addition to linking the qualities of narrow focus 
and intensity to the selfish imagination, Hazlitt also links 
their opposite counterparts to the selfless imagination: the 
p 
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qualities of the second generic type of perception which he 
values so highly are a broad or universal range of awareness, 
serenity or ease of feeling, and the absence of all filters 
or pre-set structures in one's perception. Some of the exem-
plars of this type of vision are Shakespeare, Scott, Cole-
10 . 
ridge, and Jeffrey. And here again Hazlitt habitually uses 
the same diction in his assessments of different artists. 
In 1817, for example, he writes that Shakespeare was 
"the most universal genius that ever lived" (iv, 238); 
earlier in the same year he had noted that· "The power 
[Shakespeare] delights to show is not intense but discursive" 
(iv, 79)--i.e., covering a wide field of subjects rather than 
focusing on one pursuit. A year later, in "On Shakespeare 
and Milton," he states that "The striking peculiarity of 
Shakespeare's mind was its generic quality .•• so that it 
contained a universe of thought and feeling within itself, 
and had no one peculiar bias, or exclusive excellence more 
lOFigures such as Bacon, Steele, Knowles, and Thomson 
are also in this group (cf. vi, 327-328; iv, 8; xi, 184; v, 
87-88) but Hazlitt devotes less attention to them. I should 
also mention at this point that there are frequently some con-
tradictions in Hazlitt's descriptions of people who habitually 
interest him {e.g., Coleridge is sometimes said to have a 
structured or egotistical mind, molding perceptions according 
to abstract theories). But I will return to the matter of 
such inconsistencies in Chapters III and VI. 
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than another" (v, 47). In 1823,too, he praises the Bard's 
"infinite variety" {ix, 204). 
'!he term "universal" is also applied to Scott in the 
same way it is to Shakespeare--indeed, Hazlitt uses the same 
quotation, "born uni versa~ he_ir to all humanity," to refer 
to both men (1821: viii, 42; 1825: xi, 69). And in The 
Spirit of the Age he writes that the "scope" of Scott's 
writing is "wide" {xi, 63), even going so far as to say that 
"His works {taken together) are almost like a new edition of 
human nature" {xi, 30). In 1830, too, he notes that Scott 
is ~·ready to converse on all subjects alike" {xi, 274). 
Coleridge is another person who "walks abroad in the 
majesty of an universal understanding''; he is a person "of 
the greatest capacity" {xi, 30). Like Shakespeare, he has 
"discursive reason" {xi, 34); and in his poetry he "drank of 
the spirit of the universe" {xi, 33). "He lends himself to 
all impressions alike," Hazlitt says: "he gives up his mind 
and liberty of thought to none. He is a general lover of art 
and science, and wedded to no one in particular" {xi, 29). 
Similarly, Jeffrey shows a "great range of knowledge" and 
"discursiveness of reason" (xi, 130-131) • 11 
11 . ' See also iv, 64, 151; v, 52, 54, 55; vi, 327-328; 
vii, 142, 314; viii, 29, 52; x, 303; xi, 47,- 190,-275; xii, 
123; xvi, 53, 59; xvii, 92, 189f., 328; xviii, 81, 113; xx, 
157. 
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Another quality of genius of the Shakespearean type 
is a complete lack of tension; exemplars of this type of mind 
are the opposite of "intense" people of the Wordsworthian 
type. Thus, in "On Posthumous Fame" Hazlitt writes that "men 
I 
of the greatest genius produce their works with too much fa-
cility (and, as it were, spontaneously) to require the love 
of fame as a stimulus to their exertions" (1817: iv, 24). 
Such men are completely at ease--they lack the burning fires 
Of egotism. Scott is like this, as a contrast to Byron dem-
onstrates: "Lord Byron's verse glows like a flame, consuming 
everything in its way; Sir Walter Scott's glides like a river, 
clear, gentle, harmless'' (1825: xi, 69-70) . 12 Shakespeare;. 
too, has this serene quality--Hazlitt speaks of "the natural 
ease and indifference of his temper" (1818: v, 56) and of 
"the greatest ease and unconsciousness of effort" in his work 
(1830: xi, 248). 13 Being "indifferent" to factions or nar-
row ways of seeing things is a description frequently applied 
to Shakespeare; the term usually functions on two levels, 
12The river image as used here for Scott suggests 
ease of flow--the concern in this context is not for its "nar-
row" as opposed to "broad" characteristics. See also xi, 131, 
where the stream image is used to suggest Jeffrey's "copi-
ousness .and facility"; and xii, 121, where Hazlitt uses it to 
speak of his own style. 
l3Note that Hazlitt is talking about Shakespeare him-
self, not about his created characters, e.g., Lear or Othello, 
whom he sees as entirely separate "people." Cf. v, 50. 
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suggesting both ease of mind and lack of constrictions in 
one's perceptions. The use of the word "indifference" is 
a kind of description by negation--in this case it is a way 
of saying that Shakespeare lacks the passionately self-willed 
involvement with a subject that people like Byron or 
Rousseau demonstrate. Coleridge is similarly indifferent; 
we have already seen that he is a "general" lover of art and 
science, "and wedded to no one in particular." His "ease" 
is also suggested in another reference, that he "drank of 
the spirit of the universe, and wandered at eve by fairy 
stream or fountain" (xi, 33). To "wander" is to move about 
without any set direction in mind--to be utterly free to go 
anywhere without being channelled to a fixed course; and a 
certain leisureliness is also connoted. Jeffrey, too, ex-
hibits "unpretending carelessness and simplicity"; and his 
style shows great "rapidity," "facility," "flow," and "ease" 
(xi, 134, 130-132). And the same ease that Hazlitt sees in 
such writers is also evident elsewhere--the essayist admires 
it in such diverse subjects as the Indian Jugglers (viii, 78, 
80, 87), the Elgin marbles (xvi, 353), and Mrs. Siddons' 
. ( . . . 278) 14 acting xviii, • 
14see also iv, .53; v, 88; vi, 163; v111, 283, 316; 
ix, 237-241; x, 44, 61, 67; xi, 47, 60, 134, 248, 248n; xii, 
92, 329; xvi, 12, 49, 188, 318; xviii, 81, 113; xx, 153, 243. 
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Those who have both universality of awareness and 
ease of feeling usually exemplify the selfless imagination--
they do not tamper with the objects or relations they per-
ceive; they impose no coloring or structuring of their own. 
Thus, Hqzlitt says that Shakespeare was one 
who did not tamper with nature or warp her to his own 
purposes; who 'knew all qualities with a learned spirit,' 
instead of judging them by his own predilections; and 
was rather 'a pipe for the Muse's finger to play what 
stop she pleased, ' than anxious to set up any character 
or pretensions of his own. 
(1821: viii, 42) 
Such a mind serves as a transparent medium through which 
nature appears directly. Indeed, Hazlitt uses the terms 
"clear" and "transparent" {as opposed to "coloured," "tine-
tured, 11 etc.) in talking of Scott's qualities. We have al-
ready seen in passing that Scott's verse "glides like a 
river, clear, gentle, harmless"; the contrast to Lord Byron 
{in the essay on Byron from The Spirit of the Age) states 
the idea more explicitly: 
The colouring of Lord Byron's style, however rich and 
dipped in Tyrian dyes, is nevertheless opaque, is in 
itself an object of delight and wonder: Sir Walter 
Scott's is perfectly transparent~ In studying the one, 
you seem to gaze at the figures cut in stained glass, 
which excludes the view beyond, and where the pure light 
of heaven is only a means of setting off the gorgeous-
ness of art: in reading the other, you look through a 
noble window at the clear and varied landscape without. 
(xi, 72) 
It is worth noting, furtherj that in the first quotation 
, 
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above on Scott, "clear" is linked to "gentle" and "harm-
less"; in the second, "clear" is linked with 11 varied 11 --the 
three qualities of clarity (or lack of perceptual filters), 
tranquility, and universality are often closely linked in 
Hazlitt's mind, just as their opposing qualities are often 
connected in the opposite type of perception. 
Coleridge, too, as we might expect, is selfless; 
referring to him as one of those "Persons of the greatest 
capacity," Hazlitt says of this group: "surveying themselves 
from the highest point of view, amidst the infinite variety 
of the universe, their own share in it seems trifling, and 
scarce worth a thought" (1825: xi, 30). Such selflessness 
prevents him from imposing structures upon his perceptions--
he "can act only on spontaneous impulses without object or 
method" (xi, 36). Structures of any sort are bad in this way 
of seeing--anything that molds or casts one's perceptions is 
to be avoided, just as "colouring" is to be shunned. Thus 
Shakespeare is praised because in his dialogues "Nothing is 
made out by formal inference or analogy, -by climax and an-
tithesis: all comes, or seems to come, immediately from 
nature" (1818: v, 50) • 15 The literary devices of climax, 
anthithesis, etc., are seen·as confining structures or molds 
15rn qua.lifying this assertion by adding "or seems 
to come," Hazlitt is probably mindful of the operation of 
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of thought--and are therefore considered to be undesirable 
in this perspective. Indeed, one of Hazlitt's objections 
to Dr. Johnson is precisely the fact that he has such struc-
tures in his criticism: "All his ideas were cast in a given 
mould, in a set form: they were made out by rule and system, 
by climax, inference, and antithesis:--Shakespeare's were 
the reverse" (1817: iv, 175). 
Hazlitt often speaks of minds of the Shakespearean 
type as being free from "bigotry" or "bias, 11 the condition 
of having a fixed way of seeing things or of screening out 
certain possibilities of perception. Thus Shakespeare's 
mind "contained a universe of thought and feeling within it-
self, and had no one peculiar bias, or exclusive excellence 
more than another" (v, 47); so, too, the Bard "had none of 
the bigotry of his age" (v~ 56). Similarly, Jeffrey is 
11 neither a bigot nor an enthusiast," and "He is not wedded 
to any dogma" (xi, 130), whereas people like Dante and Milton 
are--they share a "spirit of partisanship" (v, 66). 
Much value therefore lies in certain men of genius 
imposing no personal colors or structures upon their visions 
/the understanding as opposed to the imagination. Thus Shake-
speare's mind can indeed arrange the physical data of sense 
perception according to the "moulds" of his understanding 
while--more importantly--he refrains from clouding perceived 
values by imaginative tampering. See above, Chapter I, pp. 
7-9. 
, 
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of the outside world. Indeed, not only do they impose 
nothing of their own, but they actually tear off old per-
spectives. Thus, speaking of Scott's novels and romances, 
Hazlitt says: 
The grand secret of the author's success in these 
latter productions is that he has completely got rid 
of the trammels of authorship; and torn off at one 
rent ..• all the ornaments of fine writing and worn 
out sentimentality. All is fresh, as from the hand 
of nature. 
(xi, 61) 
Such work is particularly significant to a reader because 
it serves the function of stripping him of his set ways of 
seeing things, of his own prejudices, biases, and egotis-
"tical perspectives: 
[Scottl draws aside the curtain, and the veil of ego-
tisml& is rent • . • he expands and lightens reflec-
tion, and takes away that tightness at the breast which 
arises from thinking or wishing to think that there is 
nothing in the world out of a man's self!~-in this point 
of view, the Author of Waverley is one of the greatest 
teachers of morality that ever lived,17 by emancipating 
l~The "veil" or "curtain" image is one that Hazlitt 
frequently uses to indicate constricted perception or colored 
awareness. See iv, 74; v, 10; vi, 176; viii, 6; xi, 54, 71; 
xii, 122, 129; xvi,. ·53; xvii, 314. 
l7For the same reasons, Shakespeare is "not only one 
of the greatest poets, but one of the greatest moralists we 
have" (xii, 245). Note, however, that Hazlitt's view of the 
~oral aspect of art is part of a larger critical concern. 
Even though he is often classically oriented in his criticism 
(approaching art as an imitation or embodiment of external 
values in nature), he is, from another point of view, romantic 
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the mind from petty, narrow, and bigoted prejudices. 
(xi, 71-72) 18 
The diction is of course significant: "egotism," "tight-
ness," "narrow," "bigoted," and "prejudiced" are character-
istically opposed to such terms as "expands," "lightens," 
and "emancipating." It is also interesting that Hazlitt 
specifies "In this point of view," which indicates his con-
scious awareness of the other point of view, that based on 
the selfish imagination. 
in that his major concern is actually one step removed--i.e., 
he approaches art as the perception of ~ individual which 
allows for (.£!: prevents) imitation of nature. Using Abrams' 
scheme from The Mirror and the Lamp (New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1953), pp. 6-7, I would say that Hazlitt's primary 
emphasis in his artistic theory is placed upon the role of the 
artist. Thus, he saw even Shakespeare's plays as, in a sense, 
expressions of a unique personality--this personality, however, 
was one of utter selflessness and "transparency." A lesser em-
phasis {i.e., iess often expressed, but strong when it is 
verbalized) is placed on the (moral) effect of art on an au-
dience--i. e., the method of perception which art creates in 
a reade.r or viewer. Differing weights of importance are placed 
on the external universe--at one time it is the objective 
source of perceived values; at another, it is not objective 
but plastic or neutral and receptive of personal investments 
of value. At still other times it occupies a middle ground; 
as Abrams notes (p. 52), Hazlitt sometimes combines the 
"mirror" with a "l~p. 11 He is simply inconsistent on this 
point. 
Regarding the last element in Abrams' scheme, Hazlitt 
was never much concerned with the formalities of art works 
themselves. He "typically applies his criticism, not to the 
analysis of design, ordonnance, and the inter-relations of 
parts, but to the representation in words of the aesthetic 
qualities and feeling-tones of a work of art" (p. 135). 
18see also xii, 320, where Scott is said to have "a 
perfect indifference to self." 
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Shakespeare, Scott, and men of their type are imper-
tant because they restore us to nature; they make our vision 
fresh again, as if we were seeing the world for the first 
time. This is the type of vision Hazlitt admires so much in 
his essay "Romeo and Juliet"--the vision of as yet uncorrup-
ted youth: 
What is it that in youth sheds a dewy light round the 
evening star? That makes the daisy look so.bright? 
That perfumes the hyacinth? That embalms the first kiss 
of love? It is the delight of novelty, and the seeing 
no end to the pleasure that we fondly believe i~ still 
in store for us. 
( 181 7: iv, 2 5 0) 
"Novelty" suggests that no habitual or set ways of perception 
have yet developed; "seeing no end" is tantamount to saying 
"seeing no constrictions or barriers," which is the important 
quality of being free and open to the universal range of all 
possible experience. · Hazlitt admires this same type of fresh 
vision in his description of Adam and Eve (from Paradise~), 
who were literally seeing the world for the first time: 
In them hung trembling all our hopes and fears. They were 
as yet alone in the world, in the eye of nature, wondering 
at their new being, full of enjoyment .•.• All things 
seem to acquire fresh sweetness, and to be clothed in beau-
ty in their sight. 
( 1818: v, 6 7) 
"In their sight" suggests that the way they see, more specifi-
cally than what they see, is what Hazlitt considers to be im-
portant. And the several superlatives ("all," "full," "all") 
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suggest that, as yet, no limitations of any kind have become 
attached to their way of seeing. 
People with such fresh vision are the opposite of 
"egotists," "egotism" being the term used in connection with 
writers of the Wordsworthian type. Shakespeare_ is thus not 
an egotist--a point which Hazlitt makes in several different 
essays (e.g., iv, 23-24; v, 47; xi, 92). so it is with 
Scott, too, by whom "the veil of egotism is rent" (xi, 71}. 
And Hazlitt also carefully specifies that "Mr.· Coleridge talks 
of himself, without being an egotist, for in him the individ-
ual is always merged in the abstract and general" (xi, 31). 
The term is therefore another which signals a sharp division 
between the two types of perception Hazlitt is delineating. 
The concept is also often expressed as in "On Shakespeare and 
Milton"; here, referring to Shakespeare, Hazlitt writes that 
"by an art like that of the ventriloquist, he throws his imag-
ination out of himself" (v, 50). Those who see with such 
vision "lose" themselves, or "go out" of themselves19--they 
leave behind the habitual structures _the self must normally 
have in order to function in the everyday world. 
19see also i, 39; ii, 239; ix, 213; xvi, 67, 91-92; 
xvii, 338. 
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III 
Hazlitt thus distinguished two general types of per-
ception, and he used the various elements involved as stand-
ards of value throughout his writing career. It was probably 
these opposites that he had in mind when, looking back on his 
writings of twenty-three years, he wrote the comment used as 
the epigram for this chapter: 
I hardly ever set about a paragraph or a criticism, but 
there was an undercurrent of thought, or some generic 
distinction on which the whole turned. Having got my 
clue, I had no difficulty stringing pearls upon it. 
(xvii, 312) 
It is interesting that Hazlitt perceived essentially 
the same "undercurrent of thought" in so many different ob-
jects at so many points in his career. Though he would flesh 
out the oppositions he perceived in many different and unique 
ways, he habitually and consciously made use of the same 
skeletal structures of thought. In 1814, for example, he writes: 
Poetry may be properly divided into two classes: the 
poetry of imagination and the poetry of sentiment. The 
one consists in the power of calling up images of the 
most pleasing or striking kind; the other depends on the 
strength of interest which it excites in given objects. 
The one may be said to arise out of the faculties of 
memory and invention, conversant with the world of ~­
ternal nature; the other from the fund of our moral 
sensibility. 
(xix, 18) 
Though he uses the word "imagination" here in an unusually re-
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stricted sense, he is, nevertheless, still using the oppo-
sition first noticeable in the Es~ Q!2 the Principles of 
Human Actio~: one can either perceive value which resides 
in external objects, or one can personally create it. and in-
vest it in such objects. A similar distinction underlies 
his comments on the classical and the romantic styles of 
art--the former describes things "as they are interesting in 
themselves"; the latter, things as they are made interesting 
by personal associations (1816: xvi, 63). Using "imagina-
tion" in another restricted sense, he writes in 1820 that 
"The two principles of imitation and imagination, indeed, 
are not only distinct, but almost opposite" (vi, 350) .20 
Two years earlier he had again used his opposite qualities, 
saying that Wordsworth "is the reverse of Walter Scott in his 
defects and excellences. He has nearly all that the other 
wants, and wants all that the other possesses" (v, 156); simi-
larly, Wordsworth and Shakespeare are "the antipodes of each 
other" (1824: xvi, 253). Contrasts of Marlowe and Heywood 
(vi, 2llf.), Sh~cespeare, Beaumont and Fletcher (vi, 250), 
Paine and Cobbett (viii, 51-52), Titian and Domenichino (x, 
20The qualification of "almost" may again indicate 
Hazlitt's belief that even in strict "imitation" there is 
always some "moulding" done by the understanding. See foot-
note 15, above. 
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328), Mackintosh and Coleridge (xi, 100), Raphael and Guido 
(xii, 284), Mme. Pasta and Mlle. Mars (xii, 324f.), Moore and 
Byron (xvi, 4llf.), Kernble's conception of Hamlet vs. Haz-
litt's (xviii, 199), Scott and Rizzio (xviii, 350), Pope and 
the poets of nature (xx, 90f.) and countless others21 bring 
out one or more oppositions of the selfish vs. the selfless 
imagination, broadness vs. narrowness of scope, and intensity 
vs. ease of feeling. 
While it is true that Hazlitt placed great emphasis 
on his generic contrasts, it is also true that he always fur-
ther specified his analyses to distinguish individuals within 
the broad classifications. His specific criticisms are just 
that--they are each unique. But since below the generic 
level they do not tend to repeat themselves from one essay to 
the next, it is beyond the scope of this study to pursue hun-
dreds of such individual criticisms in detail. A few examples, 
though, will indicate some of the differences between gener-
ically similar people. 
Godwin and Wordsworth, for instance, are both intense 
men, "egotists" of narrow focus; but on a more specific level 
they are very different. Godwin appealed to men's reason a-
lone, ignoring human imperfections and passions in his moral 
21Note xi, 277-278, and xvi, 402, in_ particular. 
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system--"he raised the standard of morality above the reach 
of humanity" and gave "no quarter to the amiable weaknesses 
of our nature, nor [did] he stoop to avail himself of the sup-
plementary aids of an imperfect virtue" (xi, 18-19). In ad-
vocating the "omnipotence of reason" he assumed "but one class,. 
of ideas or motives, the highest and least attainable pos-
sible" (xix, 304). Despite the impracticality of his moral-
ity, though, Hazlitt. greatly admired Godwin's ideas, directed 
as-they were to the ends of human liberty and poiitical re-
form. Godwin made a major contribution to human thought, Haz-
litt believed, in that by straining reason to its limits as a 
motivating force for moral action, he thereby "pointed out the 
limit or line of separation, between what is practicable and 
what is barely conceivable." By "imposing impossible tasks on 
the naked strength of the will, he has discovered how far it 
is or is not in our power to dispense with the illusions of 
sense, to resist the calls of affection, to emancipate our-
selves from the force of habit." Godwin's discovery of the 
borders of such possibility was a great accomplishment, Haz-
litt believed, because it ultimately enabled others to place 
"the Gothic structure of human virtue on an humbler, but a 
wider and safer foundation than it had hitherto occupied in 
the volumes and systems of the learned" (xi, 23-24). 
Hazlitt recognized that reason by its~lf could not 
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much affect men: "the levers with which we must work out 
our regeneration are not the cobwebs of the brain," he wrote 
in 1824, "but the warm, palpitating fibres of the human 
heart" (xvi, 268}. 22 He found a correspondent awareness in 
Wordsworth, wh,p "communicated interest and dignity to. the 
primal movements of the heart of man"--"no one," he says, 
"has displayed the same pathos in treating of the simplest 
feelings of the heart" (xi, 89, 8B} . 23 Wordsworth's concern 
for the simple but fundamental passions thus clearly sepa-
rates him from Godwin. But, while Hazlitt praises words-
worth's pursuit of his "new avenue to the human heart" (viii, 
45) in his poetry, he repeatedly.berates the poet for his 
later reactionary political views. In this respect, too, 
Wordsworth is the opposite of Godwin, who was, to Hazlitt's 
dismay, left behind by the times as his liberal supporters 
22 see also xii, 324 (1826): "When we appeal to a 
man's reason against his inclinations, we speak a language 
without meaning# and which he will not understand." 
23Godwin "does not stoop to avail himself of the sup-
plementary aids of an imperfect virtue,." says Hazlitt (above}. 
Quoting Northcote (xi, 211), he writes: 
"Nature is satisfied with imperfect.instruments. Instead 
of snarling at every thing that differs from us we had 
better take Shakespeare's advice, and try to find 'Tongues 
in the trees, books in the running brooks,/Sermons in 
stones, and good in every thing.'" 
This is what Wordsworth does--the same quotation from As You 
Like It is applied to him in "On Genius and common Sense" 
(viii, 44). 
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went on to become Tories.24 
Coleridge, as another instance, is different in 
various respects from Scott or Shakespeare--most notably in 
that his universal range of awareness tended to work against 
him: 
The fault of Mr. Coleridge is, that he comes to no con-
clusion. He is a man of that universality of genius 
that his mind hangs suspended between poetry and prose, 
truth and falsehood, and an infinity of other things, 
and from an excess of capacity, he does little or 
nothing. 
(xix, 32) 
Hazlitt recognized that Coleridge had the same qualities of 
mind as Shakespeare; indeed, he said of Coleridge in 1818 that 
"he is the only 'person I ever knew who answered to the idea 
of a man of genius" {v, 167). He could also see, though, that 
Coleridge's particular character made him too weak to effec-
tively utilize his great gifts. "The man of perhaps the 
greatest ability now living" (xii, 198) could not produce re-
sults like the other geniuses of his type; Coleridge wasted 
his gifts by "swallowing doses of oblivion" (xi, 34). Never .... 
. theless, Hazlitt ultimately tended to judge him kindly, de-
spite his ineffectuality. "Mr. Coleridge's works," he says 
in The Spirit of the Age, "injure instead of conveying a just 
24
other examples of distinctions within this class of 
writers may be found iri comparisons of Wordsworth and Rousseau 
(iv, 92) and Wordsworth and Byron {xix, 36). 
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idea of the man, for he himself is certainly in the first 
class of general intellect" (xi, 35). 
Shakespeare and Scott, as another instance, are also 
distinct figures in Hazlitt's thought. They share the quali-
ties of the selfless imagination, ease of manner, and great 
25 
range or variety of scope; however, they have an important 
difference, which Hazlitt spells out in "Sir Walter Scott, 
Racine, and Shakespear" (xii, 336-346). In this essay he 
objects to the implied assertions of "a French lady" that 
Scott "imitates nature in the same way" as Shakespeare; the 
point he makes is that the dramatist presents nature more ful-
ly and deeply. Shakespeare identifies with the "instinctive 
law of our nature"; he seizes on "the ruling passion" of his 
subject, and "evolves all the rest from it." He s~pathizes 
with and enters into the internal processes of nature without 
falsifying or distorting them; he then organically extends 
the operation of these principles within his subjects. His 
characters thus act from internal motivations. Shakespeare 
is thus "a half-worker with nature"; he simply sets in motion 
the principles of nature which he finds all about him. He 
25 Scott resemh.les Shakespeare in that "he thinks of 
his characters and never of himself, and pours out his works 
with such unconscious ease and prodigality of resources that 
he thinks nothing of them and is even greater than his own 
fame" (This from the end of "Sir Walter Scott, Racine, and 
Shakespear": xii, 346). 
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does not change, alter, modify, or impose his own personal 
character upon his subjects; rather, he discovers the indi-
vidual internal processes of each, enters selflessly into 
them, and impels the operation of these principles from the 
inside. Scott, on the other hand, simply presents the ex-
ternal aspects of his subjects: "He lays an embargo on 'all 
appliances and means to boot,' on history, tradition, local 
scenery, costume and manners, and makes his characters. 
chiefly up of these"--he "transcribes" rather than enters 
into his material. Like Shakespeare, he does not distort his 
material by imposing his own personal characteristics and 
values upon it; Scott's "matter-:-of-fact imagination" though, 
is content to present subjects from a distance. He can tell 
us of nature and the world, but he does not show us like 
Shakespeare: "The genius of Shakespear is dramatic, that of 
Scott narrative or descriptive." "Whenever Sir Walter comes 
to a t~uly dramatic situation, he declines it or fails"--
Scott can only record his material, not impel it. Hazlitt's 
conceptions of these two writers are thus quite distinct: 
"Sir Walter Scott gives us the external imagery or machinery 
or passion; Shakespear the soul"; "The one gives us what we 
can see and hear; the other what we are." And the difference 
is vital to an understanding of the essayist's immense love 
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of Shakespeare. 
Hazlitt often links the three qualities of selfish 
imagination, narrowness of scope, and intensity of feeling 
·together, just as he often links the three opposite qual-
ities with each other. When he talks of any one quality 
specifically, then, he often means to imply the presence of 
one or both of its usual concomitants. He writes, for ex-
ample, of the close interrelationship of Scott's qualities: 
There are two things I admire in Sir Walter~ his capac-
ity and his simplicity, which indeed I am apt to think 
are much the same. The more ideas a man has of other 
things, the less he is taken up with the idea of him-
self." 
(1830: xi, 276) 
Continuing, a few paragraphs later, he writes: 
So, in general, writers of the greatest imagination and 
range of ideas, and who might be said to have all nature 
obedient to their call, seem to have been most careless 
of their fame and regardless of their works. They treat 
their productions not as children, but as 'bastards of 
their art;' wherea~ those who are more confined in their 
scope of intellect and wedded to some one theory or pre-
dominant fancy, have been found to feel a prop.ortionable 
fondness for the off spring of their brain, and have thus 
excited a deeper interest in it in the minds of others. 
we set a value on things as they have cost us dear: the 
very limitation of our faculties or exclusiveness of our 
feelings compels us to concentrate all our enthusiasm on 
a favorable subject; and strange as it may sound, in order 
to inspire a perfect sympathy in others or to form a school, 
men must themselves be egotists! Milton has had fewer 
readers and admirers, but I suspect more devoted and bigot-
ted ones, than ever Shakespeare had: Sir Walter Scott has 
attracted more universal attention than any other writer 
of our time, but you may speak against him with less dan-
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ger of making personal enemies than if you attack Lord 
Byron. 
The passage indicates Hazlitt's own understanding of the 
dynamics by which his six generic qualities tend to be found 
in two opposite sets. 
They are not always so linked, however. He says that 
Milton, for example, has an intense, forceful quality (iv, 38; 
v, 58, 61), and that he also imposes his own perspectives 
upon his material: "So Milton has borrowed more than almost 
any other writer; but he has uniformly stamped a character of 
his own upon it" (xx, 301; see also v, 230). However, as the 
first clause of this quotation suggests, the essayist does 
not characterize Milton's range of awareness as narrow, whic~ 
we might expect. Rather, it is extensive--a point emphasized 
by a contrast to Pope: "Milton has winged his daring flight 
from heaven to earth, through Chaos and old Night •. Pope's 
muse never wandered with safety, but from his library to his 
grotto, or from his grotto into his library back again" (xix, 
83). Milton, then, does not '(here) exemplify the usual com-
bination of qualities. 
Neither, for that matter, does Pope. His world of 
concern is narrow (above; see also v, 71; xix, 84), and he 
imposes his own characteristics upon what he sees (v, 80). 
But Pope is not an "intense" or forceful poet--his manner 
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is marked by "ease" rather than "enthusiasm" (v, 71; xix, 
84; xx, 92). It is wise therefore not to consider Hazlitt's 
use of oppositions as the simple workings of a mechanical 
system, for he sometimes fluidly com.bines the generic qual-
ities in a variety of ways. 
CHAPTER III 
THE CONTRADICTIONS 
"It is said, I know., that truth is 
~; but to this I cannot subscribe, 
for it appears to me that truth is many. 
There are as many truths as there 
are things and causes of action and 
contradictory principles at 
work in society." 
(1807: vii, 308) 
Hazlitt often uses his characteristic oppositions of 
thought to create balance and tension in essays; sometimes, 
however, he also creates inconsistencies and contradictions. 
Commentators such as Paul Elmer More have noted "the innumer-
able contradictions that occur in his work. 111 These discrep-
ancies are, however, not totally haphazard and unpredictable; 
there is an internal pattern to them. First of all, they usu-
ally involve a limited number of ideas--Hazlitt does not con-
tradict himself on just any topic; when he does do so, the 
situations almost always involve his use of the same few ge-
neric qualities of perception we have already distinguished. 
And second, when such inconsistencies do occur, he is 
1 Shelburne Essays (2nd series; New York and London: 
G.P. Putnam's Sons, The Knickerbocker Press, 1909), p. 75. 
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usually doing one of two things: he may be discerning qual-
ities in a particular subject opposite to those which he usu-
ally sees in it; or he may be seeing negative value in a 
particular quality which elsewhere he sees as positive--and 
by extension of this, he may rank one whole type of percep-
tion above the other at one point, and, at another, reverse 
his idea of their relative values. 
In Scott, for example, Hazlitt saw contradictory qual-
ities of mind exemplified. Scott's novels and romances demon-
strated the workings of an imagination not taken up with it-
self, its concern being rather with presenting an undistorted 
view of the whole range of human experience. But, in contrast 
to these literary productions, his politicai life demonstrated 
just the•opposite qualities; and in The Spirit of the Age Haz-
litt hit with deadly force at the bigotry, prejudice, and nar-
row-mindedness that made the novelist a stumbling block in 
the road to social reform: 
If there were a writer, who 'born for the universe'--
'--Narrow'd his mind, 
And to party gave up what was meant for mankind--' 
who, from the height of his genius looking abroad into na-
ture, and scanning the recesses of the human heart, 'winked 
and shut his apprehension up' to every thought or purpose 
that tended to the future good of mankind-- • • • who, ami-
able, frank, friendly, manly in private life, was seized 
with the dotage of age and the fury of a woman, the instant 
politics were concerned--who reserved all his candor and 
comprehensiveness of view for history, and vented his lit-
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tleness, pique, resentment, bigotry, and intolerance on 
his contemporaries-- • . . who, the moment his own in-
terest or the prejudices of others interfered, seemed to 
forget all that was due to the pride of intellect, to 
the sense of manhood-- • . . who being (by common con-
sent), the finest, the most humane and accomplished 
writer of his age, associated himself with and encouraged 
the lowest panders of a venal press; •.. showing no re-
morse, no relenting or compassion towards the victims of 
the nefarious and organized system of party-proscription, 
carried on under the mark of literary criticism and fair 
discussion, insulting the misfortunes of some, and tram-
pling on the early grave of others-~ 
'Who would not grieve is such a man there be? 
Who would not weep if Atticus were he?' 
{xi, 67-68) 2 
Like Scott, Coleridge, too, is sometimes criticized 
for showing a "bigotted and exclusive ... spirit (xii, 101-102); 
however, Hazlitt sees these faults in his poetry as well as 
in his politics. His verse is sometimes said to be marred by 
its passing through filters of "trancendental theories" and 
"scholastic speculations" (xi, 30; xviii, 309); it is thus 
not true to nature and external realities. And in a Plain 
Speaker essay Coleridge is criticized for having more concern 
2see also x, 254-255, where Scott is referred to as 
an "understrapper of greatness and of titles, himself since 
titled, the scale of whose intellect can be equalled by noth-
ing but the pitifulness and rancour of his prejudices." 
While it is true that Hazlitt occasionally discerns preju-
dices in Scott's novels, these, somewhat paradoxically, have 
the effect of giving fresh sight to contemporary readers--
i .e., Scott "goes back to old prejudices and superstitions 
as a relief to the modern reade~·· (xi, 76). As Hazlitt says 
elsewhere in The Spirit of th~ Age, "Antiquity after a time 
has the grace of novelty" (xi, 178). 
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for himself than for his subject: "he owes everything 
to his own mind. His object is to invent; he scorns to 
imitate" (xii, 15). This, of course, brands him as one 
who derives value from his own mind rather than from out-
side objects. The blocks and filters in his perception 
are assailed elsewhere, too; in a letter to The Examiner 
in 1817, Hazlitt accuses Coleridge and Southey of tying 
down men's consciences in "rusty fetters"; the sharp ad 
hominem attack also cites a "disgusting display of ego-
tism" on Coleridge's part (xix, 197-198). There are, then, 
contradictions to the portrait of the man given in The 
Spirit of the Age; one gets the impression, however, that 
the Spirit portrait is Hazlitt's most mature assessment. 
·while the vitriolic attacks of 1816 and 1817, motivated by 
political hatred and spilling over into literary criticism, 
may portray Coleridge as a narrow-minded bigot, Hazlitt's 
later, more seasoned judgment of the man makes him out to 
be greater than thiso In 1825, the essayist concentrates 
on the positive, Shakespearean qualities of his mind; he 
even separates him from the apostasy of the rest of the 
Lake School, saying that Coleridge "did not enter with them" 
into the safe world of political pensions and laureateships, 
that he stayed behind, "pitching his tent upon the barren 
waste without, and having no abiding place nor city of 
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refuge" (xi, 38) . 
While Hazlitt's views on Coleridge show his dis-
cernment of opposite qualities in one subject, they also 
point out another type of inconsistency--that qualities 
which he admires on some occasions are the very ones which 
he criticizes on others. Thus, for example, he admires 
those who "look abroad into universality" and criticizes 
those whose minds are too narrow to do so.3 But, as we 
have seen, he frequently takes the opposite stance as well, 
pointing out the disadvantages of a broad range of aware-
ness and the benefits of focusing one's attention on a 
single pursuit: "A multiplicity of objects unsettles the 
mind, and destroys not only all enthusiasm, but all sin-
cerity of attachment and constancy of pursuit" (iv, 84).4 
And we have also seen that Hazlitt sometimes criticizes 
Coleridge from this point of view, showing that the advan-
5 tage of his type of genius may also be its weakness. 
Even Shakespeare does not escape criticism on this account: 
The universality of his genius was, perhaps, a dis-
advantage to his single works; the variety of his 
resources~ sometimes diverting him from applying them 
to the most effectual purposes ••.• If he had been 
3 
viii, 44; xi, 16 i xii, 123; xviii, 304; See xx, 
4 
See above, Chapter II, pp. 35f. 
5 See above, Chapter II, p. 56. 
157. 
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only half what he was, he would perhaps have appear-
ed greater. 
(v, 55-56) 6 
The passage continues, criticizing the playwright for his 
"ease~; here, his lack of intensity is seen as a fault 
rather than as a virtue: 
The natural ease and indifference of his temper made 
him sometimes less scrupulous than he might have been. 
He is relaxed and careless in critical places .•.• 
His very facility of production would make him set 
less value on his own excellences, and not care to 
distinguish nicely between what he did well or ill. 7 
Wordsworth's qualities, too, may be either virtues or de-
fects, depending on one's point of view: "his strength 
lies in his weakness" (xi, 94) is a comment that implies 
Hazlitt's own practice of shifting between opposite and 
contradictory viewpoints. 
Hazlitt has opposite views on even such a matter 
as prejudice--prejudice being the imposition of personal 
filters in perception that prevent the mind from seeing 
the world as it is "in itself." His attacks on bigotry 
are too numerous to need citation; however, it should be 
noted that he sometimes praises exactly what he so often 
condemns: "To take away the force of habit and prejudice 
6Repeated at xvi, 92n. 
7 see also iv, 225: "perhaps Shakespear was too 
volatile and heedless." There follows a negative refer-
ence to his "careless force." 
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entirely, is to strike at the root of our personal ex-
istence, 11 he says in The Round Table (iv, 84), in the 
very year (1817) he so savagely attacks the Lake poets. 
He makes another such statement, for example, in 1823: 
"No wise man can have a contempt for the prejudices of 
others; and he should even stand in a certain awe of his 
own, as if they were aged parents and monitors. They may 
in the end prove wiser than he" (ix, 189) .a 
A classic example of Hazlitt's inconsistency may 
be found in his different comparisons of Sir Walter Scott 
and William Godwin; he has this to say of the two in the 
essay "William Godwin" in The Spirit of_ the Age (1825): 
It is the beauty and the charm of Mr. Godwin's de-
scriptions that the reader identifies himself with 
the author, and the secret of this is, that the au-
thor has identified himself with his personages. 
Indeed, he has created them. They are the proper 
issue of his brain, lawfully begot, not foundlings, 
nor the 'bastards of his art.·' He is not an indif-
ferent, callous spectator of the scenes which he him-
self portrays, but without seeming to feel them. 
There is no look of patch-work and plagiarism, the 
beggarly copiousness of borrowed wealth; no tracery-
work from worm-eaten manuscripts, from forgotten 
chronicles, nor piecing out of vague traditions with 
gaudy staring transparency, in which you cannot dis-
tinguish the daubing of the painter from the light 
that shines through the flimsy colours and gives them 
brilliancy. Here all is clearly made out with strokes 
of the pencil, by fair, not factitious means. Our au-
thor [Godwin] takes a given subject from nature and 
8For other examples see vii, 306; xvi, 332; xx, 
97, 102. 
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from books, and then fills it up with the ardent workings 
of his own mind, with the teeming and audible pulses of 
his own art. The effect is entire and satisfactory in 
proportion. The work (so to speak) and the author are one. 
We are not puzzled to decide upon their respective preten-
sions. In reading Mr. Godwin's novels, we know what share 
of merit the author has in them. In reading the Scotch 
Novels, we are perpetually embarrassed in asking ourselves 
this question; and perhaps it is not altogether a false 
modesty that prevents the editor from putting his name on 
the title-page--he is (for any thing that we know to the 
contrary) only a more voluminous sort of Allen-a-Dale. At 
least, we may claim this advantage for the English author 
[Godwin] that the chains with which he rivets our attention 
are forged out of his own thoughts, link by link, blow for 
blow, with glowing enthusiasm: we see the genuine ore 
melted in the furnace of fervid feeling, and moulded into 
stately and ideal forms; and this is so far better than 
peeping into an old iron shop, or pilfering from a dealer 
in marine stores! 
(xi, 24-25) 
Despite the rhetorical exaggeration in the passage which goes 
to extremes in sacrificing Scott on the altar of Godwin's 
praise, the underlying criteria of Hazlitt's distinction are 
clear enough. Godwin is favored here because of his inten-
sity of feeling and his imposition of his own forms and ener-
gies upon his work; he is not "indifferent" like Scott, and 
in this instance he is therefore "far better." Hazlitt crit-
icizes the Scotch novelist because his works lack the defi-
nite personal moldings that Godwin exhibits--Scott's 11 patch-
work 11 of "chronicles," "tradition," and "borrowed" wealth 
shows that his concern is for his subject and not for him-
self. And in this passage, such selfless imagination is an 
undesirable quality. 
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We get a different opinion of Scott in the essay 
"On the English Novelists" from Hazlitt's Lectures on the 
Comic Writers (1819); here, he says of Scott's work: 
In knowledge, in variety, in facility, in truth of 
painting, in costume and scenery, in freshness of sub-
ject and in untired interest, in glancing lights and 
the graces of a style passing at will from grave to gay, 
from lively to severe, at once romantic and familiar, 
having utmost force of imitation and apparent freedom of 
invention; these novels have the highest claims to admi-
ration. What lack they yet? The author has all power 
given him from without--he has not, perhaps, an equal 
power from within. The intensity of the feeling is not 
equal to the distinctness of the imagery. He sits like 
a magician in his cell, and conjures up all shapes and 
sights to the view • • • • In the midst of all this 
phantasmagoria, the author himself never appears to take 
part with his characters, to prompt our affection to the 
good, or sharpen our antipathy to the bad. It is the 
perfection of art to conceal art; and this is here done 
so completely, that while it adds to our pleasure in the 
work, it seems to take away from the merit of the author. 
As he does not thrust himself forward in the foreground, 
he loses the credit of the performance. The copies are 
so true· to nature'· that they appear like tapestry figures 
taken off by the pattern; the obvious patch-work of tra-
dition and history. His characters are transplanted at 
once from their native soil to the page which we are read-
ing, without any traces of their having passed through the 
hot-bed of the author's genius or vanity. He leaves them 
as he found them; but this is doing wonders. The Laird 
of Bradwardine, the idiot rhymer David Gellatly, Miss Rose 
Bradwardine, ••. and Meg Merrilees, are at present 'fa-
miliar in our mouths as household names,• and whether 
they are actual persons or creations of the poet's pen, 
is an impertinent inquiry. 
(vi, 128-129) 
But it is this same impertinent inquiry that forms the basis 
of his criticism of Scott in the essay "William Godwin." 
There, Scott suffers, being criticized with the same diction 
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that is here used to praise him. The present passage con-
tinues into a consideration of Godwin; and in this essay both 
men are praised, though, of course, on the basis of opposite 
qualities. As the essayist himself says in the next para-
graph: 
Whoever else is, it is pretty clear that the author of 
Caleb Williams and st. Leon is not the author of Waver-
ley. Nothing can be more distinct or excellent in their 
several ways than these two writers. If the one owes 
almost every thing to external observation and tradition-
al character, the other owes every thing to internal con-
ception and contemplation of the possible workings of ·the 
human mind. There is very little knowledge of the world, 
little variety, neither an eye for the picturesque, nor a 
talent for the humorous in Caleb Williams, for instance, 
but you cannot doubt for a moment of the originality of 
the work and the force of the conception. The impression 
made upon the reader is the exact measure of the strength 
of the author's genius. 
(vi, 130) 
There is yet another comparison of Godwin and 'Scott 
in a third essay, entitled 11Mr. Godwin, 11 contributed to the 
Edinburgh Review in 1830. Speaking of Godwin's novel 
Cloudesly, Hazlitt writes: 
The plot is borrowed from a real event that took.place 
concerning a disputed succession in the middle of the 
last century, and which gave birth not long after to a 
novel of the title Annesley. We should like to meet 
with a copy of this work, in order to see how a writer 
of less genius [than Godwin] would get to the end of 
his task, and carry the reader along with him without 
the aid of those subtle researches and lofty declama-
tions with which Mr. Godwin has supplied the place of 
facts and circumstances. The published trial, we will 
hazard a conjecture, has more 'mark and likelihood in 
it. I 
(xvi, 400-401) 
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Hazlitt is critical of Godwin here--Godwin, he maintains, is 
supplying "declamations" of his own in place of "facts and 
circumstances"; he is covering over the external reality with 
the workings of his own mind. And, in the present context, 
this is a negative quality. (The reference to the author of 
Annesley having "less genius" than Godwin is ironic, since 
Godwin is being criticized in comparison with him.) Hazlitt 
then immediately continues by setting off Godwin's fault in 
contrast to the excellence of another writer--Scott: 
This is the beauty of Sir Walter Scott: he takes a leg-
end or an _actual character as he finds it, while ot_her 
writers think they have not performed their engagements 
and acquitted themselves with applause, till they have 
slobbered over the plain face of nature with paint and 
varnish of their own. They conceive the truth is a 
plagiarism, and the thing ~ it happened a forgery and 
imposition on the public. They stand right before their 
subject, and say, 'Nay, but hear me first.' We know no 
other merit in the Author of Waverley than that he is 
never this opaqu~, obtrusive body, getting in the way and 
eclipsing the sun of truth and nature, which shines with 
broad universal light through the different works. If we 
were to describe the secret of this author's success in 
three words, we should say, that it consists in the ab-
sence of egotism. 
The passage speaks _for itself. It is especially interest-
ing, though, in that, when matched with the other Godwin-Scott 
co~parisons, it readily underscores Hazlitt's inconsistency in 
the use of his polar values. In one essay, Godwin is "far 
better" and Scott is a source of perpetual embarrassment; in . 
another, both authors are praised; in a third, Scott is 
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praised highly and Godwin is heavily criticized. And in 
each instance the comparison of the two writers is made on 
exactly the same grounds: the opposite qualities of mind 
they exhibit.9 
Hazlitt was aware of such inconsistencies in his 
writing, and in his polemical Letter to William Gifford 
(1819) he defends himself by saying: 
my love of paradox may, I think, be accounted for from 
the necessity of counteracting the obstinacy of prej-
udice •. If I have been led to carry a remark too far, 
it was because others would not allow it to have any 
force at all. My object was to show the latent oper-
ation of some unsuspected principle, and I therefore 
took only some one view of that particular subject. I 
was chiefly anxious that the germ of thought should be 
true and original; that I should put others in posses-
sion of what I meant, and then left it to find its 
level in the operation of common sense, and to have its 
excesses corrected by other causes. The principle will 
be found true, even where the application is extravagant 
or partial. I have not been wedded to my particular 
speculations with the spirit of a partisan. I wrote for 
instance an Essay on Pedantry, to qualify the extreme 
contempt into which it has fallen, and to shew the neces-
sary advantage of an absorption of the whole mind in some 
favourite study, and I wrote an Essay on the Ignorance 
of the Learned to lessen the undue admiration of Learning, 
and shew that it is not everything. 
(ix I 30) 
"The latent operation of some unsuspected principle" is; like 
9Note, then, .the unintentional irony of a comment made 
in 1824: 
"Nothing provokes me more than these exclusive and invid-
ious comparisons, which seek to raise.one man of genius 
by setting down another, and which suppose that there is 
nothing to admire in the greatest talents, unless they can 
be made a foil to bring out weak points or nominal imper-
fections of some fancied rival." 
(xvi, 295) 
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the "generic distinction" upon which he strings pearls,10 
a reference to this customary oppositions. Hazlitt's mind 
habi~ually worked with the tensions of contrasting elements; 
as he says in his Characteristics (1823), "There is a natu-
ral principle of antithesis in the human mind. We seldom 
grant one excellence but we hasten to make up for it by a 
contrary defect, to keep the balance of criticism even" (ix, 
180). The reason for this habitual practice is precisely 
his belief that there is indeed "a natural principle of 
antithesis" in the human mind itself; specifically, there 
is an antithesis in the operation of the faculty of imagi-
nation. Hence, Hazlitt's famous dictum: "Truth is not one,· 
but many; and an observation may be true in itself that 
contradicts another equally t~ue, according to the.point of 
view from which we contemplate the subject" (ix, 228). The 
human mind is capable of shifting--and does shift--between 
the selfless point of view and an infinite variety of fil-
tered or individual points of view; but, for Hazlitt, as 
long as the "warm, palpitating fibres of the purnan heart" 
are involved--no matter what contradictions may result--
then there, too, is truth.11 
10
see above, Chapter II, p. 51. 
llsee Chapter V!, below, for further discussion of 
the overall relationship of Hazlitt's opposite types of per-
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ception. 
For other statements in opposition to each other, see 
also the following: 
la) Favorable references to "intensity" or criticisms of 
"ease": i, 125; v, 85, 151, 379; viii, 30; ix, 240, 244; x, 
45, 52, 273; xi, 131-132; xii, 269, 304; xvi, 18, 41-42, 92n, 
403-404, 413, 415, 445; xvii, 8, 169; xviii, 33, 36, 114. 
lb) Favorable references to "ease" or criticisms of "inten-
sity": iv, 53; v, 88; vi, 163; viii, 78, 80, 87, 283, 316; 
ix, 237~241; x, 44, 61, 67; xi, 60, 69, 131-132, 134, 248, 
248n; xii, 92, 329; xvi, 12 1 49, 153, 188, 318, 353; xviii, 
81, 113, 278; xx, 153, 243. 
2a) Favorable teferences to narrow scope, or criticisms 
of broad range of concern: i, 125; iv, 132; v, 71, 151, 181, 
376, 379; vii, 117; viii, 79, 103; ix, 175, 180, 196, 218, 220, 
243; x, 303; xi, 30, 97, 131-132, 147, 229, 278, 317; xii, 197-
199, 312; xvi, 188, 402, 404, 408; xvii, 8, 33, 167-168, 332f.; 
xviii, 4ln, 304; xi~, 84, 209-210; xx, 92, 135. 
2b) Favorable references to broad scope, or criticisms of 
narrowness: i, 124; iv, 47-51, 64, 123, 151, 200, 238; v, 52, 
54-55; vi, 65-66~ 150, 327, 328; vii, 142, 314; viii, 29, 33, 
52, 59-69, 266n, 271; ix, 170, 195, 204; x, 130, 303; xi, 8, 
16, 47, 116, 130-131, 190, 275; xii, 26, 10.1, 123, 164, 248; 
xvi, 53, 59, 243, 371, 401; xvii, 25, 26, 92, 175,. 189f., 326, 
328; xviii, 81, 113, 417; xix, 15, 288; xx, 157, 262, 270,:~321. 
3a) Favorable references to structured, filtered, or self-
ish perception, or criticisms of unmodified or selfless per-
ception: iv, 120, 152; v, 3; viii, 57-58, 176, 202; ix, 244; 
x, 52; xi, 81, 154, 278; xvi, 41-43, 53, 101-102, 397-398, 402, 
404; xvii, 8, 29, 33, 65, 332; xix, 10, 210; xx, 97, 102, 237. 
3b) Favorable references to selfless perception, or criti-
cisms of structured/filtered.awareness: i, 3, 7; iv, 5, 74; 
vi, 92-93, 151; vii, 144, 228, 310; viii, 52, 76, 77, 169, 224, 
266n, 269, 270; ix, 165, 195; x, 18, 89; xi, 48, 54, 115, 135; 
xii, 32, 101, 352; xvi, 6, 89, 132-133, 339, 364; xvii, 103, 
189f., 326; xviii, 36, 148; xix, 93,. 95-96; xx, 126, 157, 230, 
316f. 
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CHAPTER IV 
ANALYSES OF INDIVIDUAL ESSAYS 
" • . . for I seldom see my way 
a page or even a sentence beforehand." 
(1821: viii, 6) 
A trying problem that many Hazlitt.scholars· have 
faced is that of finding any kind of pattern in the writings 
of a man who often wrote quickly and with little revision--
indeed, Hazlitt himself said in his Table-Talk collection: 
What abortions are these Essays! What errors, what ill-
paced transitions, what crooked reasons, what lame con-
clusions! How little is made out, and that little how 
ill! •.• I have also time on my hands to correct my opin-
ions, and polish my periods: but the one I cannot, arid 
the other I will not do. 
(viii, 79) 
M. H. Abrams has said that Hazlitt's rapidity of composition 
was possible "only because his essays are relatively plan-
less"; 1 elsewhere he contr~sts Lamb's "delicately contrived 
rhetoric and meticulously controlled organization" to Haz-
litt's "hard-hitting plain style and seemingly casual order 
of topics. 112 Ian Jack writes that "Interested as he is in 
111william Hazlitt," in Vol. II of The Norton An-
thology of English Literature (2 vols.; New York: w. w. 
Norton & co., Inc., 1962), p. 512. 
2Ibid., p. 19. 
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the essay as a form, he is more interested in the truth 
which he is pursuing," and "At times he piles up statements 
with an apparent lack of any evolution in the thought."3 
One of the best treatments of the structure of Hazlitt's 
writing has been contributed by W.P. Albrecht; but his ex-
emplary analysis of "On the Fear of Death" is only three 
pages long.4 
To anyone acquainted with Hazlitt's varied essays 
i_t is obvious that there is no simple solution to the 
structural questions involved. In general it may be said 
that he frequently utilized the tensions of contrasts of 
ideas and of shifting points of view; he was also, as 
Herschel Baker puts it, "a master of association"5 in giv-
ing his mind free reign to wander about--and often away 
from--his topics, or in letting his moods grow in layers of 
accretion about a central nugget of experience. The prob-
lems of structure in Hazlitt's work are quite diverse, and, 
extreme individual that the man was, his mind would never 
lend itself to such rhetorical conventions as those of Dr. 
311Hazlitt, 11 in English Literature: 1815-1832, Vol. 
X of The Oxford History of English Literature, ed. by F~P. 
Wilson and Bonamy Dobr~e (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), 
pp. 273, 277. 
4Hazlitt and the Creative Imagination, pp. 163-169. 
5william Hazlitt, p. 393. 
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Johnson; indeed, Hazlitt would probably bridle at any hint 
of predictability in his spontaneous responses to the varied 
world he lived in. 6 
However, I think that some further progress can be 
made in our knowledge of Hazlitt's structures--though it will 
never, of course, be a complete solution--if more attention 
is given to the particular oppositions already delineated. 
So steeped in them was his way of thinking that Hazlitt some-
times hung large sections of essays-~and occasionally entire 
compositions--on the interplay or balance of the same few 
elements we.have been concerned to trace. Particular analysis 
of several essays will make the point more clear. 
I 
"On Going a Journey" (1822: viii, 181-189) 1 is di-
vided into five paragraphs. For most of the essay the au-
6see, for example, viii, 285: "Now I hate my style 
to be known; as I hate all idiosyncracy." 
1
'I'his essay was a favorite of Robert Louis Stevenson, 
who quotes from it repeatedly in his own "Walking Tours." At 
one point he refers to it with the accolade, "On Going .E Jou·r-
ney, which is so good that there should be a tax levied on all 
who have not read it." Later in the same essay he quotes part 
of the passage in which Hazlitt recollects his twentieth birth-
day; Stevenson then adds: "I should wish to quote more, for 
though we are mighty fine fellows nowadays, we cannot write 
like Hazlitt" (Works [26 vols., Author's edition; New York: 
Charles Scribner's sons, 1895~1901], XIII, 153, 157). 
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thor treats of how a journey allows him to see the world 
with great serenity and with no constrictions or hindrances--
essentially as Shakespeare would see it. But as the essay 
moves on, Hazlitt also begins to assert the value of a fo-
cused and concentrated perspective, in which one's own hab-
itual patterns of thought are to be valued rather than dis-
carded. The piece ends in a balance of the opposites, with 
both of the polar ways of approaching life being accepted 
as necessary and desirable. 
The first paragraph is quite brief. "One of the 
pleasantest. things in the world," the essayist begins, "is 
going a journey; but I like to go by myself. I can enjoy 
society in a room; but out of doors, nature is company 
enough for me." There is a contrast immediately estab-
lished here between "society," linked with the confi"ning 
structure of a room,_and "nature," linked with the boundless 
expanse of the out-of-doors. Already, then, we have a 
strong suggestion that Hazlitt's mind is working with its· 
characteristic polar concerns of confinement and focus of 
awareness vs. a universal susceptibility; and we might sus-
pect, therefore, that the other elements of the opposition 
are also involved (the next paragraph will show clearly that 
they are). The essayist continues with a remark taken from 
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cicero's De Officiis: "I am then never less alone than when 
alone. 112 Obviously this is an apparent contradiction; it 
may be more intelligible, though, if we realize that in using 
this particularly appropriate quotation Hazlitt is shifting 
from one polar viewpoint to the other within the one sentence, 
even as he did in his remark that Wordsworth's "strength lies 
in his weakness." The word "alone," always carrying the 
notion of separation from something, is used from two dif-
ferent points of reference. From one angle, Hazlitt is 
standing within a structured pattern (society)--"alone" in 
this case signifies separation from this habitual order of 
men. But when he is "alone" in this sense, he is "never 
less alone" in the other. This other sense derives from 
a stance within nature, for in this context he is not sepa-
rated from anything--he experiences what we shall call 
Shakespearean or Paradisal vision, in which there are no 
hindrances which distance him from the objects of his per-
ception; he has complete "negative capability" and is one 
with everything he sees. Thus Hazlitt may indeed be alone 
2
cf. De Officiis, III, i, 1, trans. by Walter Miller 
in The Loeb Cl~sical Library, ed. by T.E. Page et al. (London: 
William Heinemann Ltd; New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1928), 
pp. 270, 271; and De Re Publi~~· I, xvii, 27, trans. by Clin-
ton W. Keyes in The Loeb Classical Library_, ed. by T.E. Page 
et al. (London: William Heinemann Ltd; Cambridge, Massachu-
setts: Harvard University Press, 1951), pp. 48, 49. 
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and not alone at once, separated and not separated, if we 
understand that two different angles of vision lie behind 
the surface of his statement. 
The second paragraph is quite lengthy; it has the 
function of specifying and expanding the contrast of per-
spectives suggested in paragraph one. In addition, it con-
tinues the emphasis on Shakespearean vision as being superior 
to structured or confined ways of seeing things. The para-
graph repeatedly states the essayist•. s desire for a feeling 
of serenity, his craving for a large expanse to ~ove about 
in (physically and intellectually), and his wish to see 
things freshly, without any habitual associations. For ex-
ample, expressing his desire for serenity, he wishes "to 
muse on indifferent matters 11 -- 11 indifferent 11 being an imper-
tant word for him, as we have previously seen. He "sings 
for joy"; and "mine," he says, "is that undisturbed silence 
which alone is perfect eloquence." Quoting Shakespeare, he 
writes, "'Leave, oh leave me to my repose!'"; and he gives 
a passage from Fletcher's Faithful Shepherdess describing 
Phoebe and Endymion: 
.•. she convey'd him softly in a sleep 
His temples bound with poppy 
He says, further, of his own state: "I want to see my vague 
notions float like the down of the thistle before the breeze." 
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Such concerns for emotional tranquility are endlessly re-
peated in the paragraph, sometimes shading so finely into 
his other two desires that this one notion of serenity is 
difficult to separate. 
A similar situation holds true with his wish for a 
broad, rather than confined, expanse in which to operate--
the notion is always there, though usually mixed in and dove-
tailing with the other two elements which, for purposes of 
analysis, we are distinguishing. He says, for example: "I 
like more elbow-room, and fewer incumbrances"; and shortly 
afterwards: "It is because I want a little breathing space 
to muse on indifferent matters . . that I absent myself 
from the town for a while." And he wishes to walk and move 
about down a "winding" road, i.e., one which allows for lat-
eral motion. He also says, "I am for the synthetical method 
on a journey, in preference to the analytical"; the former 
term suggests a desire to take in a variety of objects in 
his perception, the latter to focus on some one thing in par-
ticular. The contrast of "broadness" vs. "narrowness" is 
certainly present. 
Several times he expresses the _further desire to be 
free of all structures that usually exist within his per-
ception--verbal and societal structures especially. If Haz-
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litt is to put a feeling into words or try to describe a 
subtle sensation, he must inevitably formalize this thought~ 
due to the very nature of language. Language does not exist 
without structure and order; these "incumbrances" must in-
evitably accompany verbal expression. And it is just such 
pre-set patterns that Hazlitt wishes to avoid when he is in 
the country: "No one likes puns, alliterations, antitheses, 
argument, and analysis better than I do; but I sometimes had 
rather be without them." Such structures of.thought are 
anathema to a Shakespearean type of vision. Indeed, in his 
essay "On Shakespeare and Milton" he specifically }(raises the 
dramatist for his lack of such structures: "Nothing is made 
out by formal inference and analogy, by climax and antithesis: 
all comes, or see~s to come, immediately from nature" (v, 50). 
Hazlitt may therefore ask, "Is not this wild rose sweet without 
a comment?" And he repeats the same idea in saying that "this 
continual comparing of notes interferes with the involuntary 
impression of things upon the mind, and hurts the sentiment." 
We have already seen that writers such as Shakespeare 
and Scott actually free their readers' minds from old ways1 
it is therefore appropriate that Hazlitt can have such vision 
"when I escape from the throng to do so." The notion of "the 
throng," society, or people in one's everyday world, is impor-
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tant in paragraph two because social relations also demand a 
.. '''' f structure (as does language). Hazlitt gives examples; speak-
~· ing of walking in the country in company with others he says: 
I have heard it said that you may, when the moody fit 
comes on, walk or ride on by yourself, and indulge your 
reveries. But this looks like a breach of manners, a 
neglect of others, and you are thinking all the time 
that you ought to rejoin your party. 
"Manners" is the key word--when in a social situation, one 
must abide by such set patterns of action. But there are 
other difficulties, too: "If you remark the scent ·of a bean--
field crossing the road, perhaps your fellow-traveller has 
no smell. If you point to a distant object, perhaps he is 
short-sighted, and has to take out his glass to look at it." 
In short, different people perceive things in different ways, 
and if there is a discrepancy, one has to resort to a verbal, 
analytical tack to account for it--but to do so distorts 
one's own feelings. It is not surprising, then, that Haz-
litt, earlier, says: '"Out upon such half-faced fellowship,' 
say I. I like to be either entirely to myself, or entirely 
at the disposal of others." It is important, and character-
istic, that these two opposites of structured and non-
structured activity are not unified--Hazlitt must have one 
or the other separately. He can balance, but not synthesize 
them. 
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of serenity it creates, as we have already indicated. But 
there is another striking aspect to the passage: 
Here be all new delights, cool streams, and wells, 
Arbours o'ergrown with woodbine, caves and dells; 
Choose where thou wilt, while I sit by and sing, 
Or gather rushes to make many a ring 
For thy long fingers; • . .• 
The fact that the speaker tells his auditor to "Choose where 
thou wilt" to sit would probably have appealed to Hazlitt, as 
it points out the lack of any restrictions or "manners" in 
this natural setting~ 
A further point about paragraph two is the inconsis-
tency of person throughout it--Hazlitt seems to arbitrarily 
use 11 I, 11 11we, 11 "you," and "one" in expressing agency in his 
sentences. This _may well be an unconscious dramatization of 
the difficulty he had in capturing verbally the type of ex-
perience he wants to relate--something which he repeatedly 
admits is difficult for him to do,. whereas he specifically 
points out that for someone like Coleridge it is easy. There 
is a mixture of the personal with universal elements in his 
choice of words--as if Hazlitt could not quite capture the 
universality he experienced in all its purity, or as if he 
felt the need to speak personally in order to communicate to 
others what was really a non-personal and universal sensation. 
If we take the inconsistencies collectively, we get the im-
pression that the necessary but limiting forms of language 
87 
are preventing him from perfectly communicating his feelings. 
His own writing, then, unconsciously dramatizes his assertions. 
The third paragraph, also quite lengthy, continues the 
contrast of opposite viewpoints, with the same stress as to 
which is the more valuable. The opening, though, pays some-
thing of a compliment to Charles Lamb and his kind of per-
spective, which (here) is opposite to the Shakespearean type. 
Lamb is the "best" company indoors, i.e., within the structure 
of society; but he is therefore bad when one wishes to quit 
such confinements. Nevertheless, Hazlitt seems to suggest 
(though the passage is ambiguous) that someone like Lamb may 
still have value out of doors, as conversing with him in the 
open air wi_ll set a "keener edge on appetite." This is defi-
nitely a statement made from the stance of Hazlitt's Words-
worthian set of values, indicating as it does the positive 
value of focusing on and intensifying one particular avenue 
of response. And "this sort of friendly altercation," here, 
is a good thing, whereas "this continual comparing of notes" 
from the previous paragraph was an activity to be shunned. 
It is interesting to see, however, that Hazlitt switches back 
to the opposite, non-Wordsworthian view very quickly, and 
characteristically he contradicts himself in the process. The 
relevant passage is as follows: 
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The open air improves this sort of conversation or 
friendly altercation, by setting a keener edge on 
appetite. Every mile of the road heightens the fla-
vor of the viands ~ expect at the end of it. How 
fine it is to enter some old town, walled and tur-
reted, just at the approach of night-fall, or to 
some straggling village, with the lights streaming 
through the surrounding gloom; and then after in-
quiring for the best entertainment that the place 
affords, to 'take one's ease at one's inn!' These 
eventful moments in our lives are in fact too pre-
cious, too full of solid, heart-felt happiness to be 
frittered and dribbled away in imperfect sympathy. 
!. would have them all to myself and drain them to the 
last drop: ~ney will do to talk of or to write about 
afterwards. 
Apparently conversation with a friend (at the start of the 
passage) is a contributing factor in heightening one's appe-
tite and is therefore valuable. There is, however, an ambi-
guity--is the "friend" or the "open air" responsible for set-
ting the "keener edge" on appetite? If the "open air" alone 
is responsible for the increased expectation, why would con-
versation be mentioned in connection with it at all? Evidently 
the human element is necessary here. But at the end of this 
passage, Hazlitt renounces any social relationship and any use 
of language in going to an inn--such things should come "after-
wards," lest they distort the pure feelings of the moment. 
Despite the ambiguity which is there, we are left with the 
sense that the essayist has two opposite views on the value 
of having conversation with a friend as he approaches dinner 
in some roadside town. 
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If there is to be any talk at all, Hazlitt would pre-
fer it to be with a stranger--for a friend calls up the asso-
ciations and responses that must be used in the world of the 
town; and these are the very things, the very "manners" one 
wishes to escape from. "A stranger takes his hue and charac-
ter from the time and place; he is part of the furniture and 
costume of an inn," he says; and a few sentences later he adds: 
"But a friend reminds one of other things, rips up old griev-
ances, and destroys the abstraction of a scene. He comes in 
ungraciously between us and our imaginary character"--as would 
a filter. 
He continues: ''Something is dropped in the course of 
conversati.on that gives a hint of your profession and pursuits 
• • • • You are no longer a citizen of the world: but your 
'unhoused free condition is put into circumscription and con-
fine.'" From this viewpoint it is obviously bad if such hints 
of profession turn up in conversation. This, incidentally, is 
a direct contradiction to what the essayist says in his essay 
"On Pedantry": "It is a very bad sign (unless where it arises 
from singular modesty) when you cannot tell a man's profession 
from his conversation. Such persons either feel no interest 
in what concerns them most, or do not express what they feel" 
(iv, 8ln). As in the other cases mentioned, the existence of 
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such a contradiction clearly indicates that Hazlitt's mind 
is working with his opposite values. 
Paragraph three continues to repeat ideas we have 
encountered before. One of the characteristics of Shake-
spearean vision is the complete lack of "egotism" and per-
sonal identity separate from the objects bf vision; the es-
sayist now returns to this theme: 
Oh! It is great to shake off the tranunels of the world 
and of public opinion~-to lose our importunate, tor-
menting, everlasting personal identity in the elements 
of nature, and become the creature of the moment, clear 
of all ties •..• One may take one's choice of all 
characters in this romantic state of uncertainty as to 
one's real pretensions, and become indefinitely respect-
able and negatively right-worshipful. 
To lose his own identity and to become whatever character he 
chooses is the capability Hazlitt desires--the "negative 
capability," as Keats .called it. What the essayist wants here 
i~ precisely what he values so highly in Shakespeare in "On 
Posthumous Fame": "He seemed scarcely to have an individual 
existence of his own, but to borrow that of others at will, 
and to pass successively through 'every mode of untried being'" 
{iv, 23). Again, we might point out that Hazlitt's valuing of 
negative capability here contradicts his stance in another es-
say, entitled {ironically!) "On consistency of Opinion," in 
which he says: "It is well not to go out of ourselves, and 
to be contented to take up with what we are, for better for 
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worse" (xvii, 33). 
He moves on to talk about inns; his essential comment 
is that "an inn restores us to the level of nature, and quits 
scores with society!" Thus, even though an inn is a place of 
social assembly, it does not impose societal manners or struc-
tures upon one's perspective--rather, it frees one from just 
such confinements. At an ,inn, Paradisal or Shakespearean vi-
sion and not structured perception obtains; and this is what 
is essential--again, the way one sees is what Hazlitt is in-
terested in, not what one sees. Hazlitt may therefore be ob-
serving men just like those he would see in London; but there 
is a radical difference--at an inn, the way he perceives them 
is not at all like the way he would see them in the city. 
There, his perception is confined and directed by custom, per-
sonal habit, and prescribed manners; here, he sees everything 
freshly, as if looking upon things for the first time. It is 
because of this newness of vision that Hazlitt says he has 
"spent some enviable hours at inns." For in looking at problems 
with this new, non-habitual approach, he has had several genuine 
insights that would not have .arisen in London. He lists a num-
ber of examples: he "found out the proof that likeness is not 
a case of the association of ideas"; he "compared triumphantly" 
Westall's drawings to the figure of a girl who ferried him 
across the Severn. And when he turns his attention to books 
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"in this way" (i.e., with serenity, universal awareness, and 
freshness of vision) the experience is exhilarating--he even 
sits up half the night at an inn in Bridgewater reading senti-
mental novels. The particular subjects of his insights aren't 
really important--what he remembers is the joy he .felt from 
his way of looking at them. But the most memorable of all his 
experiences of Paradisal or Shakespearean vision is that which 
he had while walking to the Welsh inn at Llangollen on his 
twentieth birthday. 
Hazlitt relates this incident very carefully, choosing 
several details which emphasize the freshness of the vision 
he experienced. First, the letter he reads from the New 
Eloise is "St. Preux's description of his feelings as he first 
caught ~ glimpse from the heights of the Jura of the Pays de 
Vaud"; i.e., his reading matter is of someone who saw a strik-
ing natural scene for the very first time--with fresh vision, 
untainted by habit. Second, it is Hazlitt's own birthday, 
probably suggestive to him of a new beginning, free from the 
trammels of the past. Third, he says: "I had for the first 
time come from a place in the neighborhood to visit this de-
lightful spot [the Vale of Llangollen]"; he himself is seeing 
a natural scene with no preconceived expectations, even as 
St. Preux did. Fourth, he says: "The road to Llangollen turns 
off between Chirk and Wrexham; and on passing a certain point, 
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you come all at once upon the valley, which opens like an 
amphitheatre ••• 11 ; 3 he thus emphasizes the surprise of the 
incident, the unexpected nature of what happened--he there-
fore could not have had any set expectations. Fifth, he 
quotes lines from Coleridge's "Ode to the Departing Year~,4 
to describe what he sees; and Coleridge, of course, is re-
markable for his own freshness of perception. Sixth, Hazlitt 
himself relates that "a budding ash-tree dipped its tender 
branches in the chiding stream"; he thereby emphasizes the 
youth and newness of nature in the Spring, in harmony with 
his own mental state. And finally, he describes that mental 
state as one of great 11 Hope 11 --and it is this quality, along 
3Having visited this delightful spot myself, I can 
personally. attest to the.accuracy of Hazlitt's description. 
The road which turns off between Chirk and Wrexham is now 
labelled the AS; the "certain point" is precisely at the 
western boundary of the village of Froncysyllte (near a house 
called "Argoed cottage"}, where, due to a bend in the road, 
one does indeed come "all at once" upon the beautiful prospect 
of Langollen Vale stretching in the distance. 
4Note the association with Eden in the context of the 
lines quoted from the Ode: 
---, 
O Albion! O my mother Isle! 
Thy valleys fair as Eden's bowers, 
Glitter green with sunny showers; 
Thy grassy uplands' gentle swells 
Echo to the beat of flocks; .• 
(The Com;elete. Poetical Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ed. 
by E.H. Coleridge [2 vols.; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1912], 
I, 166.} 
t 
r 
•. 
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with freshness, that Hazlitt says characterized the vision of 
Adam and Eve in Paradise: 
In them hung trembling all our hopes and fears. They 
were as yet alone in the world, in the eye of nature, 
wondering at their new being, full of enjoyment •.•• 
All things seem to acquire fresh sweetness, and to b~ 
clothes with fresh beauty in their sight. 
{v, 67) 
The great emotional power of the Llangollen vision thus derives 
primarily from the way in which Hazlitt perceived nature, from 
the qualities of his own type of vision. 
But immediately after the relation of this incident, 
his ·thoughts start to take a new turn, toward the idea that 
"The beautiful is vanished, and returns not." The great ex-
perience he had is now lost--the traces of it are now "broken 
and defaced" and "a precipice of years separates me from what 
I then was •••• Not only I myself have changed--the world, 
which was then new to me, has become old and incorrigible." 
He says he will try to return "in thought" to his Paradisal 
vision (indeed, the Dee is called "the river of Paradise" here), 
but he is still faced with the fact that he has lost the type 
of sight which would allow him back into Paradise. · 
Paragraph four is a digression, but a necessary one, 
for in it Hazlitt attempts to find the reasons for his loss 
of such vision. The fact that the paragraph is digressive is 
indicated immediately by the radical change in the texture of 
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the language--the end of paragraph three is personal, poetic, 
and laced with images; paragraph four is suddenly abstract, 
assertive, and analytical. The essence of his argument here 
is that men naturally tend to have limited vision and to re-
late everything they see to their own narrow selves, and.that 
therefore such comedowns are, in general, inevitable. Travel-
ling, he says, demonstrates this fact; in giving us new per-
spectives it makes us realize how narrow our normal vision is. 
"We cannot enlarge our conceptions," he says, "we only shift 
our point of view." And "the map that we do not see before 
us is a blank. . the mind can form no larger idea of space 
than the eye can take in at a single glance." This same idea, 
that men naturally tend to have a narrow scope of awareness, 
is characteristically rephrased several times within this one 
paragraph. So, too, travel shows us that not only do we nat-· 
urally have a narrow perspective, but that it is also a self-
centered one. "In travelling through a wild barren country," 
Hazlitt writes, "I can form no idea of a woody and cultivated 
one. It appears to me that all the world must be barren, like 
what· I see of it. 11 And shortly afterwards he says: "We meas-
ure the universe by ourselves"--we naturally tend to fit 
everything to the procrustean structures of our own minds. 
This thought, that in everyday life our vision is the 
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opposite of Paradisal, is not new to Hazlitt; it is quite 
characteristic of his other writings. In "On the Feeling 
of Immortality in Youth" he makes a similar statement,. 
although more bitter in tone, of the same idea: "The mind 
soars by an effort to the grand and lofty: it is at home in 
the grovelling, the disagreeable, and the little" (xvii, 199). 
And in "On the Qualifications Necessary to success in Lifeu 
he suggests that such vision is not only normal but, indeed, 
necessary in the everyday world: 
In common life, the narrowness of our ideas and appetites 
is more favorable to the accomplishment of our designs, 
by confining our attention and ambition to one simple ob-
ject, than a greater enlargement of comprehension or sus-
ceptibility of taste. 
(xii, 197) 
And in the same essay he also says: 
To do any one thing best, there should be an exclusive-
ness, a concentration, a bigotry, a blindness of attach-
ment to that one object; so that the widest range of 
knowledge and most diffusive subtlety of intellect will 
not uniformly produce the most beneficial results. 
The first part of this statement sounds very much like a com-
ment he would make of Wordsworth. 
It is important to note that Hazlitt's comments on 
our everyday social practices are essentially like his com-
rnents on Wordsworth, Byron, Godwin, and the others of their 
sort. In "On Poetry in General" the essayist himself attests 
to the general similarity of the types of perception involved. 
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First of all, we must understand that in this essay he is 
talking about Wordsworthian rather than Shakespearean poet-
ry--e. g., he states that "Poetry is the high-wrought 
enthusiasm of fancy and feeling. As in describing natural 
objects, it impregnates sensible impressions with the forms 
of fancy ." {v, 4-5) and so on. And he makes·compari-
sons of this type of poetry with everyday life: "If poetry 
is a dream," he says, "the business of life is much the same. 
If it is a fiction, made up of what we wish things to be, and 
fancy that they are, because we wish them so, then there is 
no other or better reality" (v,: 3). And in the next paragraph 
he says explicitly: "We shape things according to our wishes 
and fancies, without poetry; but poetry is the most emphatical 
language that can be found for these creations of the mind 
'which ecstacy is very cunning in.'" "Everyday" vision is 
thus similar to Wordsworthian sight in that both involve the 
imposition of our own shapes or structures upon the subjects 
of perception; and, as we have seen, both involve narrowness 
rather than broadness in ~he scope of sensibility. Hazlitt 
does not really speak of intensity of feeling in connection 
with "everyday" vision; on the other hand, though, even from 
the contrast set up in "On Going a Journey" it is obvious 
that such a way of seeing things lacks the serenity of Shake-
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spearean vision. The second quotation from Hazlitt, above, 
r [• 
may give us the necessary insight we need here: "but poetry 
II Evidently the major differ-
! ence between "everyday" vision and Wordsworthian sight is a 
matter of degree--the former is just less intense than the 
latter. It is not an important difference that Wordsworth 
generates his own structures to impose upon objects, and that 
a more conventional person simply accepts the predetermined 
structures of society and imposes them on what he sees. The 
conventional man of society, in accepting prevailing "manners," 
thereby makes such structures his own; thus he does impress 
his own forms upon what he sees. What he does is therefore 
essentially like Wordsworth's practice, in that the resulting 
perception is indeed filtered or modified. "Everyday" vision 
is thus essentially like Wordsworthian perception, being also 
essentially opposed, then, to Shakespearean vision. 
At the very end of the digression of paragraph four, 
Hazlitt says he will now return "to the question r·have quit-
ted above," i.e., in paragraph three. At the end of this 
third paragraph, he had.just come to the realization that he 
now lacks Paradisal vision and that what is left to him is 
the mere perspective of limitation. In paragraph five he re-
turns to this topic, that at present his perceptions are nar-
rowed, by verbal and societal structures. 
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But in treating this topic he now takes a new tack, 
t · one which illustrates his characteristic inconsistency in 
~·· 
~ assigning preference to one set of values over the other. 
For where he saw limited vision as a negative thing at the 
end of paragraph three, he now sees the same limitation as 
a source of positive strength. Travelling "in company with 
a friend or party" now heightens his appreciation of "ruins, 
aqueducts, and pictures," just as a companion before had set 
a "keener edge" on appetite. He now giv.es several examples 
of instances in which limited or focused vision has produced 
great pleasure for him. He mentions discussing.Stonehenge, 
and also "descanting 11 to a party on the sights at Oxford. 
In both cases, the acts of verbalization and interaction with 
other people are processes that are joyful rather than annoy-
ing, which he previously thought them to be. So, too, he says 
that when he travels among foreign lands he feels pleased to 
have companions of his own--in essence he is saying that the 
societal structure which is one's own culture can be thought 
of as a refuge and a source of safety; from this viewpoint it 
is much more than a confining and inhibiting cage. "In such 
situations, so opposite to all one's ordinary train of ideas," 
he says, "one seems a species by one's-self, a limb torn off 
from society, unless one can meet with instant fellowship and 
support." 
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But at this point he again swings back to a memory 
of Paradisal vision--in this essay, when one side of his 
dialectic becomes too prominent, the other seems to be auto-
matically called in to balance things off. He therefore 
remembers Calais at the time of the French Revolution, where 
he "breathed the air of general humanity." cultural differ-
ences were non-existent, as at this time all such structures 
had vanished from men's vision; the sensation was truly that 
of Paradise. But now he says, "the whole is vanished like a 
shade," even as his experience at Llangollen is now gone. 
And the recognition that it is gone leads him into another 
consideration of why such vision is transient--the movement 
of his mind here is much the same as what we have just seen 
in his digression to account for the loss of the Llangollen 
experience. And, indeed, he goes into something of a di-
gression here, too, for the dash that marks the start of his 
explanation of this loss also signals a sharp break from the 
·depressing direction in which his thoughts were turning. 
Notice just how sharp this break is: 
The whole is vanished like a shade. Pictures, heroes, 
glory, freedom, all are fled: nothing remains but the 
Bourbons and the French people!--There is undoubtedly 
a sensation in travelling into foreign parts that is to 
be had nowhere else: but it is more pleasing at the 
time than lasting •..• 
As he did before, after the descent from the Llangollen vision, 
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he changes to the opposite perspective. Now he says of his 
Paradisal vision that it "does not piece into our daily modes 
of life. It is an animated but momentary hallucination"--
and "hallucination" i's a rather unfavorable word. 
But the movement of the remaining. sentences is essen-
tially to avoid going to an extreme in valuing one mode of 
vision over the other--the scales of his mind seem to oscil-
late less violently up and down; he is moving to strike a 
balance between the two elements of his dialectic. Thus, 
he 'corrects' the uncomplimentary overstatement of Paradisal 
sight being an "hallucination" by saying that we are "perhaps 
more enviable" individuals when we see in this way. But he 
also stresses that such vision does not really relate to our 
everyday world. This is essentially the same point he made 
above, that in our normal lives we do best with limited sight. 
Therefore while it is sometimes good to be "lost to ourselves" 
or to "go out" of ourselves and our usual confinements--i.e., 
to have the negative capability of Shakespearean vision--it 
is sometimes also good to stay in ourselves and our structures. 
' At the end of the essay Hazlitt finally strikes a balance be-
tween the two modes of vision that have been alternately going 
up and down in his estimation: on the one hand, it is good to 
get away from "ties and objects that recall them," to be able 
to see without any such constrictions. On the other hand, 
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"we can only be said to fulfill our destiny in the place that 
gave us birth"--i.e., in the context.of the confinements or 
structures of one's own country and everyday society. The 
final sentence of the essay is most important: "I should on 
this account like well enough to spend the whole of my life 
in travelling abroad, if I could any where borrow another 
life to spend afterwards at home!" Note that Hazlitt does not 
choose one alternative over the other, for both have value to 
him. 
"On Going a Journey" is thus, finally, a dramatization 
of Hazlitt's famous belief that "truth is not one, 11 for the 
movement of the essay concludes with his realization that a 
mixture of opposite perspectives is the key to happiness. 
II 
Herschel Baker has said that "Mr. Kernble's Retire-
ment 11 (1817: v, 374-379) is "one of the peaks of English 
drama criticism. 111 John Philip Kemble was, with Edmund Kean, 
one of Hazlitt's favorite actors, the essayist having fol-
lowed his career for nearly twenty years; and upon Kernble 1 s 
finally leaving the stage in 1817, Hazlitt contributed to 
The Times this assessment of his life's work. Baker says 
that it is "an accolade that would gladden any actor's heart"; 
1 
· 11· l' 290 Wi iam Haz itt, p. n. 
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however, he is somewhat puzzled by the essay, for he also 
writes that, apart from the "sentimental ties" involved, 
"Hazlitt's attitude toward Kemble is hard to understand, 
for he was a stiff and formal actor. 11 2 But it is precisely 
Kemble's formality which makes the essayist's attitude easy 
to understand, for in Kemble Hazlitt found an excellent ex-
emplar of one of the sets of values he prized throughout his 
life, that of intensity of feeling and narrowed scope of con-
cern joined to formality of method.3 And most of the essay 
is structured by his consideration of this one set of values 
from alternating positive and negative viewpoints. 
The first paragraph establishes the basic reason for 
his admiration of Kemble; in it, the essayist gradually ex-
pands his consideration of the actor until it swells into a 
statement of what was for HazLitt a vital truth: 
Mr. Kemble took his leave of the stage on Monday 
night, in the character of Coriolanus. • • • There is 
something in these partings with old public favot:Lrites 
exceedingly affecting •••• Our associations of admi-
ration and delight with theatrical performers, are 
2Ibid., pp. 290, 289. 
3Joseph Donohue, Jr., in his authoritative study 
Dramatic Character in the English Romantic Age (Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970), assesses 
Kemble's style as '"neoclassic,' •.• formal in attitude 
and measured in cadence •••• Perhaps no style has ever 
been so deliberate, so calculated, as his" (p. 245). 
I 
~' 
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among our earliest recollections--among our last re-
grets ...• The impression [of Kemble nearly twenty 
years agol appears as distinct as if it were of yes-
terday. In fact, intellectual objects, in proportion 
as they are lasting, may be said to shorten life. 
Time has no effect upon them. The petty and the per-
sonal, that which appeals to our sense and our inter-
ests, is by degrees forgotten, and fades away into the 
distant obscurity of the past. The grand and the ide-
al, that which appeals to the imagination, can only 
perish with it, and remains with us, unimpaired in its 
lofty abstraction, from youth to age; as, wherever we 
go, we still see the same heavenly bodies shining over 
our heads~ 
That which appeals to the imagination is what endures in life, 
and Hazlitt admired Kemble precisely because he appealed to 
the imagination.. Seeing him retire in the role of Coriolanus 
was particularly moving because of the continuity it showed: 
Coriolanus, the character in which he took his leave of 
the stage, was one of the first in which we remember to 
have seen him; and it was one in which we were not sorry 
to part with him, for we wished to see him appear like 
himself to the last. 
Hazlitt did indeed have a "wish" as he went to the theatre on 
that June night--and the importance of the wish is underscored 
by his repetition of it: "Why then do we approve of his re-
tiring? Because we do not wish him to wait till it is neces-
sary for him to retire." Hazlitt's hope that Kemble's final 
performance would be as good as his first reflects more than 
just "sentimental ties" to the past--it shows his desire to 
believe that things of the imagination do in fact endure 
through time. The validity of one of his most cherished be-
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liefs was thus at stake. When he could finally write, then, 
that "On the last evening, he displayed the same excellence 
and gave the same prominence to the very same passages, that 
he used to do, 11 Hazlitt had experienced the fulfillment of 
his hope: Kemble's last performance proved the ultimate val-· 
ue of imagination. The feeling which thus permeates the,par-
agraph is one of satisfaction with the actor's performance 
mingled with self-satisfaction at the confirmation of a cher-
ished personal theory. 
The first paragraph concludes with the citation of 
particular incidents from the play--in the second example, 
on the scene of reconciliation between Coriolanus and his 
mother, the essayist notes that Kemble was a disappointment. 
But he adds that "Perhaps this was not the fault of Mr. 
Kemble, but of the stage itself." The brief second paragraph 
continues in the same line, noting the difficulty of any ac-
tor in trying to capture a Shakespearean character's depth 
of sentiment. 4 The argument on Kemble's appropriateness for 
4 This is perhaps an echo of a comment from 1815: 
"the reader of the plays of Shakespear is almost always dis-
appointed in seeing them acted; and, for our part, we should 
never go to see them acted, if we could help it" (v, 222). 
Charles Lamb held similar views that no production could match 
the ideal performance provided by imagination (cf. "On the 
Tragedies of ~hakespeare, considered with Reference to their 
Fitness for Stage Representation" in The Works of Charles .and 
Mary Lamb, ed. by E.V. Lucas [7 vols.; London: Methuen & co., 
1903-1905], I, 97-111). Coleridge, too, said he was always 
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a particular part, however, needs a more solid basis if it is 
to be developed. In paragraphs three and four, then, Hazlitt 
backtracks to consider the actor's general qualities as shown 
by his entire career, which qualities make him fit or unfit 
for certain roles. He also concomitantly develops the theme 
from paragraph one, that the actor's performances are indeed 
things of the imagination. And after the transitional third 
paragraph, in the fourth he specifies which of the opposite 
types of imagination he means. From this point on, the struc-
ture of the essay is governed by Hazlitt's shifts of .viewpoint 
around a central concern, that of Kemble's general qualities 
as an actor and how they are advantageous or limiting to him. 
Paragraph four begins with a classification of the 
actor according to customary standards of value: 
It has always appeared to us, that the range of char-
acters in which Mr. Kemble more particularly shone, and 
was superior to every other actor, were those which con-
disappointed by actual productions of Shakespeare's plays (cf. 
Coleridge's Shakespearean Criticism, ed. by T.M Raysor [2 
vols., Everyman's Library; London: Dent; New York: Dutton, 
1960], II, 230, 57, 68}. Note, however, Donohue's distinction 
(ibid., p. 285}: 
"The fact that Lamb, Coleridge, and Hazlitt approach the 
drama with this ideal in mind is an important indication 
of the homogeneity of their critical writings. Their es-
sential difference is simply that Lamb and Coleridge are 
descriptive critics concerned with the ideal performance, 
while Hazlitt is a judicial critic concerned with asses-
sing the failure of most actors and most productions to 
measure up to this same ideal." 
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sisted in the development of some one solitary sentiment 
or exclusive passion. From a want of rapidity of style, 
of scope, and variety, he was often deficient in expres-
sing the bustle and complication of different interest; 
• • • but in giving the habitual workings of a predomin-
ant feeling, as in Penruddock, or The Stranger, in Cori-
olanus, Cato, and some others, where all the passions 
move round a central point, and are governed by one 
.master-key, he stood unrivalled. 
Hazlitt's use ·of characteristic diction and phraseology--"soli-
tary," "exclusive," "want of •.• scope, and variety," 11habit-
ual workings" (rather than "spontaneous impulses")--clearly 
indicate that his mind is working within one of its usual 
frameworks of reference; and his attitude, in this paragraph, 
is that these Wordsworthian qualities of narrowness and per-
sonal structuring are a definite advantage to Kemble in·rnany. 
parts. And, as we might expect, Hazlitt also sees intensity 
of passion connected with the actor's ••exclusive" and "habit-
ual" mental activity; citing Kernble's performance of Coriola-
nus as a whole, for example, he says: 
So in Coriolanus, he exhibited the ruling passion with 
the same unbroken ftrmness, he preserved the same haughty 
dignity of demeanour, the same energy of.will, and unbend-
ing sternness of temper throughout. He was swayed by a 
single impulse. His tenaciousness of purpose was only ir-
ritated by opposition; he turned neither to the right nor 
the left; the vehemence with which he moved forward in-
creasing every instant, till it hurried him on to the ca-
tastrophe. 
A similar intensity is then described in Kernble's portrayal 
of Leontes. Hazlitt's conclusion, in paragraph five, is typi-
cal: 
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In such characters, Mr. Kemble had no occasion to call 
to his aid either the resources of invention, or the 
tricks of art: his success depended on the increasing 
intensity with which he dwelt on a given feeling, or 
enforced a passion that resisted all interference or 
control. 
Having listed some of the roles for which Kemble's 
qualities were suited, he then shifts his viewpoint in para-
graphs six, seven, and part of eight to consider roles for 
which the actor's same approach was unsuitable. Foremost of 
these roles was that of Hamlet: 
In Hamlet, on the contrary, Mr. Kemble in our judgment 
unavoidably failed from a want of flexibility, of that 
quick sensibility which yields to every motive, and is 
borne away with every breath of fancy, which is distract-
ed in the multiciplicity of its reflections, and lost in 
the uncertainty of its resolutions. 
No wonder that Hazlitt thought Kemble failed "unavoidably"--
Hamlet has exactly the opposite generic type of mind. Indeed, 
as he is described here the melancholy Dane appears to be 
another Coleridge! 5 The mismatch of Kemble and Hamlet is thus 
Age: 
5 See the essay "Mr. Coleridge" in The Spirit£! the 
"(Coleridge] could f10t realize all he knew or thought, and 
less could not fix hi·s desultory ambition. • While he 
should be occupied with a given pursuit, he is thinking 
of a thousand other things; a thousand tastes, a thousand 
objects tempt him, and distract his mind, which keeps open 
house, and entertains all comers .•.. Mr. Coleridge's 
bark, 'taught with the little nautilus to sail,' the sport 
of every breath, dancing to every wave, 'Youth at its prow, 
and Pleasure at its helm,' flutters its gaudy pennons in 
the air, glitters in the sun, but we wait in vain to hear 
of its arrival in the destined harbour." 
{xi, 34, 36-37) 
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complete; and this particular description of the situation 
(Kemble playing the role "in one undeviating straight line, 
which is • • . remote from the natural grace and indolent 
susceptibility of the character") mirrors Hazlitt's comment 
from Characters of Shakespear's Plays, that "Mr. Kemble un-
avoidably fails in this character from a want of ease and 
variety" (iv, 237). 
The actor's style was also unsuitable for King John 
and Macbeth, as the next paragraphs make. clear. In the for-
mer role, Hazlitt says, Kemble "seemed waiting for some com-
plicated machinery to enable him to make his next movement, 
instead of trusting to the true impulses of passion." The 
use of mechanical imagery is continued in another comment, 
comparing the actor to an automaton: "If an image could be 
constructed by magic art to play King John, it would play 
it in much the same manner that Mr. Kemble played it." The 
contrast is of course that between artful or contrived for-
mality and unstructured, unprepared-for spontaneity. The 
two opposite types of imagination underlie Hazlitt's point 
Interestingly enough, Coleridge too saw Hamlet as an image of 
himself. A.C. Bradley has noted the point, saying that "he 
dwarfs the sublime struggle of Hamlet into the image of his 
own unhappy weakness" (Poetry for Poetry's Sake [Oxford: Clar-
endon Press, 1901], p. 14). See Coleridge's statements in 
The Literary Remains of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ed. by H.N. 
Coleridge (4 vols.; London: William Pickering, 1836-1839), 
II, 205-207. See also Inquiring Spirit, ed. by Kathleen 
Coburn (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1951), p. 170. 
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here--Kemble imposes the filter of "manners" on his perfor-
mance; he is not open to direct contact with the natural 
spirit of the character. The same quality of style taints 
his Macbeth: He "maintained his ground too steadily • • • 
instead of staggering and reeling under the appalling visions 
of the preternatural world, and having his frame wrenched 
from all the holds and resting places of his will." His 
attachment to "holds and resting places" prevents him from 
being open to the truth of the situation; his Macbeth's re-
sponse is therefore governed by habit rather than by direct 
contact with the strange world around him. 
Not all of Kemble's Macbeth is criticized, though; 
he played some of the scenes so that they "smote upon the 
heart, and remained there ever after." Passion--a key element 
in Hazlitt's aesthetics--can thus be conveyed even by a formal 
or "pedantic" manner: Kemble's "monotone did not fatigue, his 
formality did not displease; because there was always sense 
and meaning in what he did." 
In this same {eighth) paragraph, there is a brief con-
trast of Kemble and Kean: "[Kemble'sJ Richard III wanted that 
tempest and whirlwind of the soul, that life and spirit, and 
dazzling rapidity of motion, which fills the stage, and burns 
in every part of it, when Mr. Kean performs this character ... 
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Kean was an actor of greater "variety" than Kemble; 6 indeed, 
elsewhere Hazlitt says of him that "He is almost the only ac-
tor who does not spoil Shakespeare" (xviii, 256)--which is 
evidently a suggestion that Kean's qualities are in closer 
accordance with Shakespeare's mind. The comparison here, then, 
apparently has something in it of the contrast of Hazlitt's 
usual opposites. But these are not developed--the rest of the 
essayist's commentary on the two actors is concerned mainly 
with their physical attributes, Kemble's "statue-like appear-
ance" and Kean's "diminutiveness" and "want of dignity of form~" 
By this point in the paragraph, however, Hazlitt is again view-
ing Kemble in a positive light, and is again listing roles 
that he played exceptionally well. The role of Pierre, for 
example, "accorded admirably with Mr. Kemble's natural manner." 
Cato was another part well suited to the actor, calling as it 
did for a studied display of artifice rather than for natural 
spontaneity: "It was a studied piece of classical costume--
a conscious exhibition of elegantly disposed drapery, that 
was all: yet, as a mere display of personal and artificial 
6This variety, though--like its opposite, "the devel-
opment of some one solitary sentiment or exclusive passion"--
has a negative side to it, too. Commenting on Kean's Richard 
III in a Morning Chronicle column of 1814, Hazlitt says that 
"we sometimes thought he failed, even from an exuberance of 
talent, and dissipated the impression of the character by the 
variety of his resources" (v, 181). 
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grace, it was inimitable."7 
The ninth paragraph shifts back to a consideration 
of a role for which Kemble was not adequate. Brutus, as de-
scribed by Hazlitt, is a character of great complexity and 
is therefore unsuited for Kemble's style of intensely devel-
oping one passion. 
The essay finishes with a summary of Hazlitt's major 
points: 
In short, we think the distinguishing excellence of his 
acting may be summed up in one word--intensity; in the 
seizing upon some one feeling or idea, in insisting upon 
it, in never letting it go • • •• If he had not the un-
expected bursts of nature and genius, he had all the reg-
ularity of art. 
In portraying characters that called for the display of these 
qualities, Hazlitt says, Kemble was "the most excellent actor 
of his time." And since these qualities were so important to 
the essayist throughout his life, Hazlitt thus rendered Kemble 
high praise indeed in seeing him as their prime exemplar on 
the contemporary stage. 
III 
"On the Feeling of Immortality in Youth," from 1827 
7Gilbert Austin, in Chironomia; or A Treatise £!!. ~­
torical Delivery .•• (1806), p. 279, similarly compliments 
Kemble for attaining "the perfection and the glory of art, so 
finished, that every look is a commentary, every tone an il-
lustration, every gesture a model for the statuary, and a study 
for the painter" (quoted by Donohue, p. 250). 
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{xvii, 189-199), is one of Hazlitt's more famous essays. It, 
too, shows extensive use of his customary concerns, most of 
the essay basing the feeling of immortality on the experience 
of selfless reliance on external objects for values, uncon-
stricted openness to the range of all experience, and the 
feeling of serenity, ease, and indolence. But Hazlitt's over-
all concern with such qualities--and, to a lesser extent, with 
their opposites--does not have a structural significance here 
as in "On Going a Journey" or "Mr. Kemble's Retirement." "On 
Going a Journey" was structured by the alternate consideration 
of opposite desirable qualities of perception; "Immortality" 
makes much less use of these opposites, and its less fully-
developed contrasts do not fall into structural blocks. And 
whereas "On Going a Journey" presented opposite sets of values, 
"Mr. Kemble's Retirement" consistently used one set, but struc-
tured itself by alternating positive and negative views of it. 
"Immortality," too, stays mainly within one set; but its al'""'. 
terations of viewpoint are minor and do not fall into careful 
balances. 
There is a general movement in time through Hazlitt's 
reflections in the course of the essay; the early paragraphs 
{by far the longest) are concerned with generalized and per-
sonal memories of the feelings of youth. The third-to-last 
paragraph is a consideration of Hazlitt's present condition 
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at the time of the writing; and the next paragraph is an an-
ticipation of the future meeting with death. However, beyond 
this broad movement in time, there is little form to the es-
say. "Immortality" does not readily lend itself to a section-
by-section breakdown. It is more homogeneous than the other 
essays considered so far. Within the broad time framework it 
moves not by steps of opposition and balance, but by repetitions 
and accretions of similar statements around a central core of 
ideas. This core--Hazlitt's concern for what we have else-
where called "Paradisal vision"--acts more as a restraining 
principle than as a structural device. Like a kind of sub-
liminal tether or leash, it keeps Hazlitt's mind generally 
within a certain circle of ideas. It doesn't determine the 
order or sequence of the essayist's wa,nderings, but it does 
confine them within general limits. 
To pro~eed with a paragraph-by-paragraph analysis 
would involve much repetition without showing much progress 
in a train of thought, for the development of this essay is 
in deepening our consideration of the same ideas without 
extending them into new conclusions. Since there is little 
movement (beyond the temporal drift) in the essay, a study 
which presents an oyerview ~ather than a sequential analysis 
will therefore be more appropriate. 
The "feeling of Eternity in youth" is the experience 
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of Paradisal vision, like that of Adam and Eve in the Garden 
(v, 67-68). One of the characteristics of such sight is its 
lack of limitation, its openness to all experience. And Haz-
litt expresses this idea in characteristic phraseology, saying, 
for example, 11 there is no line drawn, and we see no limit to 
our hopes and wishes. We make the coming age our own.--'The 
vast, the unbounded prospect lies before us.'" This thread 
is spun throughout the essay in phrases such as "we see no 
end" and "we set no bounds"; and there are many other expres-
sions of "no obstacle" and 11 no limit. 11 Young people experi-
ence 11 unrestricted opportunities," 11 plenitude of being," and 
a "variety of feelings"; indeed, in one long passage Hazlitt 
spells .out the variety and range of possibilities that life 
offers to youth: 
To see the golden sun and the azure sky, the outstretched 
ocean, to walk upon the green earth, and to be lord of a 
thousand creatures, to look down giddy precipices or over 
distant flowery vales, to see the world spread out under 
one's finger in a map, to bring the stars near, to view 
the smallest insects in a microscope, to read history, 
and witness the revolutions of empires and the succession 
of generations, to hear of the glory of Sidon and Tyre, 
of Babylon and Susa, as of a faded pageant, and to say 
all these were, and are now nothin~, to think that we 
exist in such a point of time, and'in such a corner of 
space, to be at once spectators and a part of the moving 
scene, to watch the return of the seasons, of spring and 
autumn, to hear 
--'The stockdove plain amid the forest deep, 
That drowsy rustles to the sighing gale'--
to traverse desert wildernesses, to listen to the midnight 
choir, to visit lighted halls, or plunge into the dungeon's 
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gloom, or sit in crowded theatres and see life itself 
mocked, to feel heat and cold, pleasure and pain, right 
and wrong, truth and falsehood, to study the works of 
art and refine the sense of beauty to agony, to worship 
fame and to dream of immortality, to have read Shakespear 
and belong to the same species as Sir Isaac Newton . • . . 
The customary idea is thus specified in many different ways. 
Similarly, Hazlitt repeatedly returns to the idea that 
the selfless imagination is a major factor in creating the 
feeling of immortality in youth. Such imagination, of course, 
involves the loss of awareness of personal identity and the 
reception of values from external ·objects and nature; a feel-
ing of "abstraction" from self and of merging with the outside 
world is experienced. This idea of identification with exter-
nal objects is another thread woven throughout the essay: 
~t is the simplicity, and as it were abstractedness of 
our feelings in youth, that {so to speak) identifies us 
with nature • • • • 
• • • objects press around us, filling the mind with their 
magnitude and with the throng of desires that wait upon 
them. 
. . 
We know our existence only from external objects, and we 
measure it by them. We can never be satfsfied with gazing; 
and nature will still want us to look on and applaud. 
• our step-mother Nature holds us up to see the raree-
show of the universe. 
We take out a new lease of existence from the objects on 
which we set our affections, and become abstracted, impas-
sive, immortal in them. 
Objects, on our first acquaintance with them, have that 
singleness and integrity of impression that it seems as 
117 
if nothing could destroy or obliterate them, so firmly 
are they stamped and rivetted on the brain. We repose 
on them with a sort of voluptuous indolence, in full 
faith and boundless confidence. 
Hazlitt also compares the feeling of immortality to that ex-
perienced "in setting out on a delightful journey"--i.e., like 
the paradisal experience captured in "On Going a Journey." 
And at another point, he cites as an example his own experi-
ence as a young man at the time of the French Revolution 
("It was the dawn of a new era"), saying, "I felt for years, 
and during the best part of my existence, heart-whole in that 
cause, and triumphed in the triumphs over the enemies of man!" 
The experience of selfless identification with the revolution 
is stressed; it is important, too, that passion sealed in 
Hazlitt's soul the truth of his perceived ideals. 
The feeling of serenity is the third important thread 
in the essay, Hazlitt speaking of reposing on objects in "vo-
luptuous indolence" and of "idling away a great deal of time 
in youth thinking we have enough and to spare.ti This thread, 
however, seems to be introduced almost as an afterthought, late 
in the essay (near the start of the third paragraph); it seems 
• 
as if Hazlitt suddenly realized he had left out the third ele-
ment of his usual theme and decided to correct the situation. 
But once found, the thread is not lost--indeed, it is a con-
sideration of this element of Paradisal vision that forms the 
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conclusion of the work: 
There are a few, superior, happy beings, who are born 
with a temper exempt from every trifling annoyance. 
This spirit sits serene and smiling in its native skies, 
and a divine harmony (whether heard or not) plays around 
them. This is to be at peace. Without this, it is in 
vain to fly into deserts, or to build a hermitage on the 
top of rocks, if regret and ill-hu~our follow us there: 
and with this, it is needless to make the experiment. 
The only true retirement is that of the heart; the only 
true leisure is the repose of the passions. To such 
persons it makes little difference whether they are young 
or old; and they die as they have lived, with graceful 
resignation. 
Hazlitt's specification of this feeling with these particulars 
(e.g., the vanity of flying into desert, building hermitages, 
etc.) is unique to this essay, despite his repeated use of the 
same general idea in many other works. It thus exemplifies 
his aesthetic theory--a point we shall return to. 
Throughout the consideration of Paradisal vision there 
is a contrapuntal thread that surfaces occasionally, showing 
Hazlitt's awareness of an opposite type of vision. The con-
trast is not structural in the essay; it is occasionally pres-
ent, though, setting in relief the essayist's major points. 
When the vision of youth is lost, there remains only limited 
individual awareness; and Hazlitt's description of the state 
is significant for its diction: 
Time and experience . . • circumscribe the limits of our 
expectations. It is only as the pageant of life passes 
by and the masques turn their backs upon us, that we see 
through the deception, or believe that the train will have 
an end. 
r 
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Speaking of ends and limits and circumscriptions, along with 
the negatively charged word "deception," established both an 
opposite type of awareness and Hazlitt's attitude towards it. 
The loss of the vision of youth also involves the loss 
of the selfless imagination: "It is not till we see the flow-
ers of Love, Hope, and Joy, withering around us, and our own 
pleasures cut up by the roots," Hazlitt says, "that we bring 
the moral home to ourselves." "To ourselves," of course, sug-
gests the growth of self-consciousness which kills our early 
attitudes. And the passage of time tends also to stifle the 
serenity of our early years: "The ease, the jocund gaiety, 
the unsuspecting security of youth are fled" with the coming 
of experience. Hazlitt's recognition of the impossibility of 
always maintaining youthful vision is a characteristic of his 
mature work; his treatment of the theme here is particularly 
good, for, in consid~ring the negative side of man's progress 
toward death, he does not stay solely with his frequently-
repeated general ideas. The "leash" that holds him to a cer-
tain area in considering Paradisal vision itself does not hold 
him so tightly as he considers its loss. For example, he 
speaks personally--despite his use of the editorial "we"--of 
desiring fame to provide a feeling of immortality to replace 
that lost with youth. Even so, though, he finally has too 
r 
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much integrity to mislead himself into accepting a counter-
feit substitute as an equal to the pure feeling with which 
he began his own life. · Indeed, he concludes the essay with 
the passage quoted above, showing his admir~tion for those 
who have maintained their early capacities unimpaired. The 
underlying wish is that he, too, might re-achieve such vision--
which, indeed, he will go on to do in "The Letter-Bell," at 
the end of his life. 
"Immortality" as a whole is an excellent example of 
Hazlitt's use of his own aesthetic theory, as proposed, for 
example, in the essay "On the Ideal" (1815: xviii, 77-84). 
Though this contribution to The Champion deals with pictorial 
art, its principles apply by analogy to Hazlitt's ideas of 
the writer's craft as well. In it, Hazlitt challenges the 
theory of Sir Joshua Reynolds that art is to present general-
ized forms abstracted from particulars; rather, he says, it 
should refine gross human perception, which sees abstractions 
and generalities, to see particular, concrete aspects of 
nature.I His comments on Hogarth's pictures might well ap-
ply, then, to his own writings: 
They have evidently a common or general character, but 
that general character is defined and modified by indi-
1 see xx, 33; also v, 204: "It is the business of 
poetry, and indeed of all works of imagination, to exhibit 
the species through the individual. 11 
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vidual peculiarities, which certainly do not take away 
from the illusion or the effect any more than. they would 
in nature. 
The "general character" of situations is often, for Hazlitt, 
the involvement of certain or all of the generic qualities 
of perception. Such qualities permeate "Immortality" even 
as they do "On Going a Journey" and "Mr. Kemble's Retirement"--
but Hazlitt always specifies these generalities with concrete 
particulars which do not repeat themselves from one essay to 
another. 
"Immortality" thus stands as an excellent essay in 
itself for its timeless consideration of the hope and feelings 
of young people; and it also enables us to understand more 
clearly Hazlitt's own practice of writing in accordance with 
his own aesthetic theory. 
IV 
Hazlitt's essay on "The Letter-Bell" (xvii, 376-382)--
one of the very last he wrote in his life--is one of his most 
famous and most moving works, giving us as it does the final 
views of a very perceptive man looking back on some of the 
most satisfying experiences of his life. His recollections 
are mainly of states of mind which enabled him to be happy--
to feel kinship with humanity and hope for the future, and 
to experience satisfaction with his own personal achievements. 
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All of his memories are clustered around the unifying sound 
of the letter-bell; they are all "associations" ·which spring 
to mind as he hears it pass. And, not surprisingly, his re-
collections of past happiness--enabling him to look forward 
with hope to the future, even as he lay dying--are firmly 
grounded in the same sense of values that marks the work of 
his entire life. 
After the introduction, there are essentially five 
recollections of mental states which, with various transitions 
and digressions, make up the pattern of the essay; Hazlitt's 
own paragraph divisions are largely irrelevant to the turns 
of his thought. 
He begins, typically, with an arresting statement 
which he wil~ expand and modify with various associations: 
"Complaints are frequently made of the vanity and shortness 
of human life, when, if we examine its smallest details, they. 
present a world by themselves." This opening is particularly 
arresting as we read it today, since, knowing as we do that 
its author died within a few days of writing it, it signals 
a concern on Hazlitt's mind with the value of life as a whole--
we may even wonder if Hazlitt recognized that this would be 
his last chance to record his feelings on this most important 
of subjects. He works into his treatment of it by means of 
an analogy: 
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The most trifling objects, retraced with the eye of mem-
ory, assume the vividness, the delicacy, and the impor-
tance of insects seen through a magnifying glass. There 
is no end of the brilliancy or the variety. The.habitual 
feeling of the love of life may be compared to 'one entire 
and perfect chrysolite,' which, if analysed, breaks into 
a thousand shining fragments. 
The wonder of life becomes all the more beautifui if its par-
ticulars are studied closely. With the "eye of memory" as 
his microscope, Hazlitt, then, immediately moves on to con-
sider the letter-bell, which, like an insect, may seem insig-
nificant to the casual perceiver, but which opens whole worlds 
of wonder to the mind that studies it closely enough.l And 
already Hazlitt's tack suggests his customary concerns--he is 
here exemplifying his oft-repeated idea that much value lies 
in narrowing one's focus, ·as one does with a magnifying glass, 
1see his comment from "Outlines of Taste," published 
posthumously: 
"I have, in a former essay, ascertained one principle of 
taste or excellence in the arts of imitation, where it 
was shown that objects of sense are not as it were simple 
and self-evident propositions, but admit of endless analy-
sis and the most subtle investigation. We do not see na-
ture with our eyes, but with our understandings and our 
hearts. To suppose that we see the whole of any object, 
merely by looking at it, is a vulgar error: we fancy that 
we do, because we are, of course, conscious of no more 
than we see in it, but this circle of our knowledge en-
larg~s with further acquaintance and study, and we then 
perceive that what we perhaps barely distinguished in the 
gross, or regarded as a dull blank, is full of beauty, 
meaning, and curious details. He sees most of nature who 
understands its language best, or connects one thing with 
the greatest number of other things." 
(xx, 388) 
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and intently pursuing the study of any one object. Here, how-
ever, such a narrow study of the letter-bell leads him into 
a universe of significance. Such an alternation of opposites 
is less conspicuous and more fluid than the balanced opposi-
tions of "On Going a Journey." In "The Letter-Bell" Hazlitt 
sees a tremendous "variety" and a great "multiplicity of items" 
even within one object. He has said elsewhere that "Truth is 
not one, but many"--in this instance, any "one" is seen to be 
composed of "many. 11 
The essay moves on into a recollected state of mind 
based on two different experiences. The first, quite short 
in length, follows immediately from the introduction, with 
no paragraph break: 
As I write this, the Letter-Bell passes • • • . It strikes 
upon the ear, it vibrates to the brain, it wakes me from 
the dream of time, it flings me back upon my first entrance 
into life, the period of my first coming up to town, when 
all around was strange, uncertain, adverse--a hubbub of 
confused noises, a chaos of shifting objects--. . •• 
The example of his "first" entrance into life exemplifies the 
state of mind that always accompanies "first vision" with Haz-
litt--it shows unstructured perception without the aid of hab-
it or custom to provide ready organization of experience. All 
is "strange," a "hubbub," "confused," and "chaos." The feeling 
is that which Hazlitt mentions in pointing out the negative 
aspect of fresh sight in "On Going a Journey": "In such situ-
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ations, so opposite to one's ordinary train of ideas, one 
seems a species by one's-self, a limb torn off from society, 
unless one can meet with instant fellowship and support" (viii, 
188). Immediately, though, he describes one of the pleasant 
associations he connects with the letter-bell, that its sound 
ties him to just the "fellowship and support" that he needs: 
••• this sound alone, startling me with the recollection 
of a letter I had to send to the friends I had lately left, 
brought me as it were to myself, made me feel that I had 
links still connecting me with the universe, and gave the 
hope and patience to persevere. 
Note that he says the sound "brought me as it were to myself"--
thereby implying that he had been "out of himself," a charac-
teristic of unstructured perception. The letter-bell thus af-
fords to him, here, the comfort of structured vision that en-
ables him to organize his new experience according to personal, 
habitual points of reference, and to see a frightening world 
simply as an extension of a structured social pattern with 
which he is already comfortable. 
Immediately the letter-bell suggests a second recol-
lection--this one, too, exemplifying unstructured perception, 
now as a positive thing rather than as a cause of fear: 
At that loud-tinkling, interrupted sound (now and then), 
the long line of blue hills near the place where I was 
brought up waves in the horizon, a golden sunset hovers 
over them, the dwarf-oaks rustle their red leaves in the 
evening breeze, and the road from ---- to ----, by which 
I first. set out on my journey through life, stares me in 
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the face as plain, but from time and change not less 
visionary and mysterious, than the pictures in the 
Pilgrim's Progress. I should notice, that at this time 
the light of the French Revolution circled my head like 
a glory, though dabbled with drops of crimson gore: I 
walked comfortable and cheerful by its side • . . . 
This is another "first" journey--Hazlitt's walk with Cole-
ridge from Wern to Shrewsbury was an experience which, like 
that in the Vale of Llangollen in Wales, was marked by the 
visionary qualities of openness to experience and complete 
ease (i.e., Hazlitt being "comfortable and cheerful"); in-
deed, it was a combination of these two experiences which in-
spired him to pursue a literary career.2 This particular 
walk is also marked by the Paradisal vision of the essay-
ist's enrapturement with the French Revolution. 
Clearly, Hazlitt's remembrance of his youthful vision 
enables him to re-experience it even as he writes the essay--
and the joy of recapturing the past is strengthened for him 
by the events of the present, for even as he wrote Hazlitt 
had lived to see the Revolution of the Three Days ~n July of 
1830, in which the Bourbon regime---which he detested, especially 
after its restoration following Napoleon's fall--finally came 
to an end. This was the fulfillment of a drea-..n; indeed, 
during a state of depression which he had recorded five years 
2see "My First Acquaintance wit~ Poets" (xvii, 106f.), 
and Baker's William Hazlitt, pp. 124f. 
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earlier in "On the Fear of Death" he wrote: "My public and 
private hopes have been left a ruin, or remain only to mock 
me. I would wish them to be re-edified. I should like to 
see some prospect of good to mankind, such as my life began 
with" (viii, 325). The passing of the Bourbons was just such 
a re-edification of his youthful hopes, a vindication of his 
life, and a proof to him that he had been right all along. 
Not uncharacteristically, Hazlitt's pride in maintain-
ing the integrity of his own early political ideals calls to 
his mind the loss of such ideals by the Lake poets. He chides 
Southey, hoping that the laureate will hail the age's second 
triumph "in appropriate verse"; and he quotes lines from Words-
worth on the "radiance" of that poet's own early perception 
and assails him for his loss of the "eyes of youth"--Hazlitt's 
characteristic expression for the combination of unfiltered 
perception, openness to the range of all possible experience, 
and serenity. 3 His continues his self-righteous and indignant 
attack on the Lake poets--an attack which springs from the 
very core of his values--exulting in his own faith in liberty 
and in his hatred of tyranny. When he finally comes to Coler-
idge, however, he softens his reprimands, for Coleridge's mind, 
3 See also v111, 29; xii, 296; xvi, 67, 398; xv111, 401, 
for comments on the vision of youth--and, of course, see too 
"On the Feeling of Immortality in Youth" (xvii, 189-199). 
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he says, is "still vulnerable to truth" because it is not 
"sordid or mechanical"--a recognition that his former 
friend's mind was generically different from Wordsworth's 
or Southey's. Hazlitt could therefore still see hope that 
the sage of Highgate might return to his "original liberty" 
of thought. 
The contrast of his own mind to the political apos-
tates' naturally gives Hazlitt an immense feeling of self-
satisfaction and joy; so, too, does his third recollection 
of the essay, which is another suggested to him by the letter-
bell: "Or if the Letter-Bell does not lead me a dance in 
the country, it fixes me in the thick of my town recollec-
tions, I know not how long ago." The "town recollection" he 
recounts dates from the period (1799 - ca. 1807) during which 
he lived at his brother John's house in London and ~ried his 
hand as a pa_inter. The· letter-bell, at that time, served as 
"a kind of alarm to break off from my work when there hap-
pened to be company to dinner or when I was going to the play ... 
The sound was thus something that served to link him to the 
human community, even as it had reminded him before to send 
a letter to distant friends. There is more involved in the 
"linkage" provided by the bell than simply this, however. 
The present, third recollection and the fourth exemplify op-
posite types of happiness which alternated with each other at 
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the sound of the postman's approach; and the fourth recol-
lection is anticipated when Hazlitt says the alarm cause 
him to "break off" from his work--a point I shall return to. 
The essayist now recounts experiences centering around going 
to the theatre--either his own attendance, which he valued 
all the more because, in those days, it was not a common 
occurence: or the preparations of a "Miss D--- 11 and her com-
panion as they were about to leave for a play. The whole 
concern with the theatre in this memory sugges~s that Hazlitt 
is again recalling an experience of seeing with "the eyes of 
youth," for elsewhere (xviii, 401) he says that he always saw 
with such eyes whenever he went to the theatre. Even when 
not going himself, though, he still caught the excitement: 
Even the idea that anyone else in the house· was going, 
was a sort of reflected enjoyment, and conjured up a 
lively anticipation of the scene. • And when the 
Letter-Bell announced that the time was approaching, and 
its last receding sound lingered on the ear, or was lost 
in silence, how anxious and uneasy I became, lest she and 
her companion should not be in time to get good places--
lest the curtain should draw up before they arrived • • • • 
He thus recalls his own ability to enter into the feelings of 
others--to experience the "negative capability" of selfless 
sympathy with those around him. This third memory, then, is 
like the first two in presenting an essentially similar state 
of mind. However, Hazlitt characteristically specifies the 
general similarity by means of different particular examples. 
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As we mentioned in connection with the "Immortality" essay, 
this practice shows the.workings of his aesthetic theory in 
his own writing. The memory of those leaving for the thea-
tre is thus tied to, but also differentiated from, similar 
recollections. 
The third memory of "The Letter-Bell" is then fol-
lowed by a digression: 
The punctuating of time at that early period--every 
thing that gives it an articulate voice--seems of the 
utmost consequence; for we do not know what scenes in 
the ideal world may run out of them: a world of in-
terest may hang upon every instant, and we can hardly 
sustain the weight of future years which are contained 
im embryp in the most minute and inconsiderable passing 
events. . • . 
The passage represents Hazlitt's suddenly standing back from 
his essay and stating what he has up to now been showing us--
that any single incident in life may have the utmost conse-
quence to it if considered properly. The thought re-echoes 
his introductory analogy of the insect under the microscope, 
though, of course, the values Hazlitt finds in his memories 
have more than the simple aesthetic values of the closely-
examined insect; they also have the moral qualities always 
connected with imaginative sight. In this essay, specifi-
cally, the letter-bell is often a tie which binds Hazlitt 
to the human community. 
He then cites an incident to specify his general 
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statement--he speaks of his running after the postman with 
a late letter, sending it off, and never regretting any-
thing that he had written: 
I am not like the person who, having sent off a letter· 
to his mistress, who resided a hundred and twenty miles 
in the country, and disapproving, on second thoughts, 
of some expressions contained in it, took a post-chaise 
and four to follow and intercept it the next morning. 
Such an example may have seemed to Hazlitt a microcosm of 
his life--the press of circumstances and the rush to send 
off essays in hurried attempts to secure· money was indeed a 
pattern of his professional existence. And so, too, was his 
honesty in all that he wrote, even in the hack work, so that, 
on this score at least, he never did feel the need to retract 
his writings. 
He moves into his fourth memory next; there is again 
no paragraph break, and little transition: 
At other times, I have sat and watched the decaying 
embers in a little back painting-room (just as the 
wintry day declined), and brooded over the half-
finished copy of a Rembrandt, or a landscape by 
Vangoyen, placing it where it might catch a dim gleam 
of light from the fire; while the Letter-Bell was the 
only sound that drew my thoughts to the world without, 
and reminded me that I had a task to perform in it. 
This is a recollection of his solitary work as a painter; as 
such, it gives the opposite side of his third memory, which 
was introduced with the statement that the letter-bell "was 
a kind of alarm to break off from my work when there happened 
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to be company to dinner." The third and fourth memories 
balance each other: the one ,expresses the happiness of 
leaving the solitary world of painting to enter into the 
broader, diversified world of human activity; the other re-
counts the joy of immersing one's self in an intense pursuit 
of a single object--here, painting. Hazlitt's happiness in 
remembering his days as a painter springs from the fact that 
he was "wholly in his art"; his task was that "on which all 
his projects of ambition or pleasure were founded." His 
painting was a task of "'Entire affe,ction, '" even in its 
"mechanical parts." The feeling of intensity which he re-
members is that which he captures so well in his full essay 
"On Pedantry" (1817: iv, 80-88): "The power of attaching 
an interest to the most trifling or painful pursui~s, in 
which our whole attentio·n and faculties are engaged, is one 
of the greatest happinesses o~ our nature." It is interest-
ing, however, that this memory in "The Letter-Bell" apparently 
involves the self less rather than the selfish imagination: 
11Certainly, 11 says Hazlitt, "painting gives one a strong in-
terest in nature and humanity 11 (i.e., .external objects which 
draw one out of one's self). This whole passage, then, in-
volving as it does the qualities of intensity, narrow focus, 
and a selfless imagination, is a recollection of an experience 
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of "gusto."4 
The letter-bell appears again near the end of this 
fourth memory: "I used sometimes to hurry through this 
tmechanical] part of my occupation, while the Letter-Bell 
(which was my dinner-bell) summoned me to the fraternal 
board, where youth and hope 'Made good digestion wait on 
appetite .. I II This statement repeats the introduction 
t'o the third memory ("It was a kind of alarm to break off 
from my work when there happened to be company to dinner"); 
now, however, we have become acquainted with both experi-
ences which the bell ties together: the intense absorption 
in work before the sound, and the feeling of "youth and 
hope" following it. The letter-bell is thus a linking 
device in another sense: not only does it tie Hazlitt to 
humanity--it also links in his mind the two generally oppo-
site types of happiness he valued so highly, and serves as 
a balance point between them. The function of the bell in 
the third and fourth memories is thus much like its function 
in the first, where, too, its sound served as a transition 
point between opposite qualities of perception. 
The next, brief paragraph in the essay is used for 
transition; it is also another example of Hazlitt's love of 
4 see Chapter V, below, for a detailed discussion of 
this term. 
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contrasts: 
The dustman's-bell, with its heavy, monotonous noise, 
and the brisk, lively tinkle of the muffin-bell, have 
something in them, but not much. They will bear dil-
ating upon with the utmost license of inventive prose. 
All things are not alike conductors to the imagination. 
Other sorts of bells don't speak to Hazlitt's memory as im-
mediately as does the letter-bell; it would require great 
ingenuity and "utmost license" of prose for an essay to be 
spun from them. Why then does the letter-bell speak to the 
writer so naturally when other bells don't? The answer is 
found in the next two paragraphs, comprising the fifth main 
division of the essay. 
"The postman's double knock at the door the next 
morning is 'more germaine to the matter,'" Hazlitt begins--
i.e., this knock, associated with the letter-bell, is a 
better "conductor to the imagination" than is either the 
dustman's-bell of the muffin-bell. The reason it moves Haz-
litt so much is that, like the letter-bell itself, it signi-
fies a greater tie to other people, and it more readily en-
gages the feelings of the heart than do other everyday 
sounds--such feelings, of course, being for Hazlitt an es-
sential part of all truth and human value. He captures the 
"feeling" of the post well, near the start of paragraph 
four: 
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How that knock often goes to the heart! We distinguish 
to a nicety the arrival of the Two-penny or th.e General 
Post. The summons of the latter is louder and heavier 
as bringing news from a greater distance, and as, the 
longer it has been delayed, fraught with a deeper in-
terest. We catch the sound of what is to be paid--
eight-pence, nine-pence, a shilling--and our hopes gen-
erally rise with the postage. How we are provoked at 
the delay in getting change--at the servant who does 
not hear the door! Then if the postman passes, and we 
do not hear the expected knock, what a pang is there! 
It is like the silence of death--of hope! 
Having established the feelings connected with the mails, 
Hazlitt increases and broadens his consideration of such 
passions in almost a geometrical progression, moving from 
the feelings he associates with a single postman to those he 
has while watching a single Mail-Coach {which he sees as "the 
messenger of fate") to those which spring up as he views {in 
memory) the very hub of the Mail-Coach network in the heart 
of London. "The finest sight in the metropolis is that of 
the Mail-Coaches setting off from Picadilly." he says; and 
a few sentences later: 
Some persons think the sublimest object in nature is a 
ship launched on the bottom of the ocean: but give me, 
for my private satisfaction, the Mail-coaches that pour 
down Piccadilly of an evening, tear up the pavement, and 
devour the way before them to the Land.' s-End ! 
The mails, carrying as they do the deepest passions of mankind--
they "bind or sever hearts for ever," he says--are most strik-
ing to Hazlitt in a situation which impresses upon him the im-
mense diversity and multiplicity of such passion. "Truth is 
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not one, but many," and the concrete picture of the range 
of human truths, vitalized by deep feelings, radiating out 
from Piccadilly to bind the whole nation, is very moving 
for him; indeed, he sees the mail depot as sacred, for he 
,, describes it in terms suggesting a ritual: the horses 
carry a "precious burden"; he says that "There is a pecul-
iar secresy and despatch, significant and full of meaning, 
in all the proceedings"; the passengers appear to be "borne 
on through the air as in a winged chariot"; and the coaches 
start off bearing "irrevocable scrolls." The sight of the 
Mail-Coaches leaving London was indeed the "sublimest object 
in nature" for him because in it he found an excellent ob-
jective correlative for some of his deepest feelings. 
The final paragraph of the essay is made up largely 
of a quotation from Cowper's The Task, cited to represent 
Hazlitt's own feelings on watching the Mail-Coaches. The 
lines express just what he wants, for Cowper emphasizes the 
range and diversity of human truths carried in the mail; and 
all of the various communications cited involve deep feelings. 
The final comments of the essay, that "the picturesque 
and dramatic do not keep pace with the useful and mechanical," 
are similar to statements which Hazlitt makes in "Why the 
Arts are Not Progressive" {iv, 160; xviii, 5, 7)--that prog-
ress in science, technology, and "mechanical" arts tends to 
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lead men away from natural and elemental sources of inspi-
ration. The complaint is that society, which tends to im-
pose more and more structures and filters upon perception 
with the passage of time, creates a world in itself apart 
from nature, which can be seen only with fresh sight. The 
Mail-coach is thus less natural and poetic than the Post-
Boy, as it involves more technological progress away from 
the natural state of man. A-more extreme example is the 
final one. Hazlitt cites: 
The telegraphs that lately communicated the intel-
ligence of the new revolution to all France within a 
few hours, are a wonderful contrivance; but they are 
less striking and appalling than the beacon-fires 
(mentioned in Aeschylus), which, lighted from hill-top 
to hill-top, announced the taking of Troy, and the 
return of Agamemnon. 
His last thought is thus on the Spirit of the Age and its 
tendency to lose contact with basic sources of emotion. It 
is important to note,- though, that throughout "The Letter-
Bell" Hazlitt has dramatized the possibility--exemplified 
by his own life--of achieving not a rejection of filtered 
perception, but a balancing of it by fresh sight even within 
the conventions and social structures of the age. Thus the 
letter-bell ties the writer to his society and its conven-
tional operations; but also, paradoxically, it frees him to 
perceive basic sources of inspiration within and beyond these 
conventions. 
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As we have mentioned, Hazlitt died a few days after 
' 
he wrote this essay. Perhaps it was the composition of this 
masterful work--a meditation on what he saw as the basic ele-
ments of awareness that allow for human happiness--that en-
abled him finally to see his own life as having met his own 
standards of excellence. For he died content--his last 
·words were, "well, I've had a good life. 11 
After "The Letter-Bell," such a valediction comes as 
no surprise. 
CHAPTER V 
"GUSTO" 
"You cannot comprehend my 
definition of gusto, which you 
do not ascribe to any defect 
in yourself." 
( 1819 : ix , 2 8) 
The above reprimand to William Gifford is perhaps 
more peevish than just, for few terms in Hazlitt's works 
are as hard to pin down accurately as "gusto. 11 Paul Elmer 
More says that "The word, now unfortunately falling into 
desuetude, connotes the power of intense enjoyment based 
on understanding."l Elisabeth Schneider comments that 
"Diderot writes of verve almost as often as Hazlitt does 
of gusto, and they appear to mean much the same thing, that 
is, intensity."2 W.P. Albrecht writes: "To define 'truth 
of character' and then reveal 'the soul of nature, ' ·a poet 
or painter must have the emotional intensity that Hazlitt 
calls 'gusto. 1113 Roy Park diverges somewhat from the em-
1shelburne Essays, p. 74. 
2The Aesthetics of William Hazlitt, p. 58. 
3Hazlitt and the Creative Imagination. p. 84. 
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phasis on seeing gusto as "intensity" in saying that "In 
~· a very general way gusto may be said to be the expression 
' 
of [the] unique quality of objects and works of art. The 
work of art, or the dramatic performance of a role which 
succeeds in expressing this characteristic excellence, has 
gusto. 114 I think, however, that an even more accurate def-
inition of the term may be found if we approach it with a 
knowledge of Hazlitt's patterns of opposite qualities. When 
understood in the context of related remarks elsewhere in 
Hazlitt's Works, the brief essay "On Gusto" from The Round 
Table collection (1817: iv, 77-80) will be seen to contain 
great complexity--and inconsistency. As with other diffi-
culties in Hazlitt's writings--though especially with 
11gusto 11 --it is unwise to take any one of the essayist's 
statements as the ultimate representation of his final opin-
ion on the subject •. Rather, I think, the truth can best be 
approximated by again taking an overview of the matter to 
determine the large patterns of thought involved. 
The first paragraph of "On Gusto" offers something 
of a definition of the term, but I think this will be best 
comprehended if we first consider some of Hazlitt's general 
notions on art, and his comments on those artists whose 
4 i · d h . . f h 146 Haz itt .illl_ t e Spirit ..Q_ t e .Age, p. • 
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works exemplify gusto. Indeed, after its initial paragraph, 
"On Gusto" is composed entirely of such examples--examples 
which, we must remember, are tied to other comments about 
the same artists, in different essays. 
One of Hazlitt's most important ideas about artis-
tic excellence is that each great artist is a specialist: 
The greatest artists that have ever appeared are those 
who have been able to employ some one view or aspect of 
nature, and no more. Thus Titian was famous for col-
ouring; Raphael for drawing; Correggio for the grada-
tions, Rembrandt for the extremes of light and shade. 
The combined genius and powers of observation of all 
the great artists in the world would not be sufficient 
to convey the whole of what is contained in any one 
object in nature. 
(ix, 218) 
What determines each artist's specialty is the conformation 
of his individual mind: 
how narrow is the sphere of human excellence, how dis-
tinct the line of pursuit which nature has marked out 
even for those whom she has most favoured! Thus in 
painting Raphael ·excelled in drawing, Titian in col-
ouring, Rembrandt in chiaro scuro. A small part of na-
ture was revealed to each by a peculiar felicity of 
conformation; and they would have made sad work of it, 
if each had neglected his own advantages to go in search 
of those of others, on the principle that genius is a 
large general capacity, transferred, by will or accident, 
to some particular channel." 
(xvi, 188) 5 
Apparently, then, every great artist has a specific capacity 
to see one aspect of nature clearly, and no one can "trans-
5 see also viii, 47. 
I 
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fer 11 this capacity in order to see other aspects. This 
specialization is something that Hazlitt points out through-
out his writings;6 it is also an important part of "On 
Gusto," for here, too, he catalogues the fortes of the great 
artists--and the gusto of each is found in a limited area 
(e.g., "There is a gusto in the colouring of Titian. 
Michael Angelo's forms are full of gusto"). Indeed, he also 
says that Shakespeare's gusto is diminished precisely be-
cause of his universality: "The infinite quantity of dra-
matic invention in Shakespeare takes from his gusto. The 
power he delights to show is not intense but discursive." 
Narrowed scope is thus an essential ingredient in 
gusto--at least most of the time; for Hazlitt occasionally 
makes a statement that suggests the opposite. For example, 
in "On Gusto" itself he says: 
Rubens had a great deal of gusto in his Fauns and 
Satyrs, and in all that expresses motion, but in 
nothing else. Rembrandt has it in everything; every-
thing in his pictures has a tangible character. If 
he puts a diamond in the ear of a burgomaster's wife, 
it is of the first water; and his furs and stuffs are 
proof against a Russian winter. Raphael's gusto was 
only in expression • • • . 
The gusto of Rubens and Raphael is thus limited, as it should 
be; but Rembrandt's, here, seems to be unlimited, despite Haz-
6see xvii, 4ln: "There is a certain pedantry, a given 
division of labour, an almost exclusive attention to some one 
object, which is necessary in Art, as in all the works of man." 
Cf. also iv, 151; vi, 149; xii, 291; xx, 297, 391. 
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litt's usual assertion that his excellence is confined to 
the use of chiaroscuro. Similarly, despite his statement 
here that Raphael is limited, he elsewhere suggests the 
contrary: 
Raphael gave himself up to the diviner or lovelier 
impulse that breathes its soul over the face of 
things, being governed by a sense of reality and of 
general truth. There is nothing exclusive or repul-
sive in Raphael; he is open to all impressions alike, 
and seems to identify himself with whatever he saw 
that arrested his attention or could interest 
others •••• Raphael was only a painter, but in that 
one art he seemed to pour out all the treasures and 
various excellence of nature, grandeur and scope of 
design, exquisite finishing, force ••.• 
(xvii, 148) 7 
.What Hazlitt says about an artist in "On Gusto, 11 then, may 
not accord with his description of the same artist in an-
other essay. And we cannot separate "On Gusto" from the 
context of his other works--as we have seen to the contrary, 
it is a safe rule that we can best make sense of the essay-
ist's ambiguities precisely by placing them within this con-
text. It follows then that if the exemplars of gusto have 
ambiguous or contradictory qualities, then Hazlitt's concept 
of gusto--based on such exemplars--is also ambiguous. Spe-
7This particular passage suggests that, in a broad 
sense, Raphael is limited because he is "only a painter" 
whereas Michelangelo is "painter, sculptor, architect." How-
ever, Hazlitt usually specifies very particular fortes of 
artists even within the one discipline of painting--which he 
does not do here. 
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cifically, there is an inconsistency about the involvement 
of narrowed range of awareness--in Raphael and Rembrandt 
it is sometimes present, sometimes not; and Hazlitt says 
that both of these artists have gusto. 
Similarly, there is an ambiguity about which type 
of imagination (selfless or selfish} is characteristic of 
the "gusto" artists. Most of Hazlitt's comments on them 
indicate the presence of the selfless imagination (although, 
of course, the artist's ability to perceive nature directly, 
without filters or "mediums," is confined to.a particular 
channel, like a prism that separates only one color of light 
from the natural spectrum). For example, Titian represents 
nature accurately: 
• • • the limbs of his female figures have a luxurious 
softness and delicacy, which appears conscious of the 
pleasure of the beholder. As the objects themselves in 
nature would produce an impression on the sense, pistinct 
from every other object, and having something divine in 
it, whiq,h the heart owns and the imagination consecrates, 
the objects in the picture preserve the same impression, 
absolute, unimpaired, stamped with all the truth of 
passion, the pride of the eye, and the charm of beauty. 
Hazlitt elsewhere says the same thing of this artist, that he 
gives the "exact resemblance of individual nature" (xii, 286) 
and that he shares with Raphael the quality of unfiltered per-
ception: "Titian •.. saw the colour of skin at once, with-
out any intellectual film spread over it; Raphael painted the 
actions and passions of men, without any indirect process, as 
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he found them" (xii, 245).8 
Hazlitt cites Raphael's selfless imagination on sev-
eral occasions, saying that "Nature did not put him out. He 
was not too great a genius to copy what he saw" (x, 12): that 
he 11 invented according to nature" (xii, 284); and that he ex-
hibited "intense feeling of what is beautiful and grand in 
nature" (xviii, 114). It is therefore most interesting that 
Hazlitt more than once contrasts Raphael to Michelangelo, who 
also is cited as an exemplar of gusto. In an 1827 essay on 
"The Vatican, 11 for example, he writes: 
[Raphael] seems to identify himself with whatever he 
saw that arrested his attention or could interest others. 
Michael Angelo studied for himself, and raised objects 
.. 
to the standards of his conception, by a formula or sys-
tem: Raphael invented for others, and was guided only by 
sympathy with them. Michael Angelo was painter, sculptor, 
architect: but he might be said to make of each art a 
shrine in which to build up the stately and gigantic sta-
ture of his own mind. . •• Michael Angelo, in a word, 
stamped his own character on his works, or recast Nature 
in a mould of his own, leaving out much that was excellent: 
Raphael received his inspiration from without, and his 
genius caught the lambent flame of grace, of truth, and 
grandeur, which are reflected in his works with a light 
clear, transparent and unfading. 
(xvii, 148) 
The contrast between the self less and the selfish imagination 
is obvious, especially in its use of characteristic diction 
{e.g., "mould," 11 transparent," etc.) In "On Gusto" Hazlitt 
8 Another of the 11 gusto 11 artists, Correggio, is also 
said to reflect 11 the pure light of nature on the canvas" 
(xviii, 42) • 
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does not speak of Michelangelo's imagination per se; he sim-
ply speaks of the artist's figures and of how they are "firm, 
commanding, broad, and massy," showing "power" and "muscular 
strength." In this regard, though, a passage from the essay-
ist's 1817 Encyclopaedia Britannica article on "Fine Arts" is 
revelant; after discussing Raphael, he again turns to Michel-
angelo: 
There is more an appearance of abstract grandeur of form 
in Michael Angelo. He has followed up, has enforced, and 
expanded, as it were, a preconceived idea, till he some-
times seems to tread on the' verge of caricature. His 
forms, however, are not middle, but extreme forms, massy, 
gigantic, supernatural. They convey the idea of the 
greatest size and strength in the figure, and in all the 
parts of the figure. Every muscle is swollen and turgid. 
This tendency to exaggeration would have been avoided, if 
Michael Angelo had recurred more constantly to nature, 
and had proceeded less on a scientific knowledge of the 
structure of the human body; for science gives only the 
positive form of the different parts, which the imagi-
nation may afterwards magnify, as it pleases, but it is 
nature alone which combines them with perfect truth and 
delicacy, in all the varities of motion and expression. 
(xviii, 114-115) 
The strength of Michelangelo's forms thus derives from "a 
preconceived idea" or a scientific bias rather than from na-
ture. It is interesting, too, that the very next sentence in 
the passage offers one of the Elgin marbles as a contrast to 
• 
Michelangelo: "It is fortunate that we can refer, in illus-
tration of our doctrine, to the admirable fragments of the 
Theseus at Lord Elgin• s, which shows the P.ossibili ty of unit-
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ing the grand and natural style in the highest degree." 
Like Raphael's paintings, the Elgin marbles derive their 
r ~. power directly from nature. 9 And they, too, are cited in 
"On Gusto" as exemplifying that quality. Thus Michelangelo, 
who is contrasted to both Raphael and the Greek statues, re-
presents the selfish rather than the self less imagination. 
Rembrandt, too, has gusto; but again Hazlitt does 
not speak directly of which type of imagination he repre-
sents. And his comments elsewhere are contradictory. For 
example, in "On Genius and Common Sense" he writes: 
If ever there was a man of genius, he [Rembrandt] was 
one, in the proper sense of the term. He lived in and 
revealed to others a world of his own, and might be 
said to have invented a new view of nature. He did not 
discover things out of nature, in fiction or fairy land, 
or make a voyage to the moon 'to descry new lands, rivers, 
or mountains in her spotty globe,' but saw things in na-
ture that everyone had missed before him, and gave others 
eyes to see them with. This .is the test and triumph of 
originality, not to shew us what has never been, and what 
we may therefore easily never have dreamt of, but to 
point out to us what is before our eyes and under our 
feet, though we have had no suspicion of its existence, 
9 see also, for example, x, 168n: 
"[The Elgin marbles) are the finest forms in the most 
striking attitudes, and with every thing in its place, 
proportion, and degree, uniting the ease, truth, force, 
and delicacy of Nature. They shew nothing but the art-
ist's thorough comprehension of, and entire docility to 
that great teacher. There is no petit-maitreship, no 
pedantry, no attempt at a display of science; or at 
forcing the parts into an artificial symmetry, but it is 
like cutting a human body out of a block of marble, and 
leaving it to act for itself with all the same springs, 
levers, and internal machinery." 
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for want of sufficient strength of intuition, of 
determined grasp of mind to seize and retain it. 
(viii, 43) 
Rembrandt's reliance on external nature for his art indicates 
the presence of the selfless imagination; his capturing of 
the truth of nature is also suggested in the essay "Is Gen-
ius conscious of Its Powers?" (xii, 120): 11 80 much do Rem-
brandt's pictures savour of the soul and body of reality, 
that the thoughts seem identical with the objects." 
On the other hand, though, many other of Hazlitt's 
writings indicate that he thought Rembrandt had a filtering 
or selfish imagination. For example, the essay on the "Fine 
Arts," after speaking of Vandyke ("The objects in his pie-
tures • . • are presented to the eye without passing through 
any indirect medium"), says this of Rembrandt: 
If ever there was a man of genius in the art, it was 
Rembrandt. He might be said to have created a medium 
of his own, through which he saw all objects .••• 
He took any object, he cared not what, how mean soever 
in form, colour, and expression, and from the light and 
shade which he threw upon it, it came out gorgeous from 
his hands .••• His vision acquired a lynx-eyed sharp-
ness from the artificial obscurity to which he had ac-
customed himself. 
(xviii, 122) 
References to the creation of a "medium" and to "artificial" 
obscurity indicate a filtering imagination. Hazlitt also 
implies a contrast between Rembrandt and two "natural" art-
ists in a comment to Northcote: "I mentioned that I thought 
r 149 
Sir Joshua more like Rembrandt than either Titian or Vandyke: 
he enveloped objects in the same brilliant haze of a previous 
mental conception" (xi, 198)--much as Michelangelo worked 
from "a preconceived idea." Similarly, in speaking of Words-
worth Hazlitt sometimes alludes to the similarity of his fil-
tering and selfish imagination and Rembrandt's: 
[Wordsworth's] poems bear a distinct resemblance to some 
of Rembrandt's landscapes, who, more than any other paint-
er, created the medium through which he saw nature. 
(iv, 120-121; repeated xix, 19) 
I am afraid I shall hardly write so satisfactory a charac-
ter of Mr. Wordsworth, though he, too, like Rembrandt, has 
a faculty of making something out of nothing, that is, out 
of himself, by the medium through which he sees and with 
which he clothes the barrenest subject. 
(viii, 43-44) 
The citation of Rembrandt as.an example of gusto, then, may 
imply either a selfless or a selfish imagination--Hazlitt him-
self is inconsistent on the point. 
There are other inconsistencies in Hazlitt's citation 
of Rubens as an exemplar of ,gusto. The "Fine Ar.ts" article 
says: 
Rubens is the prince of Flemish painters. Of all the 
great painters, he is perhaps the most artificial.--the 
one who· painted most from his own imagination,--and, what 
was almost the inevitable consequence, the most of a man-
nerist. 
(xviii, 120-121) 
However, a few sentences later, Hazlitt apparently says that 
Rubens presented at least one aspect of nature (flesh} with-
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out any artificial distortions: "He has given to his flesh 
greater transparency and freshness than any other painter; 
and this excellence he had from nature." Does this unfiltered 
portrayal of one aspect of nature, then, indicate that Rubens' 
flesh shows gusto? It seems as if it should--but in "On Gusto" 
itself Hazlitt says: "Rubens has a great deal of gusto in 
his Fauns and Satyrs, and in all that expresses motion, but 
in nothing else." And he also contrasts Rubens' portrayal of 
flesh {he "makes his flesh-colour like flowers") to Titian's 
("Titian's is like flesh, and like nothing else")--and here 
it is Titian and not Rubens whose flesh shows gusto. Hazlitt's 
thoughts on Rubens, then, are rather muddled regarding both 
the type of imagination he shows, and in what "specialty" his 
gusto appears. 
But despite the ambiguity about which type of imagin-
ation is shown by the different artists cited as examples, Haz-
litt's opening paragraph apparently indicates that the selfless 
imagination is what he intends to imply: 
Gusto in art is power or passion defining any object •••• 
there is hardly any object entirely devoid of expression, 
without some character of power belonging to it, some pre-
cise association with pleasure or pain: and it is in 
giving this truth of character from the truth of feeling 
. that gusto consists. 
Evidently the capturing of a quality belonging to external ob-
jects themselves is involved. Even the "association with 
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pleasure or pain" is something that Hazlitt saw (or tried to 
see) as existing in objects themselves rather than in their 
human viewer.10 If Hazlitt did indeed intend "gusto" to im-
ply an unfiltered view of a particular aspect of nature--ob-
tained by the use of a channelled self less imagination--then 
his use of Michelangelo and Rembrandt (not to mention Milton 
and Pope) as examples is rather puzzling. 11 
1 
Let us assume, though, that he did intend to imply 
the presence of that type of imagination which perceives na-
ture directly and inunediately; there is still, then, a further 
distinction to be made. Those artists who exemplify gusto 
must capture the internal principles of their subjects rather 
then merely their superficial outward characteristics. Thus, 
for example, even though Vandyke is true to nature in his 
paintings, 12 he presents only its surface: 
Vandyke's flesh-colour, though it has great truth and 
purity, wants gusto. It has not the internal character, 
the living principle in it. It is a smooth surface, not 
a warm, moving mass. It is painted without passion, with 
indifference. 
Claude's landscapes show a similar shortcoming: 
lOsee above, Chapter I, p. 13. 
11 
See also xviii, 18, for a passage which indicates 
that "nature" is not necessary for gusto: "Though neither 
the colouring nor the expression of this picture is natural, 
there is a harmony and a gusto in both that pleases the eye 
and reconciles the understanding to it." · 
12
see above, p. 148; also viii, 318. 
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Claude's landscapes, perfect as they are, want gusto. 
This is not easy to explain. They are perfect abstrac-
tions of the visible images of things; they speak the 
visible language of nature truly. They resemble a mir-
ror or a microscope. To the eye only they are more per-
fect than any other landscapes that ever were or will be 
painted; they give more of nature, as cognisable by one 
sense alone; but they lay an equal stress on all visible 
impressions. They do not interpret one sense by another; 
they do not distinguish the character of different ob-
jects as we are taught, and can only be taught, to dis-
tinguish them by their effect on the different senses. 
That is, his eye wanted imagination: it did not strongly 
sympathize with his other faculties. He saw the atmos-
phere, but he did not feel it. 
There are different skeins that are important in this tangled 
commentary. Hazlitt says, for example, that the landscapes 
"do not interpret one sense by another" and that Claude's eye 
"did not strongly sympathize with his other faculties." This 
is an echo of a comment made in the second paragraph of the 
essay, that "In a word, gusto in painting is where the impres-
sion made on one sense excites by affinity those of another." 
It is a way of saying that the "internal principle" of objects 
must be captured organically, that one quality of an object 
. 
cannot simply be me.chanically separated from others. It im-
plies that the pulse of any one sense flows through all of the 
others, too, and that therefore the presentation of any one 
sensory aspect of an object--if captured organically--rnust irn-
ply other sensory experiences in it, too. Thus, for example, 
Hazlitt says in an essay on "The Marquis of Stafford's Gallery" 
r 
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that Titian's coloring appeals to the senses of taste and 
hearing as well as sight: "Every where tone, not form, pre-
dominates--there is not a distinct line in the picture--but 
a gusto, a rich taste of colour is left upon the eye as if 
it were the palate, and the diapason of picturesque harmony 
is full to overflowing" (x, 33). Hazlitt's analysis of West's 
Christ Rejected presents another passage which points out that 
gusto implies organicism rather than mechanism: 
We might.sum up our opinion in one word, by saying, that 
there is in the present picture an absolute want of what 
is called gusto throughout; nor can we describe our idea 
of Mr. West's style in general better than by saying that 
it is the reverse of Raphael's. The dif.ference is this. 
In Raphael, every muscle and nerve has intense feeling. 
The same divine spirit breathes from every part; it either 
agitates the inmost frame, or plays in gentle undulations 
on the trembling surface .••• the whole is bursting with 
expression. But Mr. West makes no use whatever of the 
movable frame of the countenance, the only language it 
possesses • • • or if he does avail himself of this flex-
ible machinery, it is only by rule and method. The effect 
is not that which the soul of passion impresses on.it, and 
which the soul of genius alone can seize; but such as might 
be given to wooden puppets or pasteboard figures, pulled 
by wires • • • 
(xviii, 33) 
The diction itself ( 11 breathes, 11 "bursting," vs. "pasteboard 
figures") expresses the important contrast of portraying the 
subject as animated by an internal living principle rather 
than by mechanical external "wires." 
·when Hazlitt is speaking of "gusto," he frequently 
uses the terms "passion," "feeling," or "intensity" to con-
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note an artist's capturing of an organic internal principle 
in an object. These terms are always found close to his as-
sertions that an artist does or does not succeed in getting 
below the surface of what he is trying to paint--indeed, so 
closely are they associated with such assertions that these 
terms often serve as "shorthand" references which by them-
selves connote that quality of capturing the internal life of 
the object represented. Thus, when Hazlitt says that Vandyke's 
flesh color "has not the internal character, the living prin-
ciple in it. It is painted without passion, with indif-
ference," he is simply repeating the same idea. Similarly, 
when he writes that Claude "saw the atmosphere, but he did 
not feel it," he is repeating the point he made a few sen-
tences earlier, that this artist presents only the superficial, 
"visible" aspect of nature, and not this aspect as it is organ-
ically related to all other sensible characteristics in nature. 
Unlike Vandyke and Claude, Rembrandt {when he is said to have 
a self less imagination) d_oes interpret one sense by another--
and he therefore has the "intensity" of feeling that they lack: 
It seems as if he had dug [his landscapes] out of nature. 
Everything is so true, so real, so full of all the 
feelings and associations which the eye can suggest 
to the other senses, that we immediately take as strong 
an affection to them as if they were our home--the very 
place where we were brought up. No length of time could 
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add to the intensity of the impression they convey. 13 {xviii, 123) 
The term "intensity" thus often has a particular con-
notation in connection with "gusto." However, it sometimes 
seems to indicate simply the great energy of the artist, as 
in a comment on Milton from "On Milton's Versification," also 
from The Round Table: "Milton had as much of what is meant by 
gusto as any poet. He forms the most intense conception of 
things, and then embodies them by a single stroke of his pen. 
Force of style is perhaps his first excellence" (iv, 38). This 
foreshadows Hazlitt's statements on the poet from the following 
year (1818) in "On Shakespeare and Milton," that "He always 
labours, and almost always succeeds. He strives hard to say 
the finest ·things in the world, and he does-say them .. 
In Milton, there is always an appearance of effort: in Shake-
speare, scarcely any" {v, 58). Milton's "intensity" is thus 
the emotion that surges from the concentrated, forceful power 
of his own mind; and this is Hazlitt's usual usage of the term 
in most contexts. 
From all this, then, we might think that "intensity" 
in one form or another is a necessary element of, gusto. But 
13see also x, 45, and especially x, 273, for other 
similar uses of "intensity"--in these instances in connection 
with Raphael's ability to capture the internal spirit of a 
subject. 
r 
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here, too, there are contradictions, even as there were when 
Hazlitt spoke of the elements of narrowed scope and the self-
less imagination. Thus, for example, in the "Life of Sir 
Joshua Reynolds" (1820) he says: "One great proof and beauty 
of works of true genius, is the ease, simplicity, and freedom 
from conscious effort which pervades them" (xvi, 188)--he then 
goes on to specify the particular artists he means ("Thus in 
painting, Raphael excelled in drawing, Titian in colouring, 
Rembrandt in chiaroscuro"), indicating that the "ease" he 
speaks of is a characteristic of the "gusto" artists. And 
"ease" and "freedom from conscious effort" are certainly not 
a characteristic of someone like Milton as described in "On 
Gusto" itself. In another similar passage, though, .he again 
specifies •:ease" rather than "intensity" as a characteristic 
of the "gusto" artists; writing in "Is Genius conscious of 
Its Powers" in 1826 he says: 
The greatest power operates unseen, and executes its ap-
pointed task with as little ostentation as difficulty •. 
• • It is only where our incapacity begins, that we begin 
to feel the obstacles, and to set an undue value on our 
triumph over ·them. Correggio, Michael Angelo, Rembrandt, 
did what they did without premeditation or effort--their 
works came from their minds a a natural birth. 
(xii, 118) 
"Gusto," then, is a very ambiguous term. And the 
problem of its definition is further complicated by Hazlitt's 
occasional use of it as a mere synonym for "enthusiasm," as 
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in a comment from Table-Talk in 1821 about surgeon John Hun-
ter: 11 He would have set about cutting up the carcase of a 
whale with the same greatness of gusto that Michael Angelo 
would have hewn a block of marble" (viii, 85). The term again 
means simply "enthusiasm" in the 1827 essay "Why Heroes of 
Romances are Insipid, 11 when it is used in reference to one 
of Godwin's characters: 11 The case is different in St. Leon. 
The author's resuscitated hero there quaffs joy, love, and 
immortality with a considerable gusto, and with appropriate 
manifestations of triumph" (xviii, 253). Such simple uses 
of the term, however, are rare in the Works. 
A consistent definition of 11 gusto 11 .simply cannot be 
offered, for Hazlitt himself did not always use the term with 
one meaning in· mind. As we have seen even in. "On Gusto" it-
self there are statements and examples which do not match with 
each other; and Hazlitt's thoughts on the subject are by no 
means confined to this one essay--further inconsistencies turn 
up as we trace "gusto" elsewhere. It is clear, though, that 
various of the essayist's usual oppositions are involved in 
his usage of the word. And one does get the sense that one 
particular combination of elements is most often intended--
though, again, this combination is by no means absolute. A 
statement from "On Genius and Common Sense" in 1821 comes 
r 
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closest to the mark; even though Hazlitt does not specifically 
use the word "gusto" in it, I believe that he has the same 
idea in mind when he writes: "It is not then the acuteness of 
organs or extent of capacity that constitutes rare genius or 
produces the most exquisite models of art, but an intense sym-
pathy with some ~ beauty or distinguishing characteristic 
in nature" (viii, 49). The latter part of this statement, with 
its combination of these italicized elements--if we add the 
qualification that "intense" connotes the capturing' of the 
organic inner principle of the object being portrayed, rather 
than its mere surface--gives us the best general definition of 
·"gusto." But we cannot dismiss the fact that important con-
tradictions can be found for every one of these key elements. 
We must simply realize that Hazlitt was inconsistent in his 
definition, exemplification, and usage of the word. We can 
take some comfort, though, in also recognizing that the various 
contradictions fall into familiar patterns. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE SPIRIT OF THE AGE 
"We must therefore work with the 
instruments that are allotted 
us; and no man 
the spirit 
in which 
(1828: 
can resist 
of the age 
he lives." 
xiv~ 132) 
The relative importance that Hazlitt attached to the 
opposite types of perception~-structured, filtered, or ego-
tistical vs. immediate or selfless; narrowed or channelled 
vs. universal and open; intense vs. tranquil--is not an easy 
matter to determine; this question, though, is of great im-
portance both to an understanding of Hazlitt's general thoughts 
· on life and art and to an assessment of his conception of the 
spirit o.f the age in which he. lived. It is certainly true, 
for instance, that running through his writings is a clear 
thread of admiration for figures who can lose themselves en-
tirely while being open to the subtlest influences of nature; 
and such admiration is frequently emphasized by a contrasting 
disapprobation for mannered, artificial, "abstract," or single-
minded artists and thinkers. This thread is evident in such 
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diverse contrasts as those of Shakespeare's plays vs. his son-
nets (iv, 358), Addison vs. Steele (vii, 99), Shakespeare vs. 
Beaumont and Fletcher (vi, 250), Mlle. Mars vs. Mme. Pasta 
(xii, 324f.), Raphael vs. Guido (xii, 284), Byron vs. Scott 
(xii, 319), and Scott vs. Rizzio (xviii, 350) to name but a 
few. One might be tempted to see Hazlitt's preferences as 
simply one-sided along these lines, especially since there 
are few contrasts when wide-ranging, selfless perception is 
criticized in relation to its opposite.· And when ~riticisrn 
of Shakespearean qualities is advanced, it is often concerned 
mainly with the point that too great a range of concern dis-
sipates a man's effectiveness; only by implication, often, is 
the frequently concomitant quality of selflessness looked at 
unfavorably. Nor, on such occasions, does Hazlitt usually 
criticize the selfless imagination with the vehemence he of-
ten reserves for the selfish. 
Still it is unwise to say simply that Hazlitt advo-
cated selfless perception as his ideal; the matter is more 
complex than this. As he wrote in 1828: 
Everything has its turn in this chequered scene of things, 
unless we prevent it from taking its turn by over-rigid 
conditions, or drive men to despair or the most callous 
effrontery, by erecting a standard of perfection, to which 
no one can conform in reality! 
(xvii, 347) 
Hazlitt recognized the danger--and, indeed, the impossibility--
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of demanding perfection from "a creature like man, whose 'very 
name is frailty,' and who is a compound of contradictions" 
(xvi, 406); as in "On Going a Journey," he could not blind 
himself to the fact that men naturally have limited, personally 
filtered vision. 1 And he had a variety of attitudes towards 
this reality of human nature--he by no means saw such limita-
tion, or egotism, or filtered perception of nature, or "ab-
straction" as always an undesirable thing. 
sometimes he saw it as engendering its own class of 
excellence, inferior to that springing from an immediate open-
ness to nature--but excellent nevertheless. Thus, for example, 
while he admires the truth to nature of Cervantes' QQE, Quixote, 
he still sees value--though not as much--in the "mannerism" 
of Le Sage's Gil Blas: "Gil Blas is, next to Don Quixote, more 
generally read and admired than any other novel--and, in one 
sense, deservedly so: for it is at the head of its class, 
though that class is very different from, and inferior to the 
other" (xvi, 10; also vi, 111-112). Similarly, in "On the 
Question of Whether Pope was a Poet" (xx, 89-92), Hazlitt views 
Pope as a limited poet of "art" who is thus inferior to a uni-
versal "poet of nature" like Shakespeare; however, the essay-
ist's main contention cannot be ignored: "The question whether 
1viii, 187-188; see also above, Chapter IV, pp. 96-98. 
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Pope was a poet, has hardly yet been settled, and is hardly 
worth settling; for if he was not a great poet, he must have 
been a great prose writer, that is, he was a great writer of 
some sort." And his idea here ties in with a comment from the 
Lectures ..2Q the English Poets, that the "artificial" poets are 
not far separated from the "natural": 
Dryden and Pope are the great masters of the artificial 
style of poetry in our language, as the poets of whom I 
have already treated, Chaucer, Spenser, Shakespeare, and 
Milton, were of the natural; and though this artificial 
style is generally and very justly acknowledged to be in-
ferior to the other, yet those who stand at the head of 
that class, ought, perhaps, to rank higher than those who 
occupy an inferior place in a superior class. They have 
a clear and independent claim upon our gratitude, as hav-
ing produced a kind and degree of excellence which ex-
isted equally nowhere else. What has been done well by. 
some later writers of the highest style of poetry, is 
included in, and obscured by a greater degree of power 
and genius in those before them: what has been done best 
by poets of an entirely distinct turn of mind, stands by 
itself, and tells for the whole amount. Young, for in-
stance, Gray or Akenside, only follow in the train of 
Milton and Shakespeare: Pope and Dryden walk by their 
side, though of an unequal stature, and are entitled to 
a first place in the lists of fame. 2 
(v, 68-69) 
Hazlitt's admiration of non-Shakespearean poets is also evi-
dent in his comments on Wordsworth; though he is a poet of 
"paradox~'" and such writers rank at the bottom of Hazlitt's 
2Hazlitt's characterization here of Milton as a poet 
of "nature" is atypical; cf. my ensuing discussion. 
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famous scale of poetry (v, 82), 3 he still receives high praise 
indeed (e.g., iv, 111-112, 115-116; v, 156; ix, 243; xi, 86~95; 
xii, 104). 
At other times, Hazlitt simply compares the opposite 
types of perception without expressing any preference, implying 
that equal value lies on either side. Thu.s Milton, who covered 
his poetry with "religious zeal" and who, like Dante, wrote 
with "a spirit of partisanship," and who was in all respects 
a "direct contrast" to Shakespeare (v, 56, 66) is given a 
rank with Shakespeare as one of the greatest poets of the 
language (v, 46). Similarly, the essayist says that "We are 
not going to give a preference" when he compares Moore and 
Byron (xvi, 4llf.), who again exemplify the opposite generic 
qualities. And often he simply describes someone as the "re-
verse" of someone else, again without expressing preference-.... 
e. g., Wordsworth ''is the reverse of Walter Scott in his de-
31 think we must be careful about placing too much 
emphasis on seeing this scale of poetry as a "constant" fac-
tor in Hazlitt's criticism; Hazlitt himself was not especially 
consistent in his use of it. Thus, for example, while he says 
that imaginative poetry of the time of Elizabeth ranks highest, 
he elsewhere recognizes great variety within the periods be-
fore the Caroline age (the next step down on the scale), as 
when he says, "the dramatic paradoxes of Beaumont and Fletcher 
are, to all appearance, tinctured with an infusion of personal 
vanity and laxity of principle" (vi, 250). This is a comment 
which he could just as easily apply to Wordsworth or Byron. 
Conversely, he says that Coleridge {who lived in the age of 
paradox) showed "'that fine madness •.• which our first poets 
had'" (viii, 183). 
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fects and excellences. He as all that the other wants, and 
wants all that the other possesses" (v, 156). The entire 
essay "On Going a Journey"--widely recognized as one of Haz-
litt's greatest--similarly concludes with a careful balance 
of the opposites (viii, 181-189). 
There are still other times when Hazlitt sees the nar-
row, egotistical, individual, or prejudiced viewpoint as a 
better or more appropriate stance than its opposite. Indeed, 
he sometimes sees success in life as springing from these 
qualities (e.g., xii, 197}, although the observation is often 
mixed with irony. In "On Pedantry," however, he positively 
relishes the feeling of intensity that comes from narrowing 
one's range of attention to a small circle (iv, 80-88}; in-
deed, in this essay he further says that "To take away the 
force of habit and prejudice entirely, is to strike at the 
root of our personal existence" (iv, 84). Elsewhere he cas....; 
tigates the politician Brougham for not appealing in his 
speeches to a "substratum of prejudice" (xvii, 8), for the 
orator consequently fails to move his audiences. Hazlitt 
again sees value in prejudice _(i.e., views whose value derives' 
from personal sources or accepted systems rather than from 
external nature or objective reality} in two of his greatest 
heroes, Rousseau and Godwin, whose "egotism" inspired the 
great ideals of individual liberty in the period of the French 
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Revolution. Furthermore, Hazlitt's biography of Napoleon, 
his greatest hero, is a tribute to the monumental individ-
ualism of the man who, in the essayist's view, protected and 
extended these ideals. And, too, the author or the Essay .Q.!J. 
the Principles of Human Action, which establishes a philo--
sophical basis for selflessness, is als.o the author of the 
"Project for a New Theory of Civil and Criminal Legislation," 
which theory is founded on a principle of self~interest (xix, 
302-320) . 4 
Hazlitt thus had a considerable range of attitudes 
about the importance and value of selflessness, openness to 
experience, and direct contact with nature as opposed to ego-
tism, prejudice, artificiality, systematization, and abstrac-
tion--all of which involve filtered or structured perception 
that substitutes personal values for those of external nature. 
One cannot simply say that he liked one stance and disliked 
the other--he saw positive value, and drawbacks, on both sides 
of the coin. It is true that his criticisms of filtered or 
narrowed perception are greater in number, and more vehement, 
than his criticisms of open selflessness; but the reason for 
4one of its tenets, for example, is that "self-love 
is a natural guarantee for our self-interest"; and its gen-
eral conclusion is: "It se~ms, then, that a system of just 
and useful laws may be constructed nearly, if not wholly, on 
the principle of the right of self-defence, or the security 
for person, libery, and property" (xix, 303, 319). 
166 
this is obvious. Hazlitt was not an ivory-tower intellectual 
but a front-rank critic in daily contact with the everyday 
people and attitudes of his time: he was thus constantly ex-
posed to ignorance, prejudice, and entrenched political con-
servatism which such journals as the Quarterly Review and 
Blackwood's Magazine used as a basis for attacking not only 
his aesthetics but his very person as well. His milieu was 
obviously more filled with narrow-mindedness and prejudice 
than with selflessness. To bring about a reasonable balance 
Hazlitt obviously had to attack filtered perception and ad-
vocate its opposite much more than to do the reverse; due to 
the circumstances, an imbalanced approach was necessary to 
bring about a balance of truth. And Hazlitt realized this. 
In 1828, for example, speaking of his own "paradoxical" 
writing he says: 
All abstract reasoning is in extremes, or only takes up 
one view of a question, or what is called the principle 
of the thing: and if you want to give this popularity 
and effect, you are in danger of running into extrava-
gance and hyperbole. I have had to bring out some ob-
scure distinction, or to combat some strong prejudice, 
and in doing this with all my might, may have often over-
shot the mark. It is easy to correct the excess of truth 
afterwards. I have been accused of inconsistency, for 
writing an essay, for instance, on the Advantages of 
Pedantry, and another, on the Ignorance of ~ Learned, 
as if ignorance had not its comforts as well as knowledge. 
(xvii, 312-313) 
This, of course, is in accord with his comment from 1819: 
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my love of paradox may, I think, be accounted for from 
the necessity of counteracting the obstinacy of prej-
udice. If I have been led to carry a remark too far, 
it was because others would not allow it to have any 
force at all. My object was to shew the latent opera-
tion of some unsuspected principle, and I therefore 
took only some one view of that particular subject. 
· (ix, 30) 5 
A typical example of Hazlitt's taking "one view" of a subject 
is his statement from "On the Spirit of Partisanship" (1821) 
that "There is nothing more contemptible than party-spirit 
in one point of view" {xvii, 35); it is obvious from his words 
that, even while condemning his subject, he realizes that he 
could take another viewpoint. 
Hazlitt'~ personal "ideal" approach to life and art 
was thus a mixture of perspectives, which, in toto, were cor-
rective to each other. Attractive as the open, innocent, or 
"existential" stance was to him, he realized that this alone 
does not constitute wisdom; rather, he saw it as a corrective 
to other valid sources of wisdom which are also necessary, 
and which are in turn corrective of the defects of openness. 
He was a realist, fully cognizant that no conception of hap-
piness was worthwhile which did not allow one to live in the 
world of everyday realities. Detached poetic ease is fine, 
he thought; but since one must also earn his daily bread in 
an imperfect world, one would do best not to neglect the sources 
5see above, Chapter III, p. 73. 
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of happiness that this world, too, extends to the perceptive 
man. His mixture of perspectives thus allowed him to maximize 
the potential for satisfaction within the ultimately inescap-
able parameters of everyday human life. 
An example of Hazlitt's ideal mixture is found in his 
description of Neufchatel in Notes of a Journey through France 
and Italy (1826): 
This kind of retreat, where there is nothing to surprise, 
nothing to disgust, nothing to draw.the attention out of 
itself, uniting the advantages of society and solitude, 
of simplicity and elegance, and where the mind can indulge 
in a sort of habitual and self-centered satisfaction, is 
the only one which I should never feel a wish to quit. 
The golden mean is, indeed, an exact description of the 
mode of life I should like to lead--of the style I should 
like to write • • • . 
{x, 297) 
Introversion vs. extroversion, simplicity vs. art--the elements 
are found throughout.the essayist's works. And Hazlitt saw 
a similar golden mean in the person of Charles Lamb, his only 
life-long close friend, of whom he says (in The Spirit of the 
Age): he "occupies that nice point between egotism and dis-
interested humanity" (xi, 180); Hazlitt's admiration for him 
was thus very deep indeed. 6 
6uazlitt believed at times that Lamb's imagination 
filtered his perception, as in "On Going a Journey" (1822; 
cf. above, Chapter IV, p. 87}; he also believed, at other 
times, that it entirely removed the filters of self from his 
outlook, as noted, for example, in a comment from "Character 
of the Country People" on Lamb making himself an object of 
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Seeing Hazlitt's ideal as one of mixed perspectives 
needs particular emphasis at the present time because there 
is apparently an incipient blind spot about this matter in 
recent criticism. W.P. Ablrecht, for example, writes that 
"Politically as well as aesthetically, [Hazlitt] urges dis-
interestedness: the sympathetic identification that is 
needed for imaginative fulfillment. 117 I agree with this 
statement, as far as it goes; but it is not the whole truth--
the other side of the coin needs more emphasis. Similarly, 
Roy Park, who calls Hazlitt "the most outspoken and consis-
tent English critic of abstraction in the early nineteenth 
century, 11 8 writes that "For Hazlitt, the presence of the self 
blurred the essential openness characteristic of his experi-
ental or "pluralist' viewpoint, and man's capacity for experi-
encing morally the reality or significance of human life was 
so much the more diminished."9 He also states that "The 
artist, for Hazlitt, is characterized by an openness to the 
whole of experience in all its complexity and variety as a 
laughter: " • • • the abstract idea of the jest of the 
thing prevailing in his mind (as it always does) over the 
sense of personal dignity" (1819: . xvii, 66-67). 
?Hazlitt and the Creative Imagination, p. 148. 
8Hazlitt and the Spirit of the Age, p. 77. 
9rbid., p. 59. 
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result of his greater sensitivity of feeling."10 Park's 
perception of Hazlitt's admiration of Shakespearean qual-
ities is clear enough; however, he does not clearly see the 
positive value which Hazlitt attached to the other type of 
artistic stance. For example, after discussing Hazlitt's 
views of Milton, Spenser, and Montaigne, he says that "tHaz-
litt'sJ criticism of Montaigne is important for a number of 
reasons. Its open hostility to abstraction is entirely 
characteristic. The deference shown to Spenser and Milton 
in spite of their abstraction is thus exceptional. 1111 I hope 
I have sufficiently shown by now that Hazlitt's opposition to 
abstraction is not "entirely" characteristic, and that it is 
certainly not consistent. Furthermore, Park's statement con-
tains.a misleading implication--Hazlitt liked Milton not in 
spite of his filtered perception but rather precisely because 
of it. Milton was not an "exception" to the rule; rather, he 
simply accorded with another, opposite rule.12 Hazlitt did 
lOibid., p. 109. 
llibid., p. 173. 
12In this regard it is ·interesting that Northcote 
says, in Conversation the Tenth (1830: xi, 246), that "There 
is a faculty that enlarges and beautifies objects, even beyond 
nature. It is for this reason that we must, reluctantly per-
haps, give the preference' to Milton over Shakespeare." Haz-
litt does not disagree; indeed, it is possible that he is 
using Northcote here as a mouthpiece for his own opinions, as 
he does elsewhere in the conversations. 
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not have merely one standard of excellence. A blind spot 
similar to that in Park's criticism is noticeable, too, in 
Herschel Baker's failure to understand Hazlitt's admiration 
of the "stiff and formal" John Kernble. 13 Again, these are 
precisely the qualities that caused him to admire the actor. 
This blind spot extends, too, into various assessments 
of The .Spirit of the A9e itself. G.D. Klingopulous, for ex-
ample, offers an overly simple commentary: 
Few works of criticism illustrate as vividly as does The· 
Spirit of the Age those extra-literary considerations 
which should help to form a critic's awareness of his 
own times. Hazlitt is concerned to show that rational-
ists such as Bentham and Godwin had much to learn about 
induction from the intuitive poets. It was the poets 
who were concrete, the rationalists who were abstract.14 
There is an implication here that Hazlitt saw Godwin's ration-
alism as something which prevented him from making a vital con-
tribution to the age; but this is not true. W.P. Albrecht, in 
his review of Park's book, also emphasizes only the negative 
aspect of Hazlitt's thoughts on narrowness and filtered per-
ception: 11 [Hazlittl relies on dramatic particulars to show 
how narrow rationalism, transcendental systems, class prej-
udice, or other forms of 'egotism'--enforced by external pres-
13see above, Chapter IV, pp. 102-103. 
14 11 The Spirit of the Age in Prose, 11 in A Guide to 
English Literature, Vol. V: From Blake to Byron (London: 
Cassell & Company, Ltd., 1962), p. 151. 
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sures--blocked the imagination and prevented able men from ful-
filling their powers. 11 15 Albrecht elsewhere says that "Haz-
litt, like Arnold, believed that his age and its represent-
ative men were the victims of abstraction 11 ; 16 and Park says 
that this abstraction is "the greatest vice of the age. 1117 
I cannot disagree with such statements that note Hazlitt's 
condemnation of abstraction; I can point out, however, that 
the essayist's idea of the Spirit of the Age was more complex 
than this, and that it involved a mixture of perspectives--
which saw value on both sides--analogous to the ~atterns that 
characterize his work as a whole. His criticisms of the 
figures in Spirit imply two sets of standards, not one. But 
before we insist on any conclusions, let us look at the evi-
dence within Hazlitt's great work itself. 
How does Hazlitt himself define the Spirit of the Age? 
Many references within the book do indeed see this Spirit as 
one of undesirable abstraction, prejudice, and filtered per-
ception. In the essay on "William Godwin, 11 for example, Haz-
litt notes_ that "The Spirit of the Age was never more fully 
15 11 Ralph M. Wardle, Hazlitt (Univ. of Nebraska, 1971} 
and Roy Park, Hazlitt and the Spirit of the Age {Oxford, 1971): 
A Review, 11 Wordsworth circle, III, 2 (Spring, 1972}, 109. 
16Hazlitt and the Creative Imagination, p. 61. 
17Hazlitt and the Spirit of the Age, p. 202. 
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shown than in its treatment of this writer--its love of para-
dox and change, its dastard submission to prejudice and to 
the fas ion of the day" (xi, 16) • In "Mr. Coleridge," he 
characterizes the age as one of "besotted prejudice and loath-
some power" (xi, 34). He concludes his essay on Horne Tooke 
with "a curious example of the Spirit of the Age," that Lind-
ley Murray's Grammar, which he viewed as hopelessly conserva-
tive and traditional (even to the point of "blindness and ob-
stinacy"), was in much greater demand than Tooke's Diversions 
of Purley, which offered a "geniuine anatomy of our native 
tongue" (xi, 56-57). Because he was "not subject to prejudice," 
Tooke threw aside the "veil" of custom that covered language, 
and "penetrated to the naked truth of things" (xi, 54)--but 
this caused his work to be rejected by the "prejudice and party-
spirit" of the age. The undesirable abstraction of the times 
is again implied in Hazlitt •·s critic ism of Byron, that he 
"panders to the spirit of the age, and goes to the very edge 
of extreme and licentious speculation" (xi, 76); as the essayist 
explains a few sentences later: 
In a word, we think that poetry moves best within the 
circle of nature and received opinion: speculative the-
ory and subtle casuistry are forbidden ground to it." 
But Lord Byron often wanders into this ground wantonly, 
wilfully, and unwarrantably •••• The strength of his 
imagination leads him to indulge in fantastic opinions; 
the elevation of his rank sets censure at defiance. He 
becomes a pampered egotist. 
174 
Byron thus covers over nature with his own egotistical "spec-
ulative theory." Hazlitt points out the problem again in 
the essay on "Mr. Canning," in which he says that the "Genius 
of the Age" is one "in which words have obtained a mastery 
over things" (xi, 157)--once more suggesting the dominance, 
and undesirability, of mental structures which block the 
direct perception of nature.18 
If we follow this line alone, then, we might conclude 
that Hazlitt viewed the Spirit of the Age as simply one of 
abstraction, which he viewed as totally undesirable. 
But there are also other remarks which indicate that 
Hazlitt had another view of the age. Sometimes he suggests 
that the times were characterized by a surge of human aware-
ness that broke through the prejudice. The Spirit of the Age, 
from this point of view, is one of a struggle to escape from 
prejudice or artificiality, rather than one of submission to 
it. In "Mr. Coleridge," for example, Hazlitt says that "The 
spirit of monarchy was at variance with the spirit of the age" 
(xi, 37); thus,.the spirit here is not abstraction but rather 
"the flame of liberty" struggling to overcome abstraction (as 
18In a London Magazine essay of 1820, too, Hazlitt 
makes a case that "a bias to abstraction is evidently, then, 
the reigning spirit of the age" (xviii, 305) in order to ex-
plain why his contemporaries were producing no good dramatic 
poetry. 
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represented by monarchy). A similar positive view of the ten-
dency of the age is noticeable in a criticism of Scott: "it 
is thus he administers charms and philtres to our love of 
Legitimacy, makes us conceive a horror of· all reform,· civil, 
political, or religious, and would fain put down the Spirit 
of the Age" (xi, 66). The views expressed in the opening 
paragraphs of "Mr. Wordsworth" (xi, 86-87) also present the 
age as marked by the surge of the "natural" as opposed to the 
"artificial." Here, Wordsworth is uncharacteristically de-
scribed as a poet whose eye is "ever.fixed on the face of 
nature" rather than on himself; and the poet's concern for 
nature is what Hazlitt means to imply when he says that "Mr. 
Wordsworth's genius is a pure emanation of the Spirit of the 
Age. 11 At the end of the same paragraph, and the beginning of 
the next, he again shows that, here, he sees Wordsworth's 
poetry as in accord with the movement of the age in brea~ing 
through filtered perception: 
In a wordi his poetry is founded on setting up an oppo-
sition (and pushing it to the utmost length) between th~ 
natural and the artificial; between the spirit of human-
ity, and the spirit of fashion and of the world! 
It is one of the innovations of the time. It partakes 
of, and is carried along with the revolutionary movement 
of the age; the political changes of the day were the 
model on which he formed and conducted his poetical exper-
iments. 
In the essay on "Mr. Jeffrey," he says that the "talent" be-
hind the Edinburgh Review is "characteristic of the Spirit of 
! 
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the Age" (xi, 127); and Jeffrey, its editor, "has a great 
range of knowledge," "is neither a bigot nor an enthusiast," 
and "is not wedded to any dogma" (xi, 130). And in opposition 
to the Spirit of the Age is William Gifford's journal ("it 
is the express object of the Quarterly Review to discounten-
ance and extinguish that spirit, both in theory and practice") 
which is marked by "prejudice" and servile acceptance of "au-
thority" (xi, 127, 128) . 
There is thus another line in the book which sees the 
Spirit of the Age not as abstraction but rather as its oppo-
site. However, in either of these lines of opinion Hazlitt 
still sees narrowed, structured, or filtered perception as a 
vice. We must therefore look more closely at his opinions 
on this particular subject. 
In the essay on "Lord Byron," he contrasts the oppo-
site types of artists (the other being exemplified by Scott) 
and concludes with a "decided preference given to Sir Walter 
Scott over Lord Byron" (xi, 71-72). He says of the former 
that he "draws aside the curtain, and the veil of egotism is 
rent • • In this point of view, the Author of Waverley is 
one of the greatest teachers of morality that ever lived, by 
emancipating the mind from petty, narrow, and bigotted preju-
dices." Note, though, that Hazlitt specifies "In this point 
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of view," which shows his conscious awareness that he recog-
nized, and could assume if he chose to, the opposite point 
of view about Scott--which he in fact does in the essay on 
"William Godwin" (xi, 24-25). In this essay, Hazlitt's ranking 
of the opposite types is reversed: Godwin is praised for the 
Byron-like characteristics of intensity, narrowness, and ego-
tism while Scott is criticized in comparison for lacking these 
qualities.19 
The essay on "Mr. Brougham--Sir F. Burdett" furnishes 
another example of Hazlitt implying a qualification on his 
preference for unstructured over structured awareness. In 
his comparison of Irish vs. Scotch eloquence, he says that 
"The first of these is entirely the offspring of impulse: 
the last of mechanism" (xi, 134). A page later, he concludes: 
Upon the whole, we despair less of the first than of the 
last, for the principle of life and motion is, after all, 
the primary condition of all genius. The luxuriant wild-
ness of the one may be disciplined, and its excesses so-
bered down into reason; but the dry and rigid formality 
of the other can never burst the shell or husk of oratory. 
Hazlitt's preference here is clear; however, his phraseology 
("we despair less . • • ") indicates that he sees faults on 
both sides. It also indicates that "discipline" and "reason"--
19see above, Chapter III, pp. 68-69. Note also that 
in this essay Godwin is cited for having "rendered an essen-
tial service to moral science" (xi, 23). One need not tear 
aside a "ve:i,l" to be a moralist. 
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implying formality--have positive aspects. 
In the essay on Coleridge, as mentioned above, Hazlitt 
characterizes the Spirit of the Age as a war between "the flame 
of liberty" and "Legitimacy." In the same passage {xi, 37) 
he rephrases the opposition as one between "reason" and "power. 11 
A similar opposition is used in the essay on Scott, where Scott, 
the political tool of the cause of Legitimacy, is contrasted to 
poets or philosophers, heroes or sages, inventors of arts 
or sciences, patriots, benefactors of the human race, en-
lighteners and civilizers of the world, who have (so far) 
reduced opinion to reason, and power to law, who are the 
cause that we no longer burn witches and heretics at slow 
fires, • • • • 
{xi, 66-67) 
"Reason" and "law, 11 implying the formality of logical and legal 
structures, are thus very positive, healthy forces in the age. 
Indeed, at another point in "Mr. Coleridge," Hazlitt opposes 
"the yearnings of humanity and the dictates of reason 11 to 
"besotted prejudice and loathsome power" (xi, 34) •. Not all 
structured perception--such as ~eason--is bad, therefore. 
Indeed, in "On the Pleasure of Hating" from 1826 Hazlitt char-
acterizes "the spirit of the age" itself as "the progress of 
intellectual refinement, warring with our natural infirmities" 
' 
(xii, 128-129); and since he believed that only "mechanical" 
arts were capable of "progress" and "refinement, 11 20 he is 
20see, for example, 11Why the Arts are Not Progressive 11 
(iv, 160-164; xviii, 5-10.) 
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referring here to the advancement of reason and law--which 
he sees as eminently desirable. 
"Mr. Coleridge" also contains an extended comparison 
of that writer and William Godwin (xi, 35f.). _These two men, 
of course, exemplify the opposite generic qualities. And 
though Hazlitt does not specifically express a preference 
here, one thing, at least, is clear: Godwin's limited scope 
enabled him to produce definite results; Coleridge's univer-
sal mind, however, lost its practical effectiveness by being 
"the sport of every breath, dancing to every wave .• " The "de-
cided preference" given to Scott over Byron is thus not found 
in a similar comparison of their intellectual brethren. In-
deed, in speaking of Scott himself elsewhere in The Spirit of 
the Age, Hazlitt notes with telling irony (xi, 67-68) that 
his enlarged scope of mind and openness to nature were com-
pletely ineffectual in shaping his own morality. 
The essayist's admiration for minds "of the greatest 
capacity" or "of the greatest genius" was thus not always 
without serious qualification. Coleridge needed limitation; 
Scott could have profited from more reason. Hazlitt realized 
the danger of an unrealistically one-sided standard of per-
fection; he thus saw the need for a corrective mixture of 
counter-balancing qualities even in two of the men who held 
out the most promise for correcting the excesses of an overly 
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prejudiced age. It is true that the major emphasis in The 
Spirit of the Age is on calling for more of their Shakespear-
ean type of awareness to enlighten the age; indeed, Jeffrey, 
who also manifests such perception, receives very little crit-
icism. And Hazlitt's highly laudatory sketch of Knowles, who 
"instinctively obeys the impulses of natural feeling" (xi, 183), 
closes the book, thus lending a strong final emphasis to the 
essayist's call for his type of natural wisdom. However, again, 
Hazlitt's advocacy of this unfiltered perception and openness 
to nature is made within a context; as he said in 1828, "We 
must therefore work with the instruments that are allotted us; 
and no man can resist the spirit of the age in which he lives" 
(xiv, 132). He thus calls for openness to nature as a cor-
rective to other types of perception which are also necessary. 
Bentham, for example, is criticized in The Spirit_of the Age 
for not taking account of and appealing to human prejudices 
(xi, 8, 11). And Godwin is praised because his intense, single-
minded pursuit of reason has made a definite contribution to 
moral science (xi, 23); but he' is also criticized, like Ben-
tham, for neglecting "the gross and narrow ties of sense, 
custom, authority, private and local attachment'' (xi, 18-19). 
Scott and Coleridge are criticized for defects already men-
tioned. Mackintosh, like Coleridge, has so great a range of 
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knowledge that his effectiveness is dissipated (xi, 97). And 
Hazlitt levels a similar criticism at Wilberforce: 
By aiming at too much, he has spoiled all, and neutralised 
what might have been an estimable character, distinguished 
by signal services to mankind. A man must take his choice 
not only between virtue and vice, but between different 
virtues. Otherwise, he will not gain his own approbation, 
or secure the respect of others. The graces and accomplish-
ments of private life mar the man of business and the 
statesman •.•. It is best to choose and act up to some 
leading character, as it is best to have some settled pro-
fession or regular pursuit in life. 
(xi, 147) 
This criticism is particularly significant because of the gen-
eralizations which Hazlitt draws from the specific example of 
one man: and the generalizations show that he saw limitation 
as a necessary and desirable virtue. He again sees positive 
value in partisanship in the essay on "Mr. Canning," when, 
in criticizing this member of Parliament, he says, "A wise 
man would have some settled opinion, a good man would wish 
well to some cause, a modest man would be afraid to act with-
out feeling sure of his ground, or to show an utter disregard 
for right or wrong" (xi, 154) • 21 He levels a similar criticism 
against Cobbett, in an essay which he added to the Paris and 
second English editions of Spirit: "He changes his opinions as 
21This, incidentally, forms a very strong contrast to 
Keats's famous formulation of negative capability, a condition 
in which. "man is capable of being in uncertainties, Mysteries, 
doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and reason"--
Letters of John Keats, 1814-1821, ed. by H.E. Rollins (2 vols.; 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1958), II, 
193. 
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he does his friends, and much on the same account. He has 
no comfort in fixed principles" (viii, 55);22 again, the 
desirability of fixed or structured thought is implied. In 
a passage which is most significant Hazlitt also finds posi-
tive "strength" in Wordsworth's "weakness": 
The current of his feelings is deep, but narrow; the 
range of his understanding is lofty and aspiring rather 
than discursive. The force, the originality, the abso-
lute truth and identity with which he feels some things, 
makes him indifferent to so many others. The simplicity 
and enthusiasm of his feelings, with respect to nature, 
renders him bigotted and intolerant in his judgments of 
men and things. But it happens to him, as to others, that 
his strength lies in his weakness; and perhaps we have no 
right to complain. We might get rid of the cynic and the 
egotist, and find in his stead a commonplace man. We 
should ;take the good the Gods provide us': a fine and 
original vein of poetry is not one of their most contempt~ 
ible gifts, and the rest is scarcely worth thinking of, 
except as it may be a mortification to those who expect 
perfection from human nature; or who have been idle 
enough at some period of their lives, to deify men of 
genius as possessing claims above it. But this is a chord 
that jars, and we shall not dwell upon it. 
(xi, 94) 
2 2Elsewhere in this same essay (viii, 50-59) Hazlitt 
sees Cobbett's 11 egotism11 as "delightful." But he also criti-
cizes him because he "sees through the medium of heat and 
passion, not with reference to any general principles." Be-
cause of his "want of all rule and method" and because "his 
notions are free and unencumbered" he writes with "outrageous 
inconsistency" and "headstrong fickleness." A few sentences 
later, however, Hazlitt finds much value in what he has just 
criticized: "His shifting his point of view from time to time 
not merely adds variety and greater compass to his topics • 
but it gives a greater zest and liveliness to his manner of 
treating them." This and the ensuing remarks might just as 
well be applied to Hazlitt himself; the essay on Cobbett shows 
several shifts of his own viewpoint around his customary con-
cerns. 
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This cord 11 jars, 11 of course, precisely because Hazlitt recog-
nizes himself as one of those "idle" critics who had sometimes 
. . t d t t 1 1 t d d f f t. 23 1ns1s e oo s rong y on on y one s an ar o per ec ion. 
The combined particulars of The Spirit of the Age, though, 
show a more mature judgment and balanced perspective. While 
Hazlitt stresses openness to nature throughout the book, he 
advocates this perspective only as a corrective to, rather 
than a replacement for, perspectives of narrowed, filtered, 
and structured vision, which he sees as necessary to balance 
openness. The final mixture of perspectives, then, produces 
a range and depth of satisfaction which could not be attained 
by any one perspective alone. 
Hazlitt's greatest production, then, mirrors the. pat-
terns that characterize his work as a whole. The dual streams 
of imagination, selfless and selfish, which flow out of his 
earliest work in 1805, have, by 1825, swollen into wider and 
deeper rivers that bring life to vast tracts of thought and 
experience in his writings as a whole. And no matter which 
direction Hazlitt's imagination takes, all of his writings, 
critical and personal, are touched by passion and feeling--
23 see also Chapter II, above, pp. 29-30, for an analy-
sis of another relevant and important passage from The Spirit 
of. the Age. Cf., too, the passage quoted at the top of p. 35, 
also from Spirit. 
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his essays.spring as much from his heart as from his intel-
lect, and they have an unmistakeable depth and resonance as 
a result. The wise tranquility of openness to nature is 
something that we ourselves feel in his writing, be it in a 
description of Shakespeare's fated lovers, or in a memory of 
the unbounded prospects of youth, or in a roadside reverie 
on an April morning in Wales. So, too, the excited individ-
ualism that sprang from a tradition of Dissent, mellowing into 
a relish for every possible form of intense individuality, is 
brought home to us in a lively disquistion on the joys of 
pedantry, or in an incomparable portrait of Elia haunting the 
nooks and crannies of Romantic London, or in rapt appreciations 
of any unmatchable skill from Burke's oratory to Cavanagh's 
handball-playing. Hazlitt himself exemplified gusto as well 
as any artist he wrote of. His 'total immersion in life is 
perhaps his outstanding characteristic, for he experienced 
life, his subject, and recreated it in his writings with the 
combined qualities of poet, painter, critic, and philosopher, 
always trying to maximize the possibilities of human satis-
faction in the everyday world that all men must face. He was 
one of the great humanists of his age; and for range, variety, 
and depth of telling insight into the condition of man _there 
are few experiences in the scope of English literature com-
parable to the reading of Hazlitt's collected Works. 
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